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Don't tell me that the rich don't know, 
Sooner or later it all comes down to money.
-Bruce Springsteen
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ABSTRACT
The focus of this dissertation is campaign spending in congressional elections. I 
examine the benefits that candidates receive from campaign expenditures. I think that 
challengers receive greater benefits from spending than incumbents, but that the extent 
of these benefits depends on the type of challenger. High-quality challengers are those 
that have previous experience in an important elective office, while low-quality 
challengers lack this experience.
Because of this experience, high-quality challengers enjoy a higher level of 
recognition among the electorate than low-quality challengers. 1 think that the benefits 
that challengers receive from expenditures are inversely related to the level of 
recognition that voters have of these challengers, so that low-quality challengers should 
receive greater benefits from spending than high-quality challengers. 1 call this the 
voter recognition theory.
The voter recognition theory applies equally well to elections for the House and 
Senate. Incumbents from both chambers maintain high levels of recognition among the 
electorate, so the difference in spending benefits between incumbents and challengers is 
determined by the quality of challengers. The Senate is the more prestigious of the two 
chambers. Consequently, 1 think that Senate elections attract more high-quality 
challengers than House elections. Low-quality challengers should receive much higher 
benefits than incumbents, while high-quality challengers should receive benefits that 
are roughly equal to incumbents. Thus, I think that the difference in spending benefits 
between incumbents and challengers is smaller in Senate elections than in House 
elections.
In order to test these assumptions, I collect data for House and Senate elections 
from 1974 to 1994. Besides the main variables of interest-candidate spending and 
challenger political quality-I examine other relevant variables, such as party
x
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identification, incumbent controversy, challenger celebrity, and state unemployment 
level. My analysis of these variables includes descriptive statistics and multiple 
regression.
Virtually all o f the results support my key assumptions. The difference in 
spending benefits between incumbents and challengers is smaller in Senate elections 
because these elections have more high-quality challengers. Several interesting areas 
are available for future research, and the voter recognition theory provides a valid 
framework within which to conduct this research.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
If you close your eyes and try hard enough, you can imagine the nation's elected 
officials standing shoulder-to-shoulder and singing this line in glorious unison in front 
of the United States Capitol. The importance of money in elections, especially those 
for national office, has become one of the undisputed truisms of American politics over 
the past two decades. While political scientists often dispute the traditional wisdom 
emanating from the vestibules of power, the case of campaign spending provides an 
instance where the scholarly evidence seems to support the "real world" assumptions. 
Numerous studies have shown that campaign expenditures have both a direct and an 
indirect impact on the actual vote in legislative elections.
This impact is available to incumbents and challengers, to Democrats and 
Republicans, and to candidates for the House of Representatives and the Senate. The 
inclusive nature of money's influence has caused all serious candidates to respond to its 
siren call. Candidates who allow that call to go unheeded risk exposing themselves to 
opponents who have not. Candidates feel an urgent need to maintain an approximate 
parity with their opponents in order to sustain their own campaigns and present 
themselves as viable candidates.
This environment of financial brinkmanship seems to mirror the international 
security dilemma of an upwardly spiraling arms race (Sorauf, 1988). A huge 
discrepancy in campaign war chests leads to a perceived instability in the contest 
Candidates who are disadvantaged make a concerted effort to match their opponents' 
level of spending in order to achieve balance in the contest. Of course, this aggressive 
proliferation of campaign funds will be viewed by the previously advantaged candidates 
as a threat to their electoral security, so that they must also increase their funds. This
1
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pattern of escalation continues unabated. Unlike the international arena, however, the 
domestic electoral system provides for a peaceful end-game known as an election.
With almost all candidates increasingly relying on huge inflows of cash in order 
to wage competitive campaigns, the overall cost of running for office has naturally 
increased. The average cost per candidate for a House campaign in 1978 was $109,440, 
while in 1998 that figure jumped to $472,468. The average cost per candidate for a 
Senate campaign has rocketed from $951,405 in 1978 to $3.48 million in 1998. As 
mentioned above, both parties have exhibited these increases. House Democrats went 
from spending an average of $108,986 in 1978 to $426,974 in 1998; House 
Republicans went from $109,995 in 1978 to $517,730 in 1998. In the upper chamber, 
Democratic candidates spent an average of $762,831 in 1978 and $3.30 million in 
1998; Republicans went from $1.15 million in 1978 to $3.67 million in 1998 (Omstein, 
Mann, and Malbin, 1996: 81 & 85). * The explosion of campaign costs and its related 
consequences concern both scholars and politicians.
THE RISING COST OF CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS
Explanations
There are three plausible reasons why costs have increased over the past two 
decades. The first, and simplest, explanation is that candidates have more people that 
they must try to contact today than in the past, 'rhe population size of their geographic 
constituencies (Fenno, 1979) has gotten larger.
This is especially apparent in the House o f Representatives. When Congress 
passed legislation in 1911 fixing the number of seats in the House at 435, it guaranteed 
that a burgeoning national population would translate into larger district populations, 
since more seats could not be added to keep the representative-to-people ratio fairly 
low. As a result, the mean population in congressional districts has steadily increased 
through the years. In 1910, the mean population was 212,019; in 1950, it was 347,875;
2
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by 1980 it had increased to 520,794; as o f2000, it stands at 626,875 people. This 
increase in the size of legislative constituencies necessarily places greater financial 
burdens on House members and senators when they try to reach those constituents in a 
campaign.
This leads to the second explanation for increased costs. A primary medium 
that candidates use to reach vast numbers of people is television. Television advertising 
has become a staple o f most congressional campaigns and virtually all senate 
campaigns. A large number of observers, including politicians, point to this as a reason 
for escalating campaign costs. Many candidates believe that getting their messages out 
on the airwaves is the most efficient means of communication with voters, particularly 
in sizable districts of states where personal contact with a significant number of voters 
is impossible (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984:120). Even when television ads might 
not be very efficient, such as in districts in large metropolitan areas, many candidates 
still perceive the need to resort to this tactic. The feeling that television advertising is 
essential regardless of price is an important force in driving up costs (Jacobson, 1992: 
83).
One must be careful, though, not to overstate the culpability of television for 
this situation. While electronic media advertising is the single most expensive 
expenditure in campaigns, it does not comprise anywhere near the percentage of total 
campaign spending claimed by some observers. For instance, in 1990 House races only
19.5 percent of the total budget was allocated for television, while in 1990 Senate races 
that figure was 32.6 percent (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). These figures clash sharply with 
the conventional wisdom, supported by some research findings, that campaigns devote 
well over half of their total expenditures to television advertising. -
A study published in September 1990 by the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) set the level of spending on broadcast advertising at 39.5 percent for House races
3
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Table 1.1 Breakdown of Campaign Expenditures for 1990 House Races
Major Category Incumbents Challengers
Overhead $108,049 $36,614
(27.68) (27.48)






Constituent Gifts/ $6,741 $21
Entertainment (1.73) (.02)
Donations to Parties $26,492 $299
& Other Candidates (6.79) (.22)
Other Campaign $66,929 $34,964
Activity (17.14) (26.24)
Unitemized Expenses $14,243 $4,406
(3.65) (3.31)
Total Expenditures $390,387 $133,231
(100.00) (100.00)
Note: Dollar figures are averages. Percentages are in parentheses. Totals are for the 
entire two-year cycle.
* Advertising is further disaggregated into electronic media ($76,109-19.50%) and 
other media such as radio and newspapers ($11,594—2.97%).
Source: Gold-Plated Politics by Sara Fritz and Dwight Morris (pgs. 14-15 & 18-19).
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Table 1.2 Breakdown of Campaign Expenditures for 1990 Senate Races
Major Categories Incumbents Challengers
Overhead $964,194 $443,188
(23.51) (26.28)






Constituent Gifts/ $30,038 $649
Entertainment (-73) (.04)
Donations to Parties $60,008 $2,847
& Other Candidates (1.46) (.17)
Other Campaign $244,721 $152,888
Activity (5.97) (9.06)
Unitemized Expenses $39,597 $20,906
(.97) (1.24)
Total Expenditures $4,101,338 $1,686,616
(100.00) (100.00)
Note: Dollar figures are averages. Percentages are in parentheses. Totals are for the 
entire six-year cycle.
* Advertising is further disaggregated into electronic media (51,336,206—32.58%) and 
other media such as radio and newspapers ($29,166—.71%).
Source: Gold-Plated Politics by Sara Fritz and Dwight Morris (pgs. 16-17 & 20-21).
5
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and 53.5 percent for Senate races. The CRS is a respected branch of the Library of 
Congress that provides members of Congress and committees with information. The 
skewed nature of the information in this report could be attributed to the methodology 
employed. The findings were based on questionnaires filled out by major party 
candidates in competitive races in the 1988 election.^
The information contained in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 is the result of an exhaustive 
analysis of all 437,753 separate expenditures reported to the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) by 972 candidates who sought congressional office in 1990. Sara 
Fritz and Dwight Morris, two reporters for the Los Angeles Times, placed each of these 
expenditures into 1 of 220 different categories, using interviews with campaign officials 
and consultants to clarify any ambiguities. The results show that the conventional 
wisdom has been "wildly exaggerated" (Fritz and Morris, 1992: 125).
So while television is certainly one cause of increased costs, it is by no means 
the primary cause. This calls into question the logic of those who claim that a reduction 
in television advertising rates will lead to a reduction in campaign spending, and thus a 
lessening of the insatiable appetite for money. As Fritz and Morris (1992: 126) write,
Television discounts undoubtedly would help to lower campaign costs....But it 
probably would not create the huge windfall anticipated by some proponents of 
cut-rate media. Nor would it necessarily bring down overall campaign costs.
On the contrary, if broadcast costs were lowered, members of Congress would 
probably invest the savings either in buying more television time or in building 
a stronger, more elaborate permanent campaign organization.
That last phrase points to the third, and perhaps paramount, explanation for 
increased costs. The candidate-centered nature of modem congressional campaigns has 
contributed to the increased role of money. There have been numerous studies pointing 
to the decline of parties and the rise of personal organizations as sources of influence in
6
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campaigns (Abramowitz, 1980; Fiorina, 1981; Hinckley, 1980; McAdams and 
Johannes, 1983; Mann and Wolfinger, 1980; Wattenberg, 1994). As Cain, Ferejohn, 
and Fiorina (1987:10) note,
...the activities and characteristics of the candidates have increased in 
significance in recent years....And they [incumbents] are better known and more 
favorably evaluated because, among other factors, they bombard constituents 
with missives containing a predominance of favorable material, maintain 
extensive district office operations to service their constituencies, use modem 
technology to target groups of constituents with particular policy interests, and 
vastly outspend their opponents.
While the above quote focuses on the activities of incumbents, challengers have 
also learned how to cultivate supporters by focusing on their own personal 
characteristics. Should they gain office, they are then more comfortable using the 
aforementioned activities to keep these supporters. This personal constituency must be 
nurtured, and politicians find that a green thumb is as important to ensuring a healthy 
constituency as it is to ensuring a healthy garden. Since the traditional party apparatus 
that could help link candidate to constituency through organizational structures—as well 
as keep that constituency loyal through the use of patronage-has partly eroded, 
candidates are often left to their own devices in maintaining an electoral coalition. This 
increases candidates' need for money.
This need for campaign funds to maintain a personal fiefdom has precipitated 
the rise of another phenomenon: the permanent campaign. There are no longer clearly 
delineated lines between campaign periods and governing periods. The candidate- 
centered organization requires that elected officials constantly pursue the financial 
means with which to keep that organization viable; they have no one to rely on but 
themselves. The incessant fund-raising combined with coalition-maintenance duties 
places officials in constant campaign mode. In the House, this condition is even further 
exacerbated by the paltry length of time between elections. All o f the above leads to a
7
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prevailing view that one must stay on the campaign trail in order to ensure reelection.
So if for no other reason, the sheer length of the permanent campaign will heighten 
costs.
Consequences
The rising cost of congressional campaigns is not an abstract phenomenon, but 
has concrete implications for those who practice the daily art of democracy. Public 
officials, and those who assist them, must face the realities of a system in which money 
has assumed a leading role. For quite a few, this reality is not very pleasant. The 
money-dominated campaign has altered the way many officials view their roles. The 
things that they must do to get elected, as well as the way that they must allocate their 
time once in office concerns many officials.
Perhaps the single most frequently heard complaint among politicians is that 
they must dedicate such a vast amount o f time to fundraising. Not only do many feel 
that this is a degrading process, but also that it detracts from the more important 
functions of policymaking and constituent service. In recent years, several highly 
regarded members of Congress have pointed to this as one of the major drawbacks to 
public office.
The phenomenon of rising costs also affects the way that citizens view the 
relationships that occur in the corridors of power. It is no secret that, among American 
political institutions, Congress routinely receives some of the lowest public approval 
ratings. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995:6,38-39) write,
Historically, people have liked to dislike politicians, and especially members of 
Congress....In the quarter-centuxy since [1971], support for Congress has always 
been between 8 and 28 percent; support for the Court between 22 and 40 
percent; and support for the presidency between 11 and 42 percent These 
numbers suggest that support is far from static but also that it is largely locked 
into a reasonably constrained low level for all institutions, particularly Congress.
8
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More recent numbers from a Gallup poll in September 1999 show support for Congress 
at 37 percent. With these anemic numbers, Congress certainly wants to avoid the 
emergence o f any issues that would serve to cast aspersions on the conduct of its duties. 
But just such an issue has emerged in recent years.
That issue centers on the growing influence of special-interest groups in the 
political system. These groups exert financial influence on candidates through the use
Table 1J  The Growth of PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates, 1974-94
Year Corporate Labor Trade/Health Nonconnected Other Total*
1974 2.5** 6.3 2.3 — 1.4 37.6
1976 7.1 8.2 4.5 — 2.8 58.9
1978 9.5 9.9 11.2 2.5 1.0 77.5
1980 19.2 13.2 15.9 4.9 2.0 99.3
1982 27.5 20.3 21.9 10.7 3.2 128.4
1984 35.5 24.8 26.7 14.5 3.8 150.2
1986 46.2 29.9 32.9 18.8 4.9 179.4
1988 50.5 33.9 38.9 19.2 5.5 185.3
1990 53.5 33.6 42.5 14.3 6.5 169.6
1992 64.1 39.3 51.1 17.3 6.5 186.1
1994 64.1 40.6 50.1 17.3 6.6 178.8
* Adjusted for inflation, 1994=1.00.
** In millions of dollars.
Source: The Politics o f  Congressional Elections, 4th ed. by Gary Jacobson (pg. 56).
9
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Table 1.4 Sources of Campaign Contributions to House and Senate Candidates, 
1974-94
Percentage of Contributions from:
Individuals Parties PACs Candidates* Unknown
House
1974 73 4 17 6 __
1976 59 8 23 9 —
1978 61 5 25 9 —
1980 67* 4 29 — —
1982 63* 6 31 — —
1984 51 3 39 6 —
1986 52 2 39 7 —
1988 49 2 43 6 —
1990 48 I 44 7 —
1992 50 I 39 10 —
1994 54 1 37 8 —
Senate
1972 67 14 12 0.4 8
1974 76 6 11 1 6
1976 69 4 15 12 —
1978 70 6 13 8 —
1980 78* 2 21 ----- —
1982 81* 1 18 — —
1984 68 1 20 11 —
1986 69 1 25 6 —
1988 68 1 26 6 —
1990 70 1 24 5 —
1992 68 1 25 6 —
1994 61 1 17 22 —
* Includes candidates' contributions to their own campaigns.
Source: The Politics o f Congressional Elections, 4th ed. by Gary Jacobson (pg. 55).
10
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of associated political action committees. Political action committees (PACs) are a 
main source of the influx of money into modern congressional campaigns. The amount 
of PAC contributions to congressional candidates has increased from $37.6 million in 
1974 to a whopping $178.8 million in 1994. PAC contributions constituted about 37% 
of House candidates' receipts and about 17% o f Senate candidates' receipts in the 1994 
elections (see Tables 1.3 and 1.4).
Certainly PACs are not solely to blame. The campaign spending reforms of the 
mid-1970s allow huge contributions to be funneled through the two major parties in the 
form of "soft money." They also permit a practice known as "bundling," whereby an 
individual skirts around the spending limits by bundling together numerous modest 
contributions; in reality, individuals can gamer just as much influence through large 
donations as they can in the days prior to contribution limits. PACs, though, seem to 
attract much derision due to the fact that their sole stated purpose for existence is to 
persuade lawmakers to vote a certain way on specific issues. This often leads to the 
public perception that PACs cause conflicts between the national good and personal 
gains.
A dramatic manifestation of this conflict is found in a quote by Rep. Glenn 
Poshard, D-Ill.,
In 1988,1 came to Washington, D.C. and I went from PAC to PAC to PAC. 
At every stop, they asked me to fill out a questionnaire: "On House Bill X, will 
you vote yes or no?" You not only have to pledge to support their position on 
these bills, but you have to sign your name to them.
Now [after being elected] the bell rings in your office at 11:00 a.m. Tuesday 
morning and now you understand how it [the bill] affects the nation. Your guts 
start being torn apart because you signed a form a year ago during the campaign 
saying you'd vote the other way. Now you understand the issue and it comes in 
conflict with what you told them you would do a year ago. This is a rage inside 
you.
You walk onto the floor and you know that if  you vote their way, they will 
announce it in their PAC newsletters, and next time you wont even have to beg
11
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for money, or you can do what in your heart you think is right That happened 
to me three or four times in a row and I told my AA [administrative assistant], "I 
cant do this anymore." I’m not going to take any PAC funds. I want to be free 
to vote how I want to vote (Fritz and Morris, 1992:171-72).
Some candidates might perceive that a refusal to accept PAC contributions is 
too risky, since it might make them more electorally vulnerable. Certainly for 
incumbents, PAC funds are a potent way to ensure reelection. As Bennett (1996: 140) 
writes, "...the deluge of PAC money allows incumbents to keep their seats by greatly 
outspending their opponents (by a 2 to 1 margin in the Senate and a 3.5 to 1 margin in 
the House in recent elections)." Ironically, the fact that all of this PAC information is 
open and available for public scrutiny may also add to the negative perception of PACs. 
Those "fat-cat" contributors who gain leverage through bundling, for example, are 
usually not subjected to the same level of scrutiny by the media or public advocacy 
groups.
So, many politicians believe that the escalating cost of campaigns forces them to 
resort to a degrading ritual of attending endless fundraisers with their hats in hand. This 
distracts them from the more noble pursuits of policy deliberation and constituent 
service. And many citizens feel that the escalating cost of campaigns creates an 
environment where special-interest groups exercise undue influence on their elected 
officials. In the minds of many citizens, politicians have sold their collective soul to the 
proverbial devil in order to secure electoral survival; in this instance, the devil takes the 
form of an expensively tailored K-Street lobbyist All of this negativity is the result of 
the powerful impact that campaign spending has on elections. This powerful impact 
causes candidates to try to raise and spend as much money as possible. But does the 
scholarly evidence support this assertion?
12
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CONVENTIONAL WISDOM VERSUS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
There are numerous instances where beliefs held by professional politicos and 
reported by journalists are contradicted by evidence unearthed by political scientists. It 
seems that those embroiled in the daily maelstrom of political events may be denied the 
perspective achieved by scholars working in a calmer, more objective atmosphere. It 
also appears that the narrow and esoteric nature of much social science research might 
prohibit a large percentage of the public from detecting and understanding that work.
In the absence of this countervailing force, the opinions o f the politicians hold sway; 
thus, the emergence of a conventional wisdom.
The task of political scientists in this situation should be to find a way of making 
their research more accessible-which is not synonymous with "dumbed down"-so that 
the public can weigh the two alternatives, and the erroneous conventional wisdom can 
begin to be eroded. Assuming that the scientific methods employed are sound and the 
research is thorough, the light of reason should shine through. Many might argue that 
such debates are irrelevant because the outcome of the debates will not significantly 
alter the political landscape. Some of the issues around which this type of 
"conventional wisdom versus scientific evidence" conflict exists are important, and a 
shift in recognition would certainly equal a shift in public dialogue.
Campaign spending is just such an issue. Determining the legitimacy of the 
conventional wisdom-that spending affects elections-is important in terms of guiding 
the continued construction of a research agenda. An understanding of the effects o f 
campaign spending is also vital to an informed public dialogue on campaign finance 
reform. This assumes that the conventional wisdom is supported by research, for if  the 
data demonstrate that spending does not have an impact, then the whole enterprise is 
pure folly.
13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The entire campaign house of cards is built upon a logic that crumbles if the last 
sentence is true. If campaign expenditures do not have an effect on the vote, then there 
is no reason for candidates to raise and spend such vast amounts of funds. And if 
candidates need not raise and spend such vast amounts of funds, then modem 
campaigns need not have such exorbitant costs. And if  the above assumptions are true, 
then the wrangling over campaign finance reform need not continue. The key to 
lowering costs will simply be to inform candidates of the futility of relying on heavy 
spending; implementing complex bureaucratic roadblocks will be unnecessary.
But if the data demonstrate that spending does have an impact, then further 
sober reflection is required. Candidates would be behaving rationally, inasmuch as 
there is a positive utility associated with the expenditure of funds. In this circumstance, 
lowering costs is not a matter of enlightening the ignorant, since the ignorant actually 
know what they are talking about. Instead, restraints would need to be placed on the 
political animals in the form of substantive reforms. The benefits derived from a 
spending superiority eliminates the possibility of candidates unilaterally disarming their 
fundraising operation. So more impartial, objective minds will need to devise ways to 
reform the system that is fair to all.
It is clear that the issue of campaign spending is an important one. Do 
expenditures affect the vote? Do candidates benefit from outspending their opponents? 
Do some candidates benefit more than others? Do constituency and chamber 
differences affect which candidates benefit more from spending? All of these questions 
and more prove pivotal in any discussion of this subject. Resolving these questions is 
crucial to properly directing the discourse on this subject It is the goal of this 
dissertation to contribute to the ongoing process of resolving these questions.
14
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OVERVIEW
The central focus of this dissertation is campaign spending in congressional 
elections. Specifically, I examine the effect of candidate expenditures on the vote.
This is a topic that has been explored often in previous studies, but the combination of 
conflicting results and as yet untraveled terrain invites further exploration. I hope to 
add to this research agenda by bringing a fresh perspective to some previous findings, 
and by examining areas that have heretofore been relatively ignored.
Previous Findings: The Majority
The one key conclusion that is reached in virtually all o f the studies in this area 
is that challengers receive greater marginal benefits from campaign expenditures than 
incumbents. Simply put, challengers get a bigger bang for their buck. The reason for 
this is fairly straightforward. The most important thing that campaign money buys for 
candidates is visibility and recognition. Whether it be via television ads, radio ads, 
newspaper ads, billboards, yard signs, bumper stickers, fliers, brochures, telephone 
calls, or town hall meetings—candidates are primarily concerned with getting known.
Candidates who are unknown to the electorate are losing candidates. The risk of 
loss prompts candidates to be proactive in their drive toward visibility among voters. It 
is not enough to sit back and hope that news reports and word-of-mouth will provide 
adequate publicity to attract voters. In order to gain attention, candidates must take the 
initiative and spend money. In Seussian terms, if you do not have the green, you will 
not be seen.
Now, while it is certainly true that all candidates seek recognition, it is equally 
true that one set of candidates start out with an advantage in this regard. On the whole, 
incumbents are better known than challengers. This initial incumbent advantage makes 
attaining awareness among voters even more of an imperative for challengers. Since
15
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the various weapons used by entrenched incumbents are not available to challengers, 
other means are necessary for achieving this imperative. Money is crucial in allowing 
challengers to even the playing field.
It now becomes clear why challengers receive greater marginal benefits. They 
have more ground to cover in a campaign, and hence their spending buys more.
$10,000 spent by a challenger languishing in obscurity is going to yield far more in the 
way of building voter recognition than $10,000 spent by an incumbent who has already 
saturated the district with his name and image in previous elections. All candidates 
eventually fall prey to the law of diminishing returns. There is only so much 
recognition that candidates can achieve, and at higher levels the campaign dollar is 
going to yield less and less. The initial disparity in voter awareness between 
incumbents and challengers means that incumbents succumb to diminishing returns 
sooner.
Again, this conclusion about greater challenger spending effects is found 
throughout the literature. There are disagreements over how much incumbent and 
challenger spending effects differ, but there is little disagreement over the fact that a 
difference exists. There are disagreements over the exact process by which challengers 
receive these benefits, but these debates over causal processes do not nullify the 
underlying assumption. Almost all scholars are in agreement about this finding-almost 
all.
Previous Findings: The Minority
Perhaps the specter o f a whole subset o f political scientists marching in lock­
step to the same beat was more than some could bear. So in an act of academic 
contrariness, one lone voice dared to dissent, and in the discipline's most prominent 
journal no less. In a 1998 article published in the American Political Science Review,
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Alan Gerber examines the expenditures of Senate candidates, and what impact those 
expenditures had on each election outcome. He finds that incumbent and challenger 
spending effects are roughly equal, and if  anything, incumbents receive greater marginal 
benefits. He uses his results to directly attack the opposite conclusions reached in 
earlier studies, and the logic behind those conclusions.
In fact, Gerber’s results may actually strengthen the underlying logic concerning 
candidate visibility. If so, both his results and the opposite results presented in other 
articles can both exist and be explained by this single voter recognition theory. The 
reason for this is the different electoral environments within which Senate and House 
candidates operate.
The Voter Recognition Theory
The Senate is the more prestigious of the two chambers. Thus, Senate elections 
tend to be more competitive than House elections. One of the main determinative 
factors for a competitive election is the quality of the challenger. Simply, Senate 
challengers tend to be of a higher quality than House challengers. One of the main 
attributes of high-quality challengers is that they have an established reputation among 
the electorate; this reputation may come from having previously held another important 
elective office, from being a celebrity figure, etc. Thus, Senate challengers tend to be 
more well-known than House challengers by the electorate.
If the above statements are true, then it stands to reason that there should be less 
of a disparity in candidate recognition/voter awareness among incumbents and 
challengers in Senate elections than among incumbents and challengers in House 
elections. And since this disparity helps create differential spending effects, Senate 
challengers should not receive as big a bang for their buck relative to Senate 
incumbents as do House challengers relative to House incumbents. The same logic 
applies to the different environments that exist in elections for the two chambers.
17
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CONCLUSION
The following pages contain a more detailed and comprehensive explication of 
the ideas presented in this overview. Chapter Two contains a review of the relevant 
literature. In Chapter Three, I present the theory which guides this study. In Chapter 
Four, I explain the data and methods used to test the theory. In Chapter Five, I provide 
a descriptive analysis of the data. In Chapters Six and Seven, I present in-depth analysis 
of regression results for Senate and House elections respectively. In Chapter Eight, I 
summarize all of the key results and describe how they support the theory.
ENDNOTES
1) The figures for 1998 were calculated from data obtained from an FEC report. I 
used the same method of calculation as the cited authors. These figures do not 
control for inflation.
2) Relying on one election year to draw conclusions about a more general trend is 
certainly not an optimal approach, but as in much social science research, optimality 
must give way to practicality. The herculean task of analyzing and categorizing all of 
the separate expenditure reports makes it virtually impossible for me to add any 
additional years. I am not a full-time journalist with die vast resources of the Los 
Angeles Times at my disposal. Even under those conditions, it took the authors two 
years and cost the Times considerable expense to compile the database from which 
these figures are drawn. Hopefully, this project will continue and more years will 
become available for study. For the time being, I grant any misgivings while 
standing firmly beside my conclusions.
3) There are several reasons why candidate questionnaires may not be the best source 
of information about the allocation of campaign funds. First, there is the problem of 
respondent recollection. Many of the questionnaires are not filled out until many 
months after the actual campaign, so that relevant documents are not available to 
refresh some candidates' memories. This may have the effect o f  clouding those 
candidates' recollections. Second, some candidates never know the precise allocation 
of funds to begin with. They rely on campaign managers and other top organiza­
tional staff to deal with the specifics of the distribution of money. This lack of 
knowledge may be one of the factors behind candidates' overestimation of how much 
money is spent on television. Third, candidates, especially incumbents, have a vested 
interest in fostering a perception of television as the root cause o f excessive
18
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campaign costs. This shifts blame away from themselves and toward the media. It 
is much easier to point a finger at someone else than to enact self-imposed reforms. 
Thus, answers to the questionnaire may be biased.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on campaign spending can be divided into two categories. The 
first category of studies deals only tangentially with expenditures in actual campaigns. 
These studies are more concerned with the effects o f money as it relates to activities 
that occur before and after the campaign cycle. Prominent areas of research in this 
category include works that explore the access and influence that PACs purchase with 
their campaign contributions (post-election), as well as works that attempt to determine 
the degree to which incumbents can deter quality challengers by amassing large 
campaign war chests (pre-election).
The second category of studies focuses directly on the money spent in actual 
campaigns. These studies serve as the foundation upon which this particular study 
rests. Prominent areas of research in this category include the differential effects of 
spending for incumbents and challengers, the relevance of different resource allocation 
patterns, the importance of the timing of expenditures, the specific ways that spending 
impacts voters, the differential effects of spending for House and Senate races, and the 
determination of the best methodology to employ in studying this subject 
THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES
Since the literature on the influence of PACs is not directly relevant to the topic 
under consideration in this dissertation, I will only provide a cursory review. The main 
finding from these studies is that special-interest groups do not control politicians. 
Campaign contributions, which are closely related to expenditures, do not necessarily 
cause politicians to become "puppets on a string" controlled by those who wield vast 
amounts of money. Even assuming that PACs are driven by the nefarious motive of 
wielding absolute influence over a congressman, the academic literature provides no 
clear evidence that those motives ever come to fruition. Usually, campaign
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contributions gain interest groups access to politicians that they might not otherwise 
have. At most, they may persuade a congressman to look favorably upon legislation as 
it winds its way through the labyrinth of Congress. There is absolutely no reliable 
evidence to support the contention that PACs are able to buy votes directly through 
contributions (Hall, 1989; Hall and Wayman, 1990; Krasno, Green, and Cowden, 1994; 
Mayhew, 1974; Welch, 1982).
THE ROLE OF CAMPAIGN WAR CHESTS
The last decade has seen the emergence of a category of literature that focuses 
on the role that war chests play in campaigns. The main assumption behind these 
studies is that high-quality challengers are disinclined to enter races involving well- 
financed incumbents. In the face of an overwhelming spending disadvantage, smart 
challengers bide their time and wait for more opportune circumstances in which to run. 
In this way, the ability o f a candidate to raise large sums of money can have a 
substantial impact on an election. Since a main component of this dissertation involves 
the quality-level of challengers, the conclusions reached about war chests are of some 
importance.
The fundraising ability is in and of itself a weapon that can dissuade other 
candidates from entering a race, or can nullify an emerging threat once a campaign is in 
full swing. This latter scenario is studied by Krasno, Green, and Cowden (1994). They 
recognize that a campaign is a dynamic event, and that the usual total expenditures 
variable cannot fully capture the process. Even if a researcher does break down 
expenditures according to the time in the campaign that they occurred, this might 
present an erroneous picture. Expenditures at one point in the campaign might cover 
things that occur at another point in the campaign; for example, pre-paying for 
commercials to air at a later date.
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Krasno et al. (1994) argue that fundraising receipts are a more reliable 
instrument for determining the ebb and flow of a campaign. They break down these 
receipts according to the eight periods reported by the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC). As expected, incumbents raise more money than challengers over the entire 
campaign period, though the gap narrows in the final period; there is a 20 to 1 
advantage in the first period and a 1.9 to 1 advantage in the eighth period. The amount 
of funds collected rose steadily over the length of the campaign for both candidates, but 
the incumbent always had the advantage.
For challengers, the amount of receipts collected in one period affects the 
amount they collect in the following period. They must raise a lot of money early and 
then spend that money effectively in order to gamer support and additional money in 
the future. In a sense, success breeds success. Incumbents are not so dependent on past 
fundraising levels to fuel future efforts, and can turn it on late in the campaign. This 
ties into the rest of the literature that assumes that incumbents can adjust their 
fundraising and spending levels in accordance with the perceived electoral threat; a 
characteristic not shared by challengers.
Box-Steffensmeier (1996) also looks at the different stages of a campaign, but 
she is concerned with the idea that a war chest can deter challenger entrance into a race. 
She defines a war chest as the actual amount of cash on hand, since looking at receipts 
and expenditures creates the problem of untangling reactive and preemptive strategies. 
Cash on hand is defined by the FEC to include petty cash, funds held in checking and 
savings accounts, traveler's checks, certificates of deposit, treasury bills, and other 
investments valued at cost (Federal Election Commission, 1988). She utilizes the 
relatively new method of duration analysis (Yamaguchi, 1991; Bartels and Brady, 1993) 
to detect distinct patterns over time.
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She finds that, at any point in time, war chests for incumbents who faced a 
challenger did not differ significantly from those of incumbents who did not; 
measuring a war chest in January 1999 will not predict whether an incumbent faces a 
challenger in November 2000. She contends that when a challenger enters a race is as 
important as i f  a. challenger enters a race, and her dependent variable reflects this 
emphasis on the dynamic aspects of a campaign. Her results show that both the size of 
the war chest and the incumbent’s margin of victory in the previous election are 
significant determinants of challenger entry.
The effect of a larger war chest on challenger entry, however, is nonlinear. Box- 
Steffensmeier writes, "...if the increase is S 100,000, the hazard rate [of a quality 
challenger's entry] decreases 26%; if the increase is $200,000, the hazard rate decreases 
by 45%. So this $100,000 differential increase results in a decrease of 19%. In 
contrast, a $100,000 differential increase between $900,000 and $1,000,000 results in a 
decrease of only 1.8%. Thus, there are diminishing returns" (1996: 365-66).
THE EFFECTS OF MONEY DURING CAMPAIGNS
This literature is more voluminous. With the introduction of election laws that 
required campaign organizations to keep and submit detailed records of receipts and 
expenditures, researchers were able to utilize a vast reservoir of data in an effort to 
understand the meaning behind and repercussions of the increased spending in 
congressional campaigns. The emergence o f reliable data sources coupled with the 
newfound interest in candidate spending naturally led to an explosion in this research 
agenda.
I focus here on that research deemed most important to the development of 
knowledge in this area. I do this not only in the interest of brevity, but also because 
limiting review to certain key works will help to establish a clear link between the 
studies o f the past and this current study. As mentioned earlier, these studies provide
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the motivation for my current research. The conclusions drawn by other scholars 
provide illumination in some instances and provide targets for constructive criticism in 
other instances. Hopefully, any understanding of my study will only be heightened by 
placing it in a proper context.
An Initial Exploration o f Campaign Spending
The article that remains one of the seminal works in this area was written by 
Gary Jacobson in 1978. Up until that time, the literature on campaign spending was 
sparse, and the general assumption was that spending had the same consequences for 
incumbents and challengers. Jacobson challenges that assumption by showing that, in 
fact, challenger spending yields higher marginal benefits than incumbent spending. The 
explanation for this counter-intuitive finding lies in the behavior of incumbents.
Incumbency yields many inherent advantages, such as franking privileges and 
access to government agencies capable of aiding constituents. These advantages lead to 
very high reelection rates among incumbents, and they often win without facing any 
strong opposition. So normally, incumbents are not forced to spend large amounts of 
money in order to win elections. Challengers, on the other hand, have none of these 
advantages and must rely almost solely on campaign spending to be competitive in an 
election. The more challengers can spend, the better their chances of winning. 
Incumbents recognize this and adjust their level of fundraising and spending according 
to the perceived electoral threat of the challenger. If they face a strong challenger in a 
close election, they will dramatically increase their spending.
Spending is important to the extent that it provides a candidate with the 
opportunity to communicate with voters through television, radio, town meetings, 
pamphlets, etc. Spending increases voter awareness of the candidate. Since 
incumbents are already fairly well-known and challengers are usually obscure (Mann 
and Wolfinger, 1990), challengers will have more to gain from spending; they get a
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bigger bang for their buck. Even when incumbents increase expenditures to meet the 
threat, they cannot counter-balance the gains made by challengers. This leads to the 
finding that the more incumbents spend, the worse they do. In terms of the regression 
model, the effect of incumbent expenditures is often statistically insignificant and 
sometimes even negatively related to the incumbent vote share.
Jacobson finds that the two most important variables for explaining incumbent 
vote shares are challenger spending and the strength of the challenger’s party in the 
district. He finds that for every $10,000 that challengers spend, they gain 
approximately 1% of the vote. One of the flaws with his analysis is that he models the 
relationship between challenger spending and challenger share of the total vote as being 
linear, when it clearly is not. Candidates cannot gain more than 100% of the vote, so at 
some point they will begin to experience diminished marginal returns on each dollar 
spent, especially at the high end of the scale. Jacobson writes that a semilog modeling 
of this relationship underestimates the challenger vote at higher spending levels, leading 
to incorrect predictions of defeat His decision to treat the relationship as linear, 
though, is probably not the correct solution.
The Endogeneity Problem
One o f the main issues addressed by Jacobson, and an issue that plays a 
prominent role in most of the future research on the topic, is the endogeneity problem. 
The most important aspect of the endogeneity problem is that the independent variable 
is highly correlated with the error term. This often occurs in equations where two or 
more variables have a reciprocal effect on one another, and when a model is not fully 
specified (Kennedy, 1992). The basic campaign spending model matches this 
description. The two main independent variables are linked in a reciprocal relationship. 
Incumbent spending is directly influenced by challenger spending. This relationship
25
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
creates the problem of multicollinearity within the model, which often affects 
significance tests.
Also, the relationship between independent and dependent variables is 
reciprocal in nature. The hypothesized relationship is that spending affects the vote, but 
the vote can also influence the level of spending. For instance, assume that an 
incumbent becomes aware of something that causes him or her to think that the vote 
will be close. He or she will begin to spend more money in order to counter-act this 
perceived threat. We are unaware of whatever it is that the incumbent is relying upon, 
since it is not explicitly included in our model, but it is captured by the error term. As 
this unobserved phenomenon increases in importance and as incumbent spending 
increases along with it, the incumbent expenditure variable and the previously random 
error term become highly correlated.'  The usual result is the underestimation of the 
effects of incumbent spending and the overestimation of the effects of challenger 
spending. Jacobson's solution to this problem is to use two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
in order to purge the endogeneity from the spending variables.
Second-Generation Studies
Green and Krasno (1988) disagree with Jacobson's methodological decisions 
and seek to build on his work in their study. They challenge Jacobson's findings on 
three fronts. First, they posit that not all challengers will necessarily derive the same 
benefits from campaign spending. There is a vast difference between those who have 
never held elective office and are inexperienced in organizing a campaign, and those 
who have waged successful campaigns in the past. In order to capture this they 
construct a challenger political quality (CPQ) variable that is based on the attractiveness 
and skill of the candidate.
The second area of departure from the previous study involves the issue of 
spending linearity discussed above. They recognize that the gains enjoyed by
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challengers through increased expenditures must taper off at some point, and they use 
logarithmic functions in order to capture these diminishing returns. Finally, they assert 
that the problem of spending being correlated with the error term can be corrected by 
creating an instrumental variable, rather than relying on the actual expenditures as a 
direct measure. This instrumental variable is the amount of money spent by the 
incumbent in the prior election. They argue that the other independent variables 
capture the reactive nature of incumbent expenditures, which allows this variable to 
pinpoint an incumbent's propensity to spend, regardless of his or her vulnerability in the 
current election.
The results o f their study show that CPQ has a direct effect on the vote, plus a 
positive effect when interacted with challenger expenditures. This means that high- 
quality challengers get a larger effect from spending, especially at higher levels; at 
these high levels, a challenger’s personal characteristics become more important than 
long-term political forces. They find that there are diminishing returns, and that 
incumbent spending does have a direct effect on the vote total, though it is not as strong 
as challenger spending. Incumbent spending can even counter-balance most of the 
effects of challenger spending if the challenger spends a small amount. For instance, if 
a challenger spends less than $10,000, then an incumbent can reduce the share of the 
challenger's vote by 5.3% for every $100,000 that he or she spends.
In a rebuttal article, Jacobson (1990) refutes the findings by Green and Krasno. 
He claims that their instrumental variable is highly correlated with several other 
independent variables, which skews the results. He correctly points out that Green and 
Krasno only assume a nonlinear relationship for challenger spending and the vote, while 
continuing to treat the effect of incumbent spending as linear. There is no sound 
theoretical reason for drawing this distinction, and doing so could artificially inflate the 
importance of incumbent spending. In order to correct for this mistake, he conducts
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natural log transformations on both variables (making $5,000 the lowest amount that a 
candidate could spend) and reaches the same substantive conclusions that he reached in 
his original article. Challenger expenditures have twice the effect o f incumbent 
expenditures at all levels o f spending.
He adds a new twist to the research by utilizing an ABC/Washington Post panel 
survey to decipher exactly how spending affects voters. He shows that increased 
challenger spending will increase the likelihood that a voter who was originally 
opposed to the challenger will become supportive of him or her, particularly if  the voter 
is of the same party. Likewise, challenger spending prevents supporters from defecting 
to the incumbent's camp, particularly among partisan rivals. These results come after 
holding partisan identification and national political forces constant Incumbent 
spending has no effect on changes in vote intention.
Jacobson does note the continued difficulty o f trying to untangle the effects of 
variables on both the vote total and candidate expenditures. Ansolabehere and Gerber 
(1994) suggest that this task is made more difficult by the misspecification o f the key 
explanatory variables. They contend that using total expenditures as a measure of the 
challenger and incumbent spending variables is unreliable. A distinction should be 
made between total expenditures and campaign-related expenditures. As noted earlier, 
the primary importance o f money is to provide candidates with communicative access 
to the electorate; this is what we mean when we say that spending increases voter 
awareness. So the spending that goes toward other things-overhead, donations, 
unitemized expenses-is not necessarily what political scientists should want to study. 
That kind of spending certainly helps to maintain a campaign, but it does not 
necessarily translate as directly into votes.
Ansolabehere and Gerber use a 1990 data set that decomposes spending into 
different categories. They then estimate regression equations using the traditional
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measure for expenditures and their more stringent measure. They find that challengers 
spend S3 out of every $5 on direct voter contact, while incumbents spend $2 out of 
every $5. This illustrates how the traditional measure can bias the coefficients for 
spending toward zero, especially for incumbents. The model using the more stringent 
criteria also produces much stronger coefficients, though the curious result of 
incumbent spending actually being negatively correlated still holds.
Abramowitz (1991) does not find that incumbent spending is negatively related 
to vote shares, but he does find that it has no significant effect on the vote. This is 
made all the more odd due to the increased incumbency advantage in the mid-1980s 
and 1990s. Compared to the 1960s and 1970s, incumbents are being reelected at higher 
rates and with larger margins of victory. He looks at the 1984-86 elections, and 
includes variables such as seniority, political scandal, and the rate of defection on party 
votes for incumbents. Many of these contextual variables turn out to be significant 
explanations for the vote, but challenger expenditure is still the strongest.
On the endogeneity front, he argues that the problem is not so much the 
reciprocal relationship between spending and the vote, since the actual final vote total 
cannot affect campaign spending. Thus, instrumental variables need not be constructed. 
Rather, it is the expectations of the vote by political elites that influence spending. So 
Abramowitz includes a variable culled from CQ reports on the races as a measure of 
elite expectations, but finds that the coefficient for this variable is not significant. From 
this he concludes that the model must already account for these expectations, and is 
therefore not severely biased.
Part of the problem with this variable is that it relies too heavily on timing. The 
reports filed by CQ are based on hundreds of interviews with political experts from 
around the country. Based on these interviews, CQ rates the competitiveness of a race
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based on a seven-point scale ranging from "safe Democratic" to "safe Republican." 
These interviews are conducted between February and September of the election year. 
Arguably, the resulting reports might be flawed because interviews took place before 
crucial events occurred in the campaigns or well after elite actions worked their magic 
on the campaigns. In other words, elite expectations could affect the flow of campaign 
contributions and expenditures, but simply not be detected by these reports.
When comparing the results from the model for 1984-86 to results for 1974-76, 
he discovers that the effect of challenger spending is not as strong as it once was. When 
you combine this with the fact that challengers are not spending as much money as they 
once did and with the escalating costs of campaigns, then the reason for the increased 
incumbency advantage becomes clearer. Incumbents are aided by other factors that 
more than offset their impotence in terms of campaign spending.
Kenny and McBumett (1994) dismiss the claim of an incumbent's 
ineffectiveness in spending and agree with the earlier conclusion drawn by Green and 
Krasno. This innovative study directly tackles the endogeneity problem that hampered 
Jacobson and others, while also providing fresh insight into which voters are most 
affected by campaign spending. Its main distinction lies in the fact that it takes an 
individual-level approach to the issue, rather than the common aggregate approach. 
They derive the individual-level data from the 1984 ANES data set Recognizing that 
"money and electoral outcomes are closely intertwined" (1994: 700), they construct a 
multiple equation model to account for this.
Compared to the single equation model, the results conform to our common 
sense expectations. Both incumbent expenditures and challenger expenditures affect 
the vote, though the latte.* is the stronger of the two. Therefore, incumbents do derive 
direct, positive benefits from increased spending, even if  these benefits are not as large
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as those reaped by challengers. The authors also find that the voters most likely to be 
influenced by campaign communications are those that have weak partisan attachments, 
low educational levels, and little interest in the campaign.
Goidel and Gross (1994) also use a system of equations in modeling spending 
effects, and come up with conclusions that are similar to those of Kenny and 
McBumett. Though they are operating at the aggregate level, they share Kenny and 
McBumett's view that a system of equations is necessary in order to account for the 
endogenous nature of the expenditure variables; this, in turn, helps vanquish the 
endogeneity problem. Goidel and Gross (1994:135-36) note,
Unlike two-stage least squares, which proceeds on an equation-by-equation 
basis, three-stage least squares estimates the entire system simultaneously. 
Moreover, three-stage least squares incorporates the correlation between the 
residual terms of the individual regression equations into the estimation process. 
Consequently, estimation with three-stage least squares is asymptotically more 
efficient than estimation with two-stage least squares (Greene, 1990). The 
greater the correlation between these error terms, the greater the gain in 
efficiency over two-stage estimation. Given the subject matter at hand, one 
might suspect that the error terms of the separate regression equations would be 
highly correlated. Consequently, the gain in efficiency may be substantial.
Like Green and Krasno, they include a CPQ variable in their model. Their 
conclusions are similar to those of Kenny and McBumett, in that they find that 
incumbent spending does have a direct, positive impact on the total vote, though not as 
much of an impact as challenger spending. They provide an additional bit of 
information by showing that the benefits of incumbent spending are also differential. 
"First-term incumbents receive a much larger marginal return on their expenditures than 
do multi-term incumbents. In fact, the marginal return on spending by first-term 
incumbents rivals the marginal return on spending by challengers” (Goidel and Gross, 
1994:125).
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This makes sense when one considers that freshly minted incumbents have not 
had time to do the things-casework and bringing home the pork-that help to establish a 
personal constituency. Established members, however, have done the things necessary 
to become entrenched in a district, so that spending is less beneficial to them. This is 
consistent with my main theoretical argument, since established members should have 
higher visibility among constituents than their first-term counterparts.
For CPQ, they find that quality challengers are successful at fundraising; for 
every additional point on their quality scale, a challenger gains over $60,000 in 
additional expenditures. The greater ease with which quality challengers can raise 
funds combined with the greater benefits that quality challengers receive at higher 
levels o f spending (the Green and Krasno finding discussed above) provide ample 
evidence of why incumbents have reason to fear challenges from high-quality 
candidates.
A Dissenting View
The most recent article to explore this subject reaches conclusions that sharply 
differ from previous findings. Gerber’s (1998) study also distinguishes itself by being 
one of the few to take a look at the effects of spending in Senate races, instead of the 
usual focus on House races. Rather than use a system of equations approach to tackle 
the endogeneity problem, he opts for the methodology used earlier by Green and 
Krasno. Gerber suggests that a 2SLS model is sufficient, as long as one corrects for the 
blunder that plagued the earlier study; namely, one must treat both incumbent and 
challenger spending as endogenous variables. Beyond this, he claims that the major 
innovation of his study is the use o f a new set of instrumental variables that permits 
more consistent model estimation.
These instrumental variables should influence campaign spending without 
directly affecting the election itself; Gerber selects challenger wealth level, state voting
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age population, and lagged spending. The lagged spending variable is an extension o f 
the lone instrumental variable employed by Green and Krasno. Since House races are 
every two years, Green and Krasno look at the amount spent by actual incumbents in 
their last races. The staggered nature of Senate races causes Gerber to look at the 
amount spent in the last race, whether or not it involves the same incumbent He notes, 
"...the previous race and the current race rarely involve the same incumbent or 
challenger. The variable is therefore free from the criticism that might be applied to 
lagged spending by the same candidate, namely, that specific candidate attributes are 
correlated with both the regression error and past fundraising levels" (Gerber, 1998: 
405).
When estimating a standard OLS regression model, Gerber generates the same 
results as other studies; both incumbent and challenger spending is important, but 
challenger spending is almost twice as effective. It is when he estimates the 2SLS 
model using the instrumental variables that his findings veer dramatically from previous 
findings. He concludes,
...the traditional view of incumbent campaign spending does not hold up when 
OLS regressions are reestimated using an instrumental variables approach. In 
fact, after taking the endogeneity of spending into account, the marginal effects 
of incumbent and challenger spending are statistically equivalent [And the 
overall effect of campaign spending is to boost the share of the incumbent vote 
by 6.28%]. This result is very robust to changes in the set of instruments. The 
assumptions underlying the 2SLS estimation hold up very well; standard 
statistical tests confirm the endogeneity of candidate spending levels and the 
exogeneity of the instruments (Gerber, 1998:409).
CONCLUSION
With this review of the literature, we are now in a position to revisit the question 
posed earlier. Does campaign spending have an impact on electoral outcomes? The 
answer is mixed. The conventional wisdom that says special interest groups control
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politicians is not supported; the conventional wisdom that says money is important to 
campaigns is supported; and the jury is still out concerning the conventional wisdom 
that says incumbents can buy elections because of their spending advantage.
Large contributions are not enough to lure candidates into the pockets of fat-cat 
contributors. Contributions can, however, help incumbents dissuade potential quality 
challengers through the accumulation of large war chests. And when challengers do 
enter the race, there is overwhelming evidence to support the claim that actual 
expenditures do have an effect on the vote. There are virtually no political scientists 
working in this area who claim that spending in campaigns is irrelevant The only real 
points of contention remaining are whether these positive effects are shared equally by 
both candidates and how these effects come about in the first place.
In this study, I concentrate on the impact that candidate expenditures have on 
congressional elections, though I also seek to expand the literature by including 
elements from studies on candidate quality and voter information. It will also be one of 
the first to take a comparative approach by examining the effects o f campaign spending 
for both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Let us now take a more detailed 
look at the core theoretical arguments underpinning this dissertation, as well as the 
research design that is meant to fortify these theoretical positions.
ENDNOTES
1) Since receipts and expenditures are opposite sides of the same coin, a similar logic 
applies to the behavior of contributors. If contributors expect that the election will 
be close, then they are more apt to give more money to the candidates, who will in 
turn have higher expenditures.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE THEORY
The recent work of Alan Gerber (1998) serves as the catalyst for this 
dissertation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this work is interesting for three 
reasons. First, whereas the vast majority of studies on campaign spending focus on the 
House, Gerber examines the effects of spending in Senate elections. Second, Gerber 
finds a way to reliably use the tried-and-true technique of 2SLS by creating three 
instrumental variables, so that both incumbent and challenger spending can be treated 
as endogenous. Third, his conclusion that incumbent and challenger spending effects 
are roughly equal challenges the view held by most scholars.
This dissertation is a replication and extension of Gerber's work. It is a 
replication in that I try to mirror his operationalization and generate similar results for 
Senate elections. * However, 1 offer an alternative explanation that is at odds with his 
main theoretical explanation for why Senate incumbents and challengers receive equal 
marginal benefits from their respective expenditures. It is an extension of that article in 
that I apply roughly the same operationalization and methodology to House elections. 
The theoretical lens used for viewing Senate races offers an equally focused picture of 
races in the House.
A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION
Now I would like to turn to a discussion of the differences of opinion that I have 
with Gerber concerning the theoretical explanations for his findings. For any social 
science research to gain relevance, there must be a sound theoretical underpinning to 
the data and methodological machinations. Without a reasonable and enlightening 
theory, research findings are nothing more than a series of disjointed potentialities.
And when a new study comes along that presents findings that are at odds with the 
usual fare of a research agenda, it behooves the author to offer an alternative
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explanation for why these findings should be accepted. In this instance, it is Gerber 
who must offer a reasonable explanation to accompany his conclusions. Alas, such an 
explanation is not forthcoming.
The Information Explanation
As noted earlier, most research in the area of campaign spending finds that 
challengers receive greater benefits from expenditures than incumbents. The traditional 
explanation for this, originally given by Jacobson, is that spending is mainly used on 
communication which increases candidate visibility among the electorate. Since 
incumbents are better known than challengers, they naturally have less to gain by 
spending on communication. It is not as if spending is of no use to them, but simply 
that they will not achieve the dramatic increase in voter recognition that well-funded 
challengers achieve.
Gerber's finding that Senate challengers and incumbents receive the same 
benefits from spending not only challenges the usual empirical findings, but also has 
theoretical implications. Gerber asserts that the old explanation no longer holds-even 
in the case of House elections. He writes,
The level of voter familiarity with Senate incumbents is similar to that for 
House incumbents, while Senate challengers are in many cases better known 
than the typical House challenger but often not as well known as the Senate 
incumbent (Westlye, 1991). Thus, the informational advantage for incumbents 
is smaller in Senate elections, but they appear to enjoy a definite edge. This 
would lead to a prediction that estimates of spending effects in Senate elections 
might show a smaller relative advantage for challenger spending over incumbent 
spending than that observed in House elections, but not no advantage at all 
(Gerber, 1998:410).
Clearly, he thinks that the rough equality o f spending benefits among both types 
of candidates in the Senate calls the old theory into question. There is a problem with 
this line o f thinking. While Gerber is probably correct in speculating that the smaller
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informational advantages for Senate incumbents over their challengers would not result 
in equal spending coefficients for incumbents and challengers, it is quite possible that 
the differences in results for Senate and House elections could at least partly be 
attributed to the differences in informational advantages for House and Senate 
incumbents.
When examining the informational advantages of House and Senate incumbents 
from 1980 to 1994, one finds that House incumbents have an average recognition 
advantage of about 40% (i.e. 92% to 52%), while Senate incumbents have a recognition 
advantage of only 19% (i.e. 97% to 78%) (Jacobson, 1997:96). It is also telling that 
Senate challengers are 26% more recognized than House challengers. This places at 
least some limitations on how much electoral benefit that Senate challengers can obtain 
with higher levels o f spending, and hence may result in at least some equalization of 
incumbent and challenger spending effects in Senate elections. Overall, it is not 
implausible that the reduced informational advantage of Senate incumbents over their 
challengers can account for a substantial amount of equalization of spending effects for 
Senate incumbents and challengers vis-a-vis the House.
Take an instance where a high-quality challenger decides to enter a Senate race. 
Let us assume that this challenger has high name recognition within the state. Let us 
assume that, in fact, the electorate is as familiar with this challenger as they are with the 
incumbent In this instance, one would expect to find that both candidates receive 
essentially equal marginal benefits from their campaign expenditures. Thus, the 
empirical findings would contradict the traditional findings while still fitting into the 
traditional theory.
Of course, not every race is going to exhibit this type of equality. But there will 
be more Senate races approximating this situation than House races. Approximation is 
a key word A challenger need not achieve total equality with an incumbent, in terms of
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voter familiarity, in order for the data analysis to show roughly equal benefits from 
campaign spending. The challenger need only be fairly close to the incumbent for these 
results to surface.
House races typically do not attract the kind of quality challengers that Senate 
races do. The severe partisan make-up of many districts renders one of the parties 
basically impotent Often, this leads to a situation where incumbents face no 
challengers at all. There have been numerous instances of uncontested races for the 
House in the past two decades, something that is extremely rare in races for the Senate 
(Campbell, 1996). On those occasions when the disadvantaged party does field 
challengers, they often provide little more than token opposition. Needless to say, these 
challengers do not top the list of most recognized personalities in their communities. 
And even in competitive districts, challengers often find it hard to get their message 
across due to a relative lack of coverage by the media (Clarke and Evans, 1983).
These same dynamics are not at work in races for the Senate. Since a Senate 
seat is more valuable than a seat in the House, one would expect that more highly 
qualified challengers will be attracted to Senate races. The benefits of the seat help to 
alleviate the associated costs that sometimes prove to be a deterrent against candidate 
entry into a race (Black, 1972; Rohde, 1979). In cases where a sitting incumbent is 
perceived to be vulnerable, strategic considerations cause the most formidable 
challengers of all to emerge (Jacobson and Kemell, 1981).
A high-quality challenger is likely to be far more familiar to voters than an 
obscure challenger. Putting these things together, one arrives at a simple conclusion: 
the average Senate contest will exhibit a smaller gap between incumbents and 
challengers in terms of candidate quality and voter familiarity than the average House 
contest If the spending benefits that accrue to challengers are based on the initial lack 
of familiarity, then when that lack of familiarity dissipates, so should the relative
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spending benefits. Simply stated, my theory is that the difference in voter information 
about Senate incumbents and challengers is smaller than the difference in voter 
information about House incumbents and challengers, and that this smaller difference 
in voter information about the two candidates creates an environment where Senate 
incumbents and challengers derive fairly equal benefits from their campaign spending. 
In some cases, the effects may be equal.
I believe that this explanation of Gerber's results is more reasonable than the 
ones offered by Gerber himself. Though he mounts a vigorous argument for why 
Jacobson's traditional theory of campaign spending effects should be rejected, he is far 
more tepid in advancing theories that would serve to replace it. Initially, he said that 
Senate incumbents know how to spend their money more effectively than House 
incumbents. This was the argument he forwarded in an earlier draft o f his article.
Since this explanation is not explicitly presented in the published article, one can only 
assume that even he may be having second thoughts about its validity. In the 
voluminous amount of research conducted on the effects of incumbent advantages, 
nowhere is it stated that senators are more expert than their House colleagues in 
wielding these advantages (Cover and Brumberg, 1982; Ferejohn, 1977; Fiorina, 1977; 
Johannes and McAdams, 1981; Mayhew, 1974; Payne, 1980; Stein and Bickers, 1994). 
The Incumbent Efficiency Explanation
He does not seem willing to abandon this thread of logic entirely, but rather 
shifts ground to an explanation that has more "at first glance" appeal. Instead of 
comparing the spending efficiency of Senate incumbents to House incumbents, Gerber 
settles on a comparison of incumbents to challengers. He writes,
In theory, incumbent spending may be more effective than challenger spending.
Incumbents typically have advantages in organization and expertise that make
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their expenditures more efficient and therefore more effective dollar for dollar 
than those of challengers. If this is an important consideration, then the 
marginal effect of spending by the incumbent may be greater than the marginal 
effect of challenger spending (Gerber, 1998: 402).
Upon closer inspection, this explanation also reveals a couple of flaws. First, 
Gerber’s own results do not allow him to proffer this claim. His central finding is that 
Senate incumbent and challenger spending is roughly equal, but in order for the above 
explanation to hold, they would have to be unequal. Senate incumbents should receive 
higher marginal returns on their expenditures than challengers if they have greater 
organizational expertise and efficiency. He is falling into the same trap that he accuses 
those proponents of the traditional theory of having fallen into. His earlier quote states 
that the rough equality of expenditure coefficients in the face of unequal informational 
advantages is illogical, but by the same token, equal coefficients in the face of unequal 
organizational advantages are also illogical.
Second, even if Gerber's results supported the contention that Senate incumbents 
have organizational advantages over their challengers, this contention still does not 
account for the consistent results achieved by scholars studying House elections. The 
fact remains that House incumbents derive fewer benefits from campaign expenditures 
than House challengers. Surely, House incumbents have organizational and expertise 
advantages similar to those of their colleagues in the Senate. If so, why is it that 
spending coefficients for incumbents and challengers in Senate elections are roughly 
equal, while spending coefficients for challengers in House elections are greater than 
those for incumbents?
Although this alternative theory comes up short, the traditional theory forwarded 
by Jacobson and supported in this dissertation hits the mark. Again, the different 
pattern of spending effects between the two sets of candidates is the result of 
dissimilarities between the challengers. Mainly due to the prestige of the office, Senate
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contests attract challengers who have credentials that are superior to those o f House 
challengers. Among those credentials is a higher level of public recognition. This 
higher visibility brings Senate challengers into closer proximity to Senate incumbents; 
thus, both receive a similar bang for the buck. The relative lack of visibility among 
House challengers gives them more room to operate and, consequently, a greater return 
on their expenditures.
The Negative Advertising Theory
Another explanation that serves as an alternative to Jacobson's focuses on the 
various ways that campaign funds can be employed. Gerber writes, "...campaigning not 
only informs the voters about oneself but also brings to light damning information about 
one's opponent. When the voters do not know much about the challenger, this gives the 
incumbent a great opportunity to use money to 'define' the challenger" (1998:402).
This explanation is also logically flawed. Contrary to Gerber's assertion, incumbents 
usually do not bring damning information to light about their challengers until their 
challengers become serious, viable candidates. There is little reason to expect 
electorally secure incumbents with large campaign chests to spend money destroying 
their opponents if there is little chance that those opponents will win (Ansolabehere, 
Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino, 1994).
The old political axiom that any press is good press certainly applies to obscure 
challengers. If an incumbent is facing a little-known challenger and is virtually assured 
reelection, what possible rationale would lead that incumbent to risk waking a sleeping 
lion by dramatically increasing the visibility of that challenger, even if it occurs through 
the release of negative information. For if  the voters ultimately disregard the negative 
attacks, then the incumbent is faced with a visible candidate who has been at least 
partially inoculated against future negative attacks. The separation of Bill Clinton from
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the pack of other Democratic hopefuls in early 1992, due in large measure to the 
Gennifer Flowers stoiy, is a case in point.
The Incumbent Behavior Explanation
Gerber's final attempt at a reasoned explanation for his results is the weakest of 
all. He appears to wash his hands of theorizing altogether and merely exclaims that 
since politicians believe incumbent spending has an effect, then it must be true. He 
writes, "A final reason for skepticism [toward Jacobson's theory] is that the actual 
behavior o f incumbents, who are political professionals, appears to contradict the 
premise that incumbent campaign spending has little effect If incumbents are sensible, 
then it is hard to explain their substantial fundraising efforts" (Gerber, 1998:402).
Obviously, this assertion, too, is riddled with problems. First, one must 
recognize the distinction between fundraising in order to amass a substantial war chest 
and actually spending those funds during a campaign. It makes perfect sense for 
incumbents to raise large sums of money, because doing so helps to ensure that they 
will not face quality challengers (Box-Steffensmeier, 1996). Incumbents may be raising 
this money with the expectation that they will need to spend only a fraction of it during 
the actual campaign.
Second, even if incumbents are convinced that they receive vast benefits from 
campaign spending, they may be mistaken. Political scientists simply cannot accept the 
perceptions o f politicians as fact. Rather, we should examine the underlying factual 
basis for any claims made by others-"professionals" or not If we relied solely on the 
beliefs of politicians, then we would accept their absolute conviction that they must 
mirror the views o f their constituency when voting on bills or risk severe electoral 
consequences in the next election. In truth, numerous studies have found a dearth of 
knowledge among the electorate when it comes to the issue positions taken by
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congressmen. Most voters are doing well if they can recount even one of the detailed 
policy stances of their congressmen, much less punish them for straying on a particular 
roll-call vote (Hinckley, 1976; Miller and Stokes, 1963; Smith, 1989; Wright, 1989).
CONCLUSION
It now becomes clear that Gerber’s study contains interesting findings in need of 
an equally interesting theory. His empirical results, if valid, offer a sharp contrast to 
virtually all of the other studies in the field of campaign spending. But he offers no 
compelling reason for why these results should cast Jacobson's general theory in doubt. 
The results of his study may negate the specific hypothesis that incumbent spending is 
relatively unimportant in Senate elections, while confirming the general theory which 
states that the level of candidate recognition among the electorate determines the 
effectiveness of campaign expenditures.
It is my goal in this dissertation to bridge the gap between theory and data. By 
analyzing both House and Senate elections, I can explore how different electoral 
environments affect campaign spending. Also, I can compare the relevance of factors 
such as challenger political quality, candidate visibility, and campaign-specific events.
I can do all of this within the context of an overarching theory that serves to guide my 
exploration of these matters.
ENDNOTES
1) His study goes through the year 1992. Since my study goes through the year 1994, 
this will not be an exact replication. However, the addition of one election cycle 
should not dramatically alter the basic results.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
DATA AND METHODS
The following pages provide detailed information on the data and methods used 
for this study. The study encompasses all House and Senate elections occurring from 
1974 to 1994. * This creates a data set containing approximately five thousand cases. 
These cases are used in a model that contains variables proven to be related to the vote 
in previous research. Besides the main explanatory variables of interest-candidate 
expenditures and challenger political quality-the model encompasses economic factors, 
partisan and ideological influences, and situations that prove to be isolated quirks 
affecting specific elections. It also contains a set of instrumental variables. The 
dependent variable in the equation is the incumbent’s percentage of the two-party vote.
INCUMBENT AND CHALLENGER SPENDING
Since candidate spending lies at the heart of any study focusing on campaign 
finance, it is imperative that this variable be measured and modeled correctly. Much of 
the debate over the true effects o f spending centers on the elusiveness of this variable. 
Over twenty years of research by top scholars has not produced an accepted approach 
for constructing the spending variable or exploring the relationship between candidate 
spending and the vote. This is problematic when one considers that alternative methods 
of measurement and modeling produce drastically different results.
An initial point of contention centers on the type of regression equation that 
should be used to estimate the effects o f spending. The traditional method used for 
regressing a dependent variable on a set o f independent variables is ordinary least 
squares (OLS). However, due to the nonrecursive nature o f the relationship between 
spending and votes (see my discussion o f the endogeneity problem in Chapter 2), OLS 
is not the optimal method for modeling this relationship. There have been studies that
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employ OLS (Jacobson, 1978 & 1985; Abramowitz, 1988), but newer research calls the 
results of those studies into question (Gerber, 1998; Green and Krasno, 1988; Kenny 
and McBurnett, 1994).
Since the spending variables in the model are endogenous and OLS produces 
biased estimates, a different statistical technique is required. In general, there are two 
paths that one can take. Some scholars prefer using a system of equations to estimate 
the effects of spending (Goidel and Gross, 1994). As Kenny and McBumett write,
... the single-equation model produces insignificant incumbent expenditure 
effects because it suffers from the same simultaneity problems of many 
aggregate models. Estimating a system of equations accounts for the 
endogeneity of expenditures and should produce the intuitively sensible result 
that spending improves electoral prospects for incumbents as well as 
challengers, although probably not to the same degree (1994: 701).
Other scholars rely on two-stage least squares (2SLS) as their estimation 
technique (Gerber, 1998; Green and Krasno, 1988). 2SLS purges a model of any "white 
noise" caused by the covariance of independent variables with the error term. The 
procedure involves estimating a predicted value (reduced form) for the endogenous 
regressors. These predicted values are then used in the second-stage regression as 
replacements for the original independent variables. The key to any of these multi­
equation models is finding instrumental variables onto which the endogenous variables 
can be regressed. The paramount requirement for an instrumental variable is that it 
affect the endogenous explanatory variable without directly affecting the dependent 
variable.
In the case of campaign spending, an instrumental variable should influence 
candidate expenditures without influencing the vote. Jacobson (1990) notes the peril in 
trying to discover such a variable:
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Any observable variable known to influence the vote should also affect 
campaign contributions, and it is difficult to come up with any observable 
variable that would systematically affect contributions (especially to 
challengers) without also independently affecting the vote. Certainly conditions 
known to influence contributions would affect the expected vote, which would 
in turn affect contributions, and so on. If all of the available exogenous 
variables influence both spending and votes, reciprocal effects can never be 
untangled using these techniques (341-42).
Gerber (1998) claims that his most important contribution to the literature is 
putting forth instrumental variables that stand up to that paramount requirement, and, in 
so doing, provide us with the most accurate and dependable means for gleaning the true 
effects of candidate spending on the vote. This dissertation follows Gerber’s lead by 
employing these variables (see Instrumental Variables section) and estimating their 
effects in a 2SLS model.
Another point of contention concerns what form the relationship between 
spending and votes should take: linear or logarithmic. In his seminal article, Jacobson 
(1978) finds that both forms support his central conclusion of greater challenger 
spending effects, but that other differences are apparent. He writes,
The functional relationship between spending and votes is assumed to be 
linear. This has the advantage of simplicity but the drawback that it fails to 
allow for the diminishing returns that must apply to campaign spending; no 
candidate can get more than 100 percent of the vote, no matter how much is 
spent. An attractive alternative is the semilog form in which spending is entered 
as the natural logarithm of actual expenditures (Welch, 1976); it permits 
diminishing returns but does not allow them to become negative as would, for 
instance, a quadratic model (Silberman and Yochum, 1977).
But the semilog model has the defect of seriously underestimating the 
challenger's vote at higher levels of spending; that is, it provides estimates 
which exaggerate the extent to which returns diminish as spending 
increases....The linear equation exaggerates the expected vote of challengers at 
higher levels o f spending, but inspection of the residuals [the difference between 
the actual vote and the predicted vote] indicates that this is not a significant 
problem until the challenger's spending exceeds $160,000, which occurs in less 
than 2 percent of the cases in either election year, at this level of spending the
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equations are less likely to overpredict the number o f winning challengers than 
they are to overstate the size of the challenger’s victory (Jacobson, 1978:471).
A simple additive relationship between expenditures and votes is, ultimately, 
untenable. Virtually everyone agrees that there are definite diminishing returns at 
higher levels of spending, and since challengers tend to spend less than incumbents, 
simple linear models will overestimate challenger spending and underestimate 
incumbent spending. Even Jacobson (1990), in more recent research, abandons the use 
of linear functions for spending. The question becomes how to properly account for 
this diminution.
Abramowitz (1991) confronts this dilemma by including a variable that is the 
square of a candidate's spending. This "spending-squared” variable is significant in the 
model, but does not provide for the type o f nuance that one would hope for when 
constructing a spending model. It is the equivalent of a sledgehammer when a scalpel 
is preferable. For instance, this type of operationalization can tell us how diminished 
the returns are when a candidate goes from $200,000 to $400,000, but provides us with 
no information about the rate of descent between these two figures.
Perhaps the best technique for capturing diminishing returns at all levels of 
spending is to calculate the logarithm of expenditures (Gerber, 1998; Jacobson, 1990). 
This functional form conforms to the sensible expectation that spending has positive 
benefits at all levels, but that the marginal returns decrease at higher levels. This 
decreased marginal utility is to be expected for two reasons.
First, the most basic and critical campaign tasks (e.g. opening campaign offices, 
acquiring equipment, hiring staff) are taken care of with early expenditures, so that later 
expenditures should not have as dramatic an effect Second, the main value of 
campaign funds is that they increase candidate visibility. If candidates are spending
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high levels o f money, then they have probably already achieved a significant degree of 
visibility; any further spending is rendered less valuable.
In this study, the two expenditure variables represent total campaign spending 
and are measured in real 1974 dollars.^ Because the log of zero is undefined, every 
candidate is given a minimum expenditure of $5,000 before transforming the data to a 
logarithmic function (Jacobson, 1990: 338). This minimum dollar amount also prevents 
the log transformation from sending the value of very low expenditures to negative 
infinity.
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
The first instrumental variable is based on a measure of challenger wealth. 
Obviously, wealthy challengers have more money to spend on their campaigns than 
those without such resources. This variable is created by reading through the 
summaries of House and Senate races presented in the bi-annual election preview issue 
of the Congressional Quarterly. The variable is coded 0 (not wealthy) if  the 
challenger's occupation is listed as a lawyer, teacher, airline pilot, businessperson, or as 
someone who works in the public sector or military. It is coded 1 (wealthy) if the 
challenger is described as a business owner, president or top executive of a corporation, 
banker, real estate developer, doctor, law firm partner, or as someone who is "wealthy," 
"a millionaire," or "an heir."
The second instrumental variable is based on the size of a state's population.
This variable has been the focus of an ongoing debate among some in the academic 
community. Remember, state population size can only be used as an instrumental 
variable if it does not affect the vote; some scholars assert that it does just that By 
examining Senate elections from 1946 to 1980, Hibbing and Brandes (1983) find that 
each additional congressional district in a state costs incumbents .17 percent of the
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two-party vote. This would translate into a senator from California receiving around 
nine percentage points less than a senator from Montana.
There are two reasonable explanations for this finding. First, senators from 
large states are unable to have the amount of personal contact with their constituents 
that senators from small states enjoy. This kind of personal interaction is a superb way 
to cultivate a positive image among the electorate. Since senators representing large 
populations have greater difficulty meeting with a significant number of their 
constituents, their position among these possible voters is less secure (Hibbing and 
Brandes, 1983).
A similar logic applies to the handling of casework. Senators are often judged 
on their ability to effectively handle casework and other types of district service. Each 
senator has a finite amount of time and resources to devote to these tasks. As the 
population grows, the proportion of that population that a senator can attend to shrinks. 
Because constituency service often translates into votes, senators understandably want 
to solve as large a proportion of voters' problems as possible (Cain, Ferejohn, and 
Fiorina, 1984; Johannes, 1984; McAdams and Johannes, 1988; Parker, 1980; Serra, 
1994; Yianakis, 1981). Senators from large states are often unable to "pay assiduous 
attention to the needs of [their] constituents" (Jewell and Patterson, 1977:91).
The second explanation has received scant attention within this literature. This 
explanation centers on the increased political, economic, and cultural diversity that 
usually accompanies population growth. Senators from small states, as well as 
representatives, have an easier time satisfying the interests of their constituents because 
those constituents tend to be more homogenous. Simple solutions become harder to 
come by when there is a multitude of competing interests vying for a piece of the 
proverbial pie. An exploration of state heterogeneity, as opposed to sheer population 
size, as a cause of decreased incumbent vote share is a possible area for future research.
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A pair of more recent studies have cast serious doubt on the assertion that 
"Senators from heavily populated states do substantially worse on election day than 
Senators from lightly populated states" (Hibbing and Brandes, 1983: 811). Westlye 
(1991) examines Senate elections from 1968 to 1984. He uses three separate criteria to 
judge the electoral success of senators: average margin of victory, number of elections 
won by more than 20 percentage points, and number of elections where the incumbent 
lost reelection. For all three categories, he finds that there is a weak relationship 
between population size and the vote, and that this relationship is primarily due to very 
large states. He writes,
There appears to be no significant difference in the margin of victory of Senate 
elections whether a senator represents 550,000 constituents or 5.5 million. It is 
only in the very largest states-where constituents number more than 10 
million-that a senator's average margin of victory is significantly lower than in 
smaller states. It is only in these few very heavily populated states, as well, that 
notably fewer elections are of the "safe" variety and that the chances of winning 
reelection are significantly reduced....the threshold above which "assiduous 
attention to constituents' needs" fails to pay off would appear to be so high that 
only senators in the largest states are affected. For most states, and therefore for 
most Senate elections, state size is not a sufficient explanation for electoral 
results (Westlye, 1991:157).
Krasno (1994) divides Senate elections into three different periods: 1946 to 
1960,1962 to 1978, and 1980 to 1992. He finds that Senate seats located in small 
states have become safer during the last two periods, with 40 percent of incumbents 
losing reelection bids in the first period compared to 11 percent and 8 percent in the 
latter two. He also finds that seats located in the three largest states-Califomia, Texas, 
and New York-have become safer during the latest period. Since 1980, only two 
incumbent senators have lost races in these states: appointee John Seymour (R-CA) and 
scandal-ridden A1D'Amato (R-NY).
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Overall, Krasno reaches conclusions that are very similar to Westlye's. Remove 
the largest states from the equation and virtually no relationship between the two 
variables remains. He writes,
Restricting the analysis to states with fewer than twenty-six House districts... 
substantially reduces the effect of state population (to .05 percentage points). If 
representing more people does cost senators votes, this phenomenon is felt 
almost entirely in a handful of the most populous states. In addition, state size 
alone is a poor predictor of the vote. The number of congressional districts in a 
state accounts for very little of the variation in incumbent senators' share of the 
vote(R-squared=.010) (Krasno, 1994:45).
So, the size of a state's population does not appear to influence the vote. It 
should, however, influence campaign expenditures. Since senators can raise money 
independent of their states' population, those from small states should raise and spend 
more funds per capita than those from large states (Magleby, 1989). Individual 
contributors do not necessarily tie their contribution levels to the size of the state that a 
candidate is from, and research shows that PAC contributions do not increase with the 
population size of a senator’s state (Snyder 1989,1990).^ A final reason to suspect that 
per capita spending varies inversely with population size is that the legal limits on 
contributions set by the FEC are fixed sums, instead of being scaled to a state's 
population.
The state population variable is coded as the number of residents in each state as 
determined by the census. Census data are also used in determining the population size 
for each House district. Obviously, House districts do not display the degree of 
variation in population that is seen among the states.'* However, there is enough 
variance, especially in terms of a longitudinal perspective, to offer a suitable analysis.
CHALLENGER POLITICAL QUALITY 
In addition to candidate expenditures, the other key independent variable is 
challenger political quality (CPQ). As mentioned earlier, CPQ is important because it
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serves as a proxy for candidate visibility in my aggregate model. The assumption is that 
challengers with a greater degree of prominence are more recognizable to the general 
public than challengers who exist in relative obscurity. This prominence can be derived 
from holding high office or from distinguished personal characteristics. As with 
candidate spending, the importance of CPQ to the model makes it crucial that an 
appropriate measurement is utilized.
The scholarly literature is rife with various ways to measure challenger political 
quality. Jacobson (1978) and Jacobson and Kemell (1983) introduce the concept of 
CPQ. They assert that challengers who had previously held elective office were more 
successful in congressional elections than those that had no previous experience. To 
capture this difference, they use a simple dummy variable, coded 1 for candidates who 
previously held elective office. While many scholars have adopted this measure, others 
have sought more nuanced measures of CPQ.
Bond, Covington, and Fleisher (1985) develop a three-point quality scale based 
upon previous experience. They also create a composite of this scale and challenger 
spending. In a study of Senate elections, Squire (1989) also relies on more than just 
previous experience in creating a measure. He interacts a seven-point quality scale with 
the percentage of a state's population represented by the officeholder, which results in a 
staggering 600-point scale. Krasno and Green (1988) provide the most comprehensive 
measure of CPQ by combining past experience with a wide array of other 
qualifications. Gerber (1998) eschews the creation of a scale in favor of using five 
separate dummy variables representing five separate levels of office. Since one of the 
aims of this dissertation is to adhere to Gerber's methodology, I employ his approach in 
measuring CPQ.^
Any of the measures of CPQ that move beyond a dichotomous variable operate 
under the assumption that some elective offices are more valuable than others. There is
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ample research on the pattern of political careers to suggest that a definite hierarchy of 
elective offices exists (Black, 1972; Matthews, 1984; Mezey, 1970; Rohde, 1979; 
Schlesinger, 1966). For example, most people would agree that the position of 
governor is more valuable than that of small town mayor, or that the position of U.S. 
Representative carries more weight than state legislator. By placing the separate offices 
into a hierarchy, one can better establish whether a candidate who held a particular 
office should or should not be considered high-quality.
Once a researcher recognizes that different offices vary in terms of their 
intrinsic value, then the question becomes how to correctly capture the appropriate 
position of each office in that hierarchy. Until recently, there was no empirical 
justification for placing one office over another. For instance, some measures placed 
governors over U.S. Representatives even though there was no empirical evidence to 
suggest that governors garner a higher percentage of the vote when running for the 
Senate. Lublin's (1994) study was the first to empirically analyze this issue.
Lublin writes that "only after determining the relative impact of having held any 
particular office on the vote for the challenger can one rank offices, and thus challenger 
quality, on a hierarchical scale" (1994:230). To determine the relative value of prior 
office experience on the vote, he regresses the vote for senatorial incumbents on a set of 
dummy variables measuring the office held by the challenger, as well as standard 
political and economic control variables. He finds that challengers who served as U.S. 
Representatives receive "a greater boost at the polls than former governors and other 
statewide officials" (Lublin, 1994: 238). He also finds that statewide offices provide a 
higher value, in terms of votes, than local offices and state legislative posts.
The insight gained from Lublin's study is applied to the measure of CPQ used in 
this dissertation. Specifically, Lublin's results help guide my judgment in ranking the
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prestige of offices. For Senate elections, prestigious offices include governor, former 
senator, U.S. Representative, other statewide official, and mayor of a major city. For 
House elections, prestigious offices include former U.S. Representative, statewide 
official, state senator, and mayor or commissioner of any city.
CHALLENGER CELEBRITY 
Krasno and Green's scale assigns an additional point to challengers who have 
attained celebrity status. As my equation indicates, celebrity is also used as a separate 
dummy variable. Including this variable when specifying the model is important 
because it highlights the fact that some challengers have special attributes quite apart 
from any previous political experience. For example, had Warren Beatty or Donald 
Trump actually run for president in 2000 (God forbid!!), they would certainly have had 
an advantage over some obscure third-party candidate, even though neither man has 
ever held elective office.
I follow the guidelines laid out by Abramowitz (1988) for deciding whether to 
code a challenger as a celebrity. Based on the aforementioned election preview 
summaries in the Congressional Quarterly, a challenger is considered a celebrity "if he 
[or she] was a prominent public figure because of his [or her] activities before seeking 
elected office" (Abramowitz, 1988:401). Some examples of celebrity challengers 
include Oliver North (White House operative), Fred Thompson (actor), and Jack 
Lousma (astronaut).
STATE/DISTRICT PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGY 
Any study focusing on factors that influence elections should control for 
partisanship and ideology. Over the years, extensive analysis of these two factors has 
revealed their impact on election results (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 
1960; Kelly and Mirer, 1974; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Markus and Converse, 
1979; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1979; Niemi and Weisberg, 1993; Page, 1978; Page
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and Jones, 1979). The problem, though, is finding a reliable means for measuring them. 
For over thirty years, political scientists have wrestled with the problematic task of 
finding dependable substitutes.
A substitute is necessary because of the tenuousness of relying on information 
gleaned from primary sources. Using state registration information to determine 
partisanship is not helpful because many states do not require citizens to declare a 
partisan affiliation. Even when a state does require a declaration of partisanship, that 
information, as it pertains to individual districts within the state, is not maintained at a 
central location. If obtaining information on partisanship presents such a daunting task, 
then locating hard data on ideology is the research equivalent of finding the Holy 
Grail—and Indiana Jones is not a member of the APSA.
The next best alternative is to get the needed information via a survey. The 
difficulty with this option is administering a survey to enough people to accurately 
gauge the attitudes and predispositions o f the actual electorate. For example, Miller 
and Stokes (1963) relied on actual survey data gathered in the 1958 American National 
Election Study, but that survey provided an average district sample size of only 13 
respondents. This paltry sample size at the district level calls into question the validity 
of that study's findings (Erikson, 1978; Page, Shapiro, Gronke, and Rosenberg, 1984). 
To be able to rely on public opinion to determine partisanship and ideology, one would 
need to conduct a survey that includes far more respondents than the typical national 
survey does, but a lack of time and money eliminate this route as an option.
Instead, researchers have come to rely on presidential election returns (Carson 
and Oppenheimer, 1984; Fleisher, 1993; Glazer and Robbins, 1985; LeoGrande and 
Brenner, 1993; Schwarz and Fenmore, 1977). These scholars assert that presidential 
election returns are an adequate proxy because they cover both the state and district 
level, represent actual constituency behavior, and consistently occur every four years,
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which allows for time-series analysis. While most studies use returns as a substitute for 
ideology, they have also been used as a substitute for partisanship. An article by 
LeoGrande and Jeydel (1997) spotlights some troubling drawbacks to using this as a 
proxy for either electoral factor.
There are two assumptions that must hold in order for presidential election 
returns to be a valid proxy: "(a) that short-term factors determining the vote have a 
fairly uniform effect across subnational constituencies and (b) that constituency 
ideology [or partisanship] is the only significant long-term factor affecting the vote" 
(LeoGrande and Jeydel, 1997:6). Using Pearson correlations, the authors find that the 
average correlation between presidential elections at both the state and district level is 
approximately .50; far below the frequently used benchmark of .80. This shows that 
short-term forces have differing impacts on specific states or districts from election to 
election, which makes it hard to gauge any long-term predispositions.
LeoGrande and Jeydel test the second assumption by conducting principal 
components analysis. They find that there are, in fact, two significant dimensions that 
account for the vote. These dimensions translate into the long-term factors of ideology 
(60.3 percent o f the variance) and partisanship (21.8 percent of the variance). Their 
results are similar to those of Macdonald and Rabinowitz (1987) ^ With both factors 
maintaining a significant influence on the electorate's voting decisions, presidential 
election returns should not be used as a proxy for either one of them. This proxy cannot 
be justified because researchers cannot reliably discern which specific long-term factor 
they are tapping into.
The variables that I use to measure state/district partisanship and ideology avoid 
some o f the pitfalls discussed above. First, there are two distinct variables, which 
eliminates any ambiguity about what is being measured. Second, the variables are
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culled from surveys that have been pooled together over time to provide a reliable 
number o f respondents. Finally, the surveys were conducted over a long enough period 
to allay any concerns about the results being temporal quirks.
Both variables are drawn from the work of Erikson, Wright, and Mclver (1993). 
Their study establishes the partisan and ideological temperament o f a state based on 
CBS-New York Times surveys conducted between 1974 and 1988. These pooled 
surveys enable Erikson et al. to produce measures calculated from two self-placement 
questions. They test these measures by correlating them with several state polls and 
find correlations around the .80 range. They appear to have arrived at a reasonable 
estimation of a state's general partisan and ideological placement. Erikson et al. (1993) 
write,
In the CBS/NYT surveys, respondents' partisanship is measured by their 
answers to the question, "Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a 
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” Ideology is assessed by 
asking the questions: "How would you describe your views on most political 
matters? Generally, do you think of yourself as liberal, moderate, or 
conservative?" These questions are similar to the standard American 
National Election Study questions on partisan and ideological identification.
[Tables B. I and B.2] present the results of our state aggregations for the 48 
contiguous states plus the District of Columbia. (No estimates are available 
for Alaska and Hawaii.) Shown are the percentages for each self-identified 
partisan and ideological category, as well as the number of usable respondents 
on which they are based. State positions on the two trichotomized measures are 
summarized as mean positions. These means are calculated by assigning a score 
o f-100 to each Republican or conservative, a score of 0 to each Independent 
and moderate, and a score o f+100 to each Democrat or liberal and then 
calculating the mean in the standard way. Measured in this metric, the mean has 
an easy interpretation as the relative percentage point difference between the 
Democrats and Republicans or between liberals and conservatives (14 & 17).
Because Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the original analysis, I 
create a measure for these states. Erikson et al. note that states of the Pacific Rim are 
liberal, while Northwestem-Mountain states tend to be conservative. Since the past
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electoral history of the two states and the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) 
scores of their senators show Hawaii to be Democratic-liberal and Alaska to be 
Republican-conservative, I compute the mean partisan and ideological score of similar 
states and use this as a substitute. California, Oregon, and Washington are used for 
Hawaii, while Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming are used for Alaska.
Because the Erikson et al. data only gauge partisanship and ideology at the state 
level, I use a variation on their measure for the district level. Garand and Ardoin (1999) 
have developed a statistical procedure for using the state-level scores computed by 
Erikson et al. to simulate district-level scores. Basically, state-level data is used to 
estimate the relationship that state partisanship and ideology have to various 
demographic and political variables. Once the parameters of this state model are 
estimated, then analogous data from U.S. House districts are substituted into the model 
to yield predicted levels of partisanship and ideology for House districts. These 
simulated scores can be interpreted in the exact same way. ' This provides me with a 
fair degree of confidence as 1 expand my study to include House races, since the 
simulated scores exhibit the same strengths as the original data from which they are 
estimated.
ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Since economic conditions affect elections, a variable measuring the level of a 
state's unemployment in the election year is used. This variable is also interacted with a 
dichotomous variable measuring whether the incumbent is in the same party as the 
president. A high level o f unemployment should benefit all challengers, especially 
those that are not in the party of the sitting president.
There are no readily available statistics on unemployment in individual districts. 
Although districts will vary within a state, the literature on sociotropic voting suggests 
that perhaps voters will be more concerned with the macro-conditions of the state;
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thus, even if their own community may be thriving, they may still cast a ballot based on 
the overall condition of the state (Lewis-Beck, 1988). However, this type of economic 
voting has not been clearly established. Rather than include these economic variables 
based on such a tenuous amount of information, it is prudent to exclude them from the 
House model.
INCUMBENT-CENTERED VARIABLES 
The model specifies three variables that account for campaign-specific 
situations that affect election outcomes. Part o f the allure of politics is the energy and 
excitement generated when vivid personalities clash in the swirling cauldron of a 
campaign. A fiercely contested campaign often takes on the dimensions of both a 
championship fight and a suspense novel. Incumbents are content to sail to reelection 
without any such drama, but know that a perceived personal transgression can invite 
strong competition. Such negative incidents are often unique to specific campaigns and 
can alter these campaigns in differing ways.
However, negative perceptions of incumbents do produce one fairly uniform 
result: incumbents fare worse than they normally would. This manifests itself in lower 
victory margins or outright defeat. In such situations, high-quality challengers sense 
that there is blood in the water and move in for the kill. Even if  incumbents do survive, 
they are often left in a weakened state. The goal for incumbents is to avoid being 
placed in that situation to begin with. In the language of my model, this means 
avoiding scandal and controversy.
An incumbent scandal involves "allegations in the media o f illegal activities," 
while an incumbent controversy involves "incidents that were reported by the media 
and raised questions about the incumbent's honesty, judgment, or competence" 
(Abramowitz, 1988:400). Another condition that can negatively impact an incumbent's 
chances for reelection is poor health. If voters perceive that an incumbent does not
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possess the vigor and stamina necessary to adequately perform in office, they may 
decide to replace him or her with someone who does. All three variables are 
dichotomous and are constructed from information found in the Congressional 
Quarterly.
PARTY
A dummy variable is included for party for each year in order to account for 
national partisan tides that influence local elections. There are certain election years 
where the public mood is firmly in favor of one of the two parties, and this will either 
positively or negatively affect incumbents depending on their party affiliation. For 
instance, Republicans were running for cover in 1974 and running toward the spotlight 
in 1994. A strong national partisan swing does not nullify other factors, but does serve 
to accentuate them.
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
As mentioned in an earlier section, the fact that both spending variables are 
correlated with the error term makes it undesirable to apply the usual estimation 
procedure of ordinary least-squares (OLS). Rather, a procedure must be employed that 
accounts for this endogeneity problem and produces reliable results. King (1989) notes,
...the identification of this model of reciprocal causation leans heavily on the 
theoretical specification of [the different variables]. If substantive theory 
provides insufficient guidance to make these specifications, parameter estimates 
with maximum relative likelihoods are not unique. In the history of statistics, a 
large number of estimators have been proposed for this model and its close 
relatives. Most were proposed due to easier computational efficiency or as 
incremental improvements over the prior state of the literature. A mutually 
nonexclusive list includes two stage least squares (also known as 2SLS), three 
stage least squares (3SLS), generalized least squares (GLS), indirect least 
squares (US), AT-class estimators, double K-class estimators, AT-matrix-class 
estimators, limited information maximum likelihood (LIML), instrumental 
variables estimators (IV), and nonlinear versions o f each (200).
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This study employs an instrumental variables (IV) approach. The instrumental
variables must be correlated with the two spending variables and be uncorrelated with 
the error tenn, and by extension, with the vote total. Challenger wealth and 
state/district population fulfill these two requirements. These instrumental variables, 
along with the other exogenous variables in the model, are used in two stages.
FIRST STAGE: The endogenous regressors are treated as dependent variables 
and are each regressed onto the instrumental variables, plus 
the other exogenous regressors. This reduced form produces 
a predicted value for incumbent/challenger spending, known 
as an instrumental variable estimator.
Incumbent Spending =Governor, Senator, U.S. Representative, Major, Minor, 
Celebrity, Controversy, Scandal, Health, State District 
Partisanship, Ideological Distance, Unemployment, 
Unemployment*Party, State District Population, Challenger 
Wealth, Error Term.
Challenger Spending =Governor, Senator, U.S. Representative, Major, Minor, 
Celebrity, Controversy, Scandal, Health, State District 
Partisanship, Ideological Distance, Unemployment, 
Unemployment*Party, State District Population, Challenger 
Wealth, Error Term.
SECOND STAGE: The predicted value is then inserted into the next equation.
Purged of the endogenous variables, this equation should 
produce accurate, consistent coefficients. This process of 
estimation allows for greater veracity in gauging the 
effects of candidate spending on the vote.
Incumbent Vote % =Incumbent Spending, Challenger*Spending, Governor, Senator, 
U.S. Representative, Major, Minor, Celebrity Challenger, 
Incumbent Controversy, Incumbent Scandal, Incumbent Health, 
State District Partisanship, Ideological Distance, State 
Unemployment Level, State Unemployment Level*Incumbent in 
Governing Party, Party, Error Term.
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CONCLUSION
The attention focused on the Clinton administration's fundraising activities, and 
political figures such as John McCain and Bill Bradley reveal that the issue o f campaign 
finance is very much on the national agenda. The majority of citizens may not 
explicitly point to campaign finance as a pressing issue, but surely their expressed 
concern over the perceived disconnect between the government and the governed is, in 
part, derived from this issue. Such a political environment makes this study relevant 
and, hopefully, beneficial.
Some view the current trends in campaign spending as troubling and call for 
reforms, while others view these trends as benign and prefer the status quo. This study 
is not intended to reinforce any particular argument or to offer support to either side in 
the campaign finance debate. Rather, it is intended as an exploration of the role that 
money has played in congressional elections over the past two decades. Having a 
clearer understanding of money's role will help inform the current debate, and an 
informed debate is infinitely better than one mired in ignorance. Trying desperately to 
avoid sounding like Kenneth Starr, I merely want an impartial, objective examination of 
the facts.
Of course, my findings may tend to lend credence to one side over the other. 
Once the basic facts have been established, the path upon which future legislation 
should travel may appear clearer. An analysis of the results may cause me to favor 
certain types of reform and to offer my recommendations in another study. If any, or 
all, of these things turn out to be true, then so be i t  After all, one of the four roles of 
research is prescription. The key is that one's prescription be based on sound logic, and 
this requires an appreciation of relevant facts. So, this study is more concerned with the 
other three roles of research: observation, explanation, and prediction.
62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ENDNOTES
1) Open seat elections and elections with missing variables are excluded from the data 
set.
2) The sources used for this information are the bi-annual editions o f The Almanac o f  
American Politics, as well as reports issued by the FEC.
3) In fact, individuals or interest groups who wish to maximize the impact o f their 
contributions might prefer donating money to senators from small states. Since the 
cost of campaigning is usually lower in small states (Brown, 1992), a contribution 
can increase spending per voter more dramatically in small states than in large ones. 
For instance, a $3,000 contribution will go farther in Maine than in California, and by 
extension, the senator on the receiving end may be more grateful; financial donors 
get more bang for the buck. This is not to say that senators from small states raise 
more money than those from large states, but only that senators from small states
are ahead of the curve when one factors in state population size. Dianne Feinstein 
may raise more actual dollars than Olympia Snowe, but Snowe more than holds her 
own when it comes to per capita fundraising, because she need only raise one-fiftieth 
of what Feinstein does.
4) See the Supreme Court decision in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) which forwarded 
the "one person, one vote" doctrine and eliminated malapportioned districts.
3) Gerber divides candidates into five categories based on previous political experience: 
governor, U.S. Representative, major state or local official, minor public official, and 
no previous elected office. I include a sixth-senator-to capture those few instances 
where former senators sought to recapture that office.
6) Macdonald and Rabinowitz find a bit more parity between the two dimensions, but 
also conclude that the importance of ideology has been rising since the mid-1960s.
7) Erikson et al. and Ardoin and Garand measure these variabtes in the Democratic and 
liberal direction. 1 am concerned with whether a district's partisanship and ideology 
are consonant with its incumbent’s partisanship and ideology. So I recode these two 
variables in a way that allows me to gauge this relationship. If the incumbent is a 
Democrat, then I multiply by 1. If the incumbent is a Republican, then I multiply by 
-1. By performing this function, I ensure that all of the numbers are measured in the 
incumbent's direction.
63
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER FIVE:
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
There are essentially two ways to determine the outcome of any election: 
examine the percentage of the vote captured by each candidate involved in the race, or 
simply look at who won and lost. Of course, the latter standard is the one that really 
matters. The saying that "close only counts in horseshoes and hand-grenades" is 
certainly applicable to U.S. elections. It does not matter if a candidate garners 49.9% or 
.01% of the vote, in both cases he or she walks away with nothing. * Victory brings 
acclaim and opportunity, while defeat brings a pat on the back and a "better luck next 
time."
While hardball practitioners of politics may only care about winning and losing, 
academicians who study politics have additional concerns. The dichotomous nature of 
the won-lost standard makes its utility somewhat limited in a study of elections.
Though dichotomous variables are often useful-and sometimes the only measures 
available-for modeling political behavior, they are also blunt instruments. One way to 
assuage this bluntness is to construct continuous variables, which allow for a more 
nuanced approach.
This is why vote percentages are valuable. By looking at the percentage of the 
vote that a candidate receives, one has more latitude in estimating the impact of 
particular factors on election outcomes. For instance, assume that there are two 
challengers who are identical in every way, except that one has previously held elective 
office and the other has not Also, assume that previous experience in elective office 
translates into five percentage points, above and beyond what a candidate would receive 
otherwise. Finally, assume that these extra five percentage points are not enough to 
surmount the lead held by the incumbent so that both challengers are defeated.
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An analysis relying on the dichotomous measure would show the results for both 
challengers to be the same: they lost. An analysis relying on vote percentages would 
highlight the fact that the challenger with previous electoral experience performed 
better. He or she may have lost, but that loss was by a smaller margin, and that smaller 
margin can be accounted for. This is useful information. The scholarly community 
now knows that challengers with previous electoral experience wage campaigns that are 
more potent and have a greater likelihood of success.
In examining my results for House and Senate elections, I employ both of the 
above standards. In this chapter, I look at some relevant descriptive statistics, many of 
which are centered around the number o f challengers who were victorious. The next 
two chapters contain various regression results. All o f the regression equations have the 
incumbent's percentage of the two-party vote as their dependent variable.
CHALLENGER POLITICAL QUALITY 
Challenger political quality (CPQ) stands alongside candidate expenditures as 
the variables of most interest. Its importance derives from the fact that it serves as a 
proxy for a candidate's visibility among voters. Of course, the ideal would be to have 
survey data that directly measured the voters' awareness of candidates for all of the 
elections encompassed in this dissertation. That kind of data set does not exist and 
would take a lot of time and money to create. So, CPQ is called upon to serve as a 
substitute, and it is a reliable one.
At the core of any CPQ measure is whether or not a challenger has prior 
political experience in elective office. All of the approaches to measuring CPQ 
discussed earlier (see Chapter 4) have one common thread: previous elective office. 
Some researchers suggest that this information alone is a sufficient gauge of candidate 
quality (Jacobson, 1978), while others contend that additional information needs to be
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added in an effort to elaborate on the various aspects of candidate quality (Green and 
Krasno, 1988; Squire, 1989). Why is previous elective office so critical to CPQ?
Perhaps more than anything else, prior political experience is the best indicator 
for how a candidate will perform in a campaign. A challenger who has previously held 
elective office has a proven record of successfully running a campaign.^ One of the 
hallmarks of a successful campaign is connecting with a significant proportion of the 
electorate. Also, past electoral success indicates that a candidate is at least somewhat 
proficient at organizing, fundraising, advertising, and other activities required for 
victory.
In most instances, a challenger with previous experience in elective office 
should run a better campaign than a challenger with no such experience. Furthermore, 
a vigorous campaign should attract more attention from the electorate than an anemic 
one. Therefore, challengers who have held elective office should be better able to 
attract the attention of voters; they should have a higher degree of visibility. This is the 
logic behind using CPQ as a proxy for a candidate's visibility among voters. It is a 
sound logic and CPQ is a sound concept. Now let us turn to an examination of the 
actual data.
Based on my general theory of expenditure effects, there are several specific 
hypotheses that one would expect to demonstrate in regard to CPQ. First, higher quality 
challengers for both the House and Senate should spend more money in campaigns, on 
average, than their lower quality counterparts. Second, higher quality challengers for 
both chambers should win a greater proportion of the races that they enter relative to 
lower quality challengers. Third, campaigns for the Senate should attract a greater 
proportion of high-quality challengers than campaigns for the House.
In Table 5 .1 ,1 present average expenditures for incumbents and challengers for 
the twenty years under review, as well as a breakdown by decade. In Tables 5.2 and
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S.3,1 present average expenditures by challengers grouped into six categories based on 
previously held office. The main thing to be determined from these tables is whether or 
not high-quality challengers do indeed spend more than low-quality challengers. Table 
S. 1 is mentioned because it is also useful to see how high- and low-quality challengers 
compare to the overall average for challengers.
Table 5.1 Average Expenditures by House and Senate Candidates, 1974-94.
Years Incumbents Challengers N
House
1974-1994 $292,204 $123,893 (.25) 3163
1974-1978 $158,400 $100,956 (.32) 881
1980-1988 $311,103 $135,277 (.24) 1434
1990-1994 $399,257 $128,471 (.20) 848
Senate
1974-1994 $2,453,085 $1,316,491 (.30) 280
1974-1978 $1,493,668 $ 872,825 (.36) 64
1980-1988 $2,448,327 $1,273,844 (.29) 136
1990-1994 $3,228,708 $1,743,926 (.26) 80
Note: Figures are in real 1982-1984 dollars. Figures in parentheses represent 
challenger spending as a proportion of total spending.
Regarding the six categories, even though each office is treated as a separate 
entity, rather than being arranged along some scale, there should be little argument over 
the fact that some of these offices are more prestigious than others. I propose that the
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Table S.2 Average Expenditures by House Challengers-Previous Elective Office, 
1974-94
Previous Office Expenditures N
Governor $74,734 2
Senator $146,516 I
U.S. Representative $325,160 44
Major $232,600 173
Minor $187,569 470
No Elective Experience $101,343 2860
Note: Figures are in real 1982-1984 dollars.
Table 5.3 Average Expenditures by Senate Challengers-Previous Elective Office, 
1974-94
Previous Office Expenditures N
Governor $2,427,509 13
Senator $2,039,803 2
U.S. Representaive $2,235,425 49
Major $1,836,088 34
Minor $617,484 70
No Elective $1,021,198* 111
*This figure is misleading due to the exorbitant sum of money spent by Oliver North in 
his 1994 bid for the Senate. Excluding North's $13,905,106, the average figure is 
$904,071. All figures are in real 1982-1984 dollars.
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six categories be viewed as representing three levels o f prestige. The top echelon of 
offices are governor, senator, and U.S. Representative. The intermediate level covers 
major statewide elected officials other than governor, as well as mayors o f important 
cities. The lowest level covers those elected to minor offices, along with those who 
have never been elected to office.
Certainly a governorship is qualitatively far superior to any other statewide 
office; to a certain degree, governors can be thought of as the presidents of their 
individual states. While they do not have the awesome powers of the presidency and do 
not really have to deal with foreign policy, they are chief-executives and chief- 
legislators in their states. This may be one of the reasons why governors have been 
more successful than congressmen in getting elected to the highest office in the land. 
Meanwhile, senators and representatives are federal officeholders who share the cachet 
of being only one of 535 legislators to serve their country in Washington D.C..
Major statewide and local offices do confer a certain degree of status on those 
who occupy them, but in most instances, they do not have the luster of the top echelon. ̂  
However, those who hold these offices should be viewed as higher quality candidates 
than those found on the lowest level. Having been a county commissioner or a member 
of a small town school board simply does not compare to having been a U.S. 
Representative or a state attorney general. Taking these distinctions into account, let us 
proceed with an analysis of the data.
Looking at races for the House, the numbers perfectly match expectations. 
Because the number o f former governors and senators who ran in House races is too 
small to be of much probative value, it is sensible to set these two categories aside.
Once this is done, the other four categories line up as predicted. Former U.S. 
Representatives have the highest average expenditures at approximately $325,000,
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followed by major officeholders at approximately $233,000. Minor public officials 
spent an average of $189,000, with those holding no elective office bringing up the rear 
with around $101,000.
Likewise, spending figures for Senate races pretty much unfold as expected. 
Those in the top echelon of offices spent an average of over $2 million in their 
campaigns. Governors spent the most, followed by representatives and senators. Major 
officeholders were next in line at approximately $1.8 million. Challengers from the 
two low-quality categories failed to clear one million dollars in spending, with minor 
officeholders coming in at $617,000, and those with no prior office spending an average 
of$904,000.4
For House and Senate campaigns, high-quality challengers do, in fact, spend 
more money than low-quality challengers. High-quality challengers for both chambers 
also have expenditures that exceed the overall average for challengers, while those 
challengers from the two low-quality categories have expenditures that are below the 
average for all challengers, with the exception of minor officeholders campaigning for 
the House. The first hypothesis passes muster.
While it is instructive to look at the amount of money spent by candidates, it is 
also beneficial to view these expenditures as a proportion of total spending. It is 
especially important to view challenger spending within this context What might seem 
like an impressive sum of money may actually be a pittance when compared to the 
incumbent's output We know that the average amount spent by House challengers is 
roughly $124,000, but how does this amount stack up against what incumbents are 
spending? Determining the proportion spent by challengers in a campaign gives us an 
understanding of how competitive challengers are from a financial standpoint
In Table 5.1, the numbers in parentheses show challenger spending as a 
proportion of total spending. The proportion of money spent by challengers in House
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campaigns has steadily dwindled over the years. In the 1970s, challengers accounted 
for 32% of total spending in a campaign. In the following decade, that percentage fell 
to a quarter of all expenditures. By the 1990s, challengers accounted for a mere 20% of 
total spending.
While the proportion of spending accounted for by Senate challengers is greater, 
across the board, than that accounted for by House challengers, the numbers are still 
anemic. From a high of 36% in the 1970s, the trend has been downward. In the 1990s, 
their expenditures were only 26% of the total spent It is plain to see why incumbents 
continue to return to office with the slightest of ease. The overall numbers for House 
and Senate challengers point out their financial disadvantage in stark detail.
In Tables 5.4 and 5.5,1 place the total number of challengers for the House and 
Senate into the six CPQ categories, along with the number of those who were 
victorious. The findings conform to expectations. Beginning with House races, once 
governors and senators are excluded due to the small number of observations, the other 
categories basically fall into place. Of the 44 former representatives who sought 
another trip to the House, 25% of them were successful. Of the 173 who held a major 
office, 14% were successful. The minor office category does not match expectations in 
that these challengers were as successful at winning office as their major office 
counterparts.
Upon further consideration, however, this result is not too surprising. House 
districts are relatively small, so it is possible that someone holding a minor office might 
have a decent shot at winning. However, the odds of victory become much smaller 
when one competes for statewide office. Those minor candidates who are able to sneak 
through in a House race face a much bigger problem when trying to win a Senate seat 
This is borne out in results shown in Table 5.5. Finally, those challengers with no 
elective experience lag well behind with only a 4% success rate.
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Table 5.4 Winning Challengers in House Elections-Previous Elective Office, 
1974-94
Previous Office Total Challengers Winning Challengers %
Governor 2 0 0
Senator 1 0 0
U.S. Representative 44 11 25
Major 173 25 14
Minor 470 67 14
No Elective 2860 120 4
Table 5.5 Winning Challengers in Senate Elections-Previous Elective Office, 
1974-94
Previous Office Total Challengers Winning Challengers %
Governor 13 5 38
Senator 2 I 50
U.S. Representative 49 16 32
Major 34 8 23
Minor 70 6 8
No Elective 111 14 13
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In races for the Senate, things also pretty much hold to expectations.
Discounting the senate category (there are only two entries), the other top echelon 
offices yield a higher proportion of victories than the lower offices. Of the 13 
challengers in the governor category, 38% were successful. 32% of the 49 
representatives were successful. Dropping to the next level, of the 34 who held a major 
office, 23% achieved victory. This is much higher than the 8% of minor officeholders, 
out of 70, who won. The only glitch in the results for Senate races is that of the 111 
with no elective office, 13% were successful-a higher percentage than for minor 
officeholders.
So, looking at races for both chambers one finds that, with only one exception, 
challengers at higher levels won a greater proportion of the races that they entered




Governor 2 (.10) Governor 13 (4.6)
Senator 1 (.00) Senator 2 (.70)
U.S. Rep. 44(1.2) U.S. Rep. 49(17.4)
Major 173 (4.8) Major 34(12.4)
Minor 470(13.1) Minor 70 (24.8)
No Elective 2860 (80.0) No Elective 111 (39.7)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages.
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compared to challengers at lower levels. And when looking at the six categories of 
offices separately, there are only two instances when higher quality challengers did not 
have a greater proportion of victory than lower quality challengers. The second 
hypothesis comes through nicely.
The final area to be explored concerning CPQ is whether or not there are a 
greater proportion of high-quality challengers running for the Senate compared to those 
running for the House. Referring to Table S.6, the results show that this is the case.
Out of the 3,000-plus House campaigns analyzed in this dissertation, there were only 
two former governors and one former senator who competed in them. This produces a 
percentage so minuscule as to be irrelevant Barely 1% of challengers for the House 
had served in that institution previously, while only 5% had held a major statewide or 
local office. Minor officeholders accounted for a little over one-tenth of the pool of 
challengers. The overwhelming percentage of challengers (80%) for the House had no 
previous experience in office.
As for Senate races, there were only two former senators accounted for in the 
280 contests under examination in this study. But the percentages are comparatively 
higher for the positions of governor (approximately 5%), representative (17%), major 
officeholder (12%), and minor officeholders (25%). Naturally, this dispersion means 
that there are far fewer challengers (40%) in Senate contests who have never held 
office. These numbers conclusively demonstrate that Senate challengers are of a higher 
quality than House challengers, as predicted by the third hypothesis.
CHALLENGER EXPENDITURES 
Before moving on to some of the other variables in my model, I want to 
explicitly address an issue concerning challenger expenditures. Many people argue that 
because money is so important in campaigns, it can often be the determining factor in
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election outcomes. Those candidates who outspend their opponents will win more 
times than not And if challengers are more dependent on spending than incumbents, 
then outspending an opponent is especially critical for them. Is this true?
Table S. 7 casts some light on this question. Of the 222 challengers who 
defeated incumbents in elections for the House, 85 (38%) of them outspent the 
incumbent. O f the 50 challengers who defeated incumbents in elections for the Senate, 
18 (36%) of them outspent the incumbent. This would seem to indicate that it is not 
necessary to outgun an incumbent in order to achieve victory.
Table 5.7 Victories in Relation to Spending by House and Senate Challengers, 
1974-94
House
222 challengers defeated incumbents~85 (38%) of these outspent incumbents
349 challengers outspent incumbents-85 (24%) of these were victorious 
2814 challengers did not outspend incumbents-137 (5%) of these were victorious
Senate
50 challengers defeated incumbents-18 (36%) of these outspent incumbents
38 challengers outspent incumbents-18 (47%) of these were victorious
242 challengers did not outspend incumbents-32 (13%) of these were victorious
Viewing this question from a slightly different angle, o f the 349 House 
challengers who outspent incumbents, 85 (24%) of them won the election. But of the 
2814 challengers who spent less than incumbents, only 137 (5%) of them were 
victorious. In Senate elections, 38 challengers outspent incumbents and 18 (47%) of
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them were successful. But of the 242 challengers who spent less than incumbents, only 
32 (13%) of them won the election. These figures paint a more complete portrait of 
what I think is the true relationship between expenditures and victory.
Money is more important to challengers than to incumbents. Incumbents have 
an array of resources at their disposal in seeking reelection, while challengers must 
often rely more heavily on campaign expenditures to establish themselves and create 
momentum in a campaign. Just because money is more crucial to the success of a 
challenger's efforts does not necessarily mean that it is the ultimate arbiter of victory 
and defeat There are, of course, other factors involved in elections, hence the use of 
multivariate as opposed to bivariate equations; I will explore some of these other 
factors shortly.
The key point to remember about challenger spending is this: financial parity is 
usually a necessary but not a sufficient condition for success. Spewing forth money like 
a human teller machine is not enough to ensure victory, and thank goodness that it is 
not Citizens should expect more from candidates, especially relatively unknown 
challengers, than a fat wallet On the other hand, challengers who are unable to be 
financially competitive with incumbents have almost no chance of winning. For poor 
challengers, Capitol Hill is not a career destination, but a vacation destination. In the 
final analysis, challengers should recognize that a spending advantage provides a better 
chance for victory, not a guarantee of one.
INCUMBENT CONTROVERSY AND SCANDAL
Contrary to public opinion, which is often shaped by the media, all politicians 
are not unethical and crooked. By and large, politicians are conscientious about their 
jobs and try to perform their duties as public servants admirably. But as in any 
profession, there are occasions when some people fall short of the mark. Unlike other
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professions, the punishment doled out for such transgressions is decided by the public 
via a ballot, rather than by a supervisor via a pink slip.
Following the lead of Abramowitz (1988), I classify political wrongdoing into 
two categories: controversies and scandals. A controversy is when incidents call an 
incumbent's honesty, judgment, or competence into question. A scandal is when an 
incumbent is alleged to have been involved in illegal activities. In Tables C.l and C.2,1 
list the campaigns where one of these two were present.^
I hypothesize that challengers should win a greater proportion of elections 
involving incumbent controversies or scandals compared to their overall rate of victory. 
Furthermore, I would expect that the proportion would be greater for elections 
involving scandals as opposed to those involving controversies, since the wrongdoing 
involved in scandals is usually of a more serious nature. These incidents do not occur 
in a vacuum, so that potential challengers are aware that there is blood in the water. In 
an effort to capitalize on an already favorable situation, the eventual challengers should 
spend more money than usual in the campaigns, and should be aided in this cause by 
contributors who also see a real opportunity for change. Thus, I also hypothesize that 
average challenger expenditures will be higher in elections involving incumbent 
controversies or scandals compared to overall average challenger expenditures. 
Furthermore, I would expect that challenger spending would be higher in elections 
involving scandals as opposed to those involving controversies, for the reason cited 
above.
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate that both hypotheses are borne out In House 
elections involving incumbent controversy, challengers won 26% of the time; in House 
elections involving incumbent scandal, that figure jumps to 48%. Both of these are 
higher than the overall percentage (6%) of victory for challengers in House elections.
In Senate elections involving incumbent controversy, challengers won 28% of the time;
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Table 5.8 Victories by Challengers in Campaigns Involving Incumbent Controversy
or Scandal, 1974-94
House
3460 elections without incumbent controversy or scandal-challengers won 191 (6%)
86 elections involved incumbent controversy—challengers won 22 (26%)
31 elections involved incumbent scandal-challengers won IS (48%)
Senate
248 elections without incumbent controversy or scandal-challengers won 40 (16%)
25 elections involved incumbent controversy-challengers won 7 (28%)
7 elections involved incumbent scandal-challengers won 3 (43%)



















Note: Figures are in real 1982-1984 dollars.
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in Senate elections involving incumbent scandal, that figure increases to 43%. Both of 
these are higher than the overall percentage (16%) of victory for challengers in Senate 
elections.
In House elections involving incumbent controversy, challengers spent an 
average of approximately $206,000; in House elections involving incumbent scandal, 
challengers spent approximately $221,000. Both of these are higher than the overall 
challenger average of $124,000. In Senate elections involving incumbent controversy, 
challengers spent an average of approximately $2,100,000; in Senate elections 
involving incumbent scandal, challengers spent roughly $1,300,000. The overall 
challenger average is $1,300,000. So, only the final subset of elections provides a 
glitch in terms of my expectations.
As a sidenote, incumbent spending in these types of elections exhibits a curious 
pattern. Remember that the general theory of candidate spending guiding this 
dissertation assumes that incumbents adjust their level of spending to match the 
perceived level of threat. If they anticipate a tough race from a qualified opponent with 
ample financial resources, then they respond with a torrent of cash. Surely, incumbents 
who are embroiled in a controversy or scandal realize that this could prompt that kind 
of scenario. They may have behaved foolishly, but they are not fools. This would lead 
one to expect that incumbents would also raise their level of expenditures in elections 
involving controversies and scandals, in an effort to lessen the potential negative 
electoral repercussions stemming from such incidents.
The evidence partially confirms this expectation. For both chambers, 
incumbents involved in controversies do increase their level of spending above what 
they spend in a normal campaign. In both cases, their expenditures actually exceed 
those of challengers. Incumbents involved in scandals, however, do not raise spending
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levels and are outspent, on average, by challengers. So, when they are in the most 
trouble and should anticipate the stormiest weather, they do not respond as expected Is 
there any possible explanation for this?
I think the most feasible explanation involves the initial stage of the campaign 
spending process. Before candidates can spend money, they have to collect i t  Donors, 
too, are strategic thinkers when it comes to electoral politics (Jacobson and Kemell, 
1981). If they think that a candidate has little chance of winning, then they are not 
going to waste their valuable resources on that candidate.
Even though incumbents enjoy a very cozy relationship with big-time donors, 
this relationship is not impervious to outside events. The question becomes how severe 
does a negative event have to be before the flow of cash dries up. A small controversy 
may not be enough to interrupt the symbiosis of donors and incumbents, but a major 
scandal probably will be. The reason that incumbents who are on the ropes do not 
dramatically increase spending is because they cannot; they do not have adequate 
funding. Again, this is only an educated guess that is meant to highlight yet another 
interesting area to be explored.
CHALLENGER CELEBRITY 
There are occasions when incumbents must face challengers who are well 
known to a significant portion of the electorate based on factors not directly related to 
political life. Whether they be entertainers, athletes, scions o f famous families, or some 
other breed of celebrity-these challengers bring something extra to the table. To the 
extent that celebrity challengers emerge with a higher awareness among voters than 
ordinary challengers, they should have an easier time overcoming the varied obstacles 
that face anyone trying to unseat an incumbent For this reason, I hypothesize that 
celebrity challengers should win a greater proportion of the elections that they enter 
compared to the overall rate of victory for challengers.
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Table S.10 Victories by Celebrity Challengers in House and Senate Campaigns,
1974-94
House
S3 elections involved celebrity challengers-challengers won 10 (19%) of these 
Senate
10 elections involved celebrity challengers-challengers won 4 (40%) of these






In Tables S. 10 and 5.11,1 list information on the results and expenditures in 
elections involving celebrity challengers. All of the forwarded hypotheses are borne 
out. Celebrity challengers in House races win 19% of the time; this is hardly a 
staggering percentage, but it is more than the overall 6% rate of victory. Races for the 
upper chamber involving a celebrity challenger result in incumbent defeat 40% of the 
time, which is higher than the usual 16%. Celebrity challengers for the House spend 
two times more than the overall expenditure average, while that figure for Senate 
challengers is almost three times more. In fact, the average Senate celebrity challenger 
actually outspends the rival incumbent by nearly $50,000. Though both House and 
Senate incumbents do, as predicted, increase spending in order to meet the threat
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Publicity is not the only thing that celebrity attracts, it also attracts money.
There is a reason why the late Sonny Bono was the most sought after congressman for 
Republican fundraising events. Not even staid "main Streeters" can resist the allure of a 
little Hollywood dazzle. Since being a celebrity should aid challengers in attracting 
campaign funds, I expect celebrity challengers to have higher expenditures, on average, 
than other challengers. The publicity accompanying a celebrity challenger will give the 
incumbent plenty of time to gear up his or her own finance machinery, so that 
incumbent spending should increase as well.
CHALLENGER WEALTH 
The final variable to be explored in this chapter is challenger wealth. As noted 
earlier, a vast amount of wealth does not automatically translate into political success.
It should, however, translate into an enhanced ability to spend. Challengers who 
maintain a degree of personal wealth have deeper financial reservoirs to draw from. If 
necessary, they can simply write a check or secure a big loan in order to remain 
competitive in terms of spending. While there is no reason to believe that wealthy 
challengers should win more often than others, there is ample reason to suspect that 
wealthy challengers should spend more than others.
In Table 5.10,1 show that, indeed, wealthy challengers do have higher average 
expenditures. Wealthy challengers for the House spend $201,000 compared to the 
overall average of $124,000, while wealthy challengers for the Senate spend $1.98 
million compared to the overall average of $1.31 million. Incumbents' spending against 
wealthy challengers hovers close to their overall spending average. This makes sense 
when one considers that incumbents may not view wealthy challengers with as much 
alarm as they do high-quality opponents, personal scandals, and celebrities.
Just because a challenger has substantial wealth does not mean that he or she is 
willing to use i t  Many wealthy challengers who are also relatively unqualified for the
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Note: Figures are in real 1982-1984 dollars. Refer back to Table 5.1 for average 
expenditures in all campaigns.
office which they are seeking may realize the quixotic nature of their endeavor and 
refrain from squandering a small fortune (aka. the "I am not going to be another Steve 
Forbes" philosophy). Others, in a fit of near delusion, may throw caution to the wind 
and spend like there is no tomorrow (aka. the "look how much coverage Ross Perot got" 
philosophy). It is almost impossible for incumbents to know in advance which route 
wealthy challengers will take, so they tend to be reactive. More than likely, they will 
wait until they detect a spending surge from the other camp before increasing their own 
spending. And if that surge comes in the latter stages of the campaign, poll numbers 
may indicate that they have no reason to fear it anyway.
High-quality opponents, personal scandals, and celebrities are all things that 
incumbents are aware of fairly early in the election season. Unlike challenger spending 
levels, these things are predictable, so that incumbents can be proactive. A high-quality 
challenger with experience as a governor is not going to suddenly lose that credential; a 
scandal is not going to suddenly disappear, a  celebrity cannot choose to suddenly
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become an obscure figure for the campaign. When everything is said and done, it may 
turn out that the incumbent was not in that much trouble after all, but that is a chance 
that most incumbents are unwilling to take.
CONCLUSION
This initial, descriptive look at the data provides a favorable view of the main 
theoretical ideas guiding this dissertation. Focusing on the percentage of victories by 
and the average expenditures of challengers who fit into certain categories allows one 
to get a feel for the topic under review. Though simple and straightforward, these 
descriptive techniques are valuable and insightful.
However, in order for this study to be complete, multiple regression is required. 
Multiple regression is the best technique for uncovering the true relationship between a 
candidate's awareness among voters, a candidate's expenditures, and a candidate's vote 
total. It also serves as a more vigorous test of the hypothesized relationships between 
other variables and the vote. I now turn to an analysis of my multiple regression results.
ENDNOTES
1) This is the case because of the winner-take-all system that governs U.S. elections.
2) Unless that challenger assumed his or her previous office via an appointment.
3) Mayors of world-renowned cities, such as New York and San Francisco, can be 
placed in that top echelon. However, they are the exceptions that prove the rule.
4) Oliver North's exorbitant campaign spending in the 1994 Virginia contest skews 
these results.
5) The coding procedure is as follows: I culled through relevant issues o f CQ and 
coded each election as I deemed appropriate. Those cases that were not absolutely 
clear-cut were given to three of my colleagues. After their independent assessments, 
I correlated these cases. The correlation rate was .84. In those instances where 
there was disagreement, I used the classification that received the most votes. I offer 
my thanks to Jamie Pasley, Scott Crichlow, and Karrie Huggins for their assistance.
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CHAPTER SIX:
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SENATE ELECTIONS
Congressional elections are dynamic events. Ambitious candidates, powerful 
parties, inquisitive voters, strategic interest groups, and complex public policy issues 
blend together into a unique electoral stew. It should come as no surprise, then, that the 
results o f these elections are determined by a wide array of factors. Money, the 
economy, partisanship, candidate attributes, and campaign-specific occurrences all 
impact the final decisions rendered in voting booths across the land.
In order to better understand the dynamic processes that drive congressional 
elections, one must be able to delineate the nature and extent of the impact that relevant 
factors have on the vote. For instance, the importance of money in elections truly 
becomes apparent only after other potential factors have been considered. If campaign 
spending is not made to stand beside other variables, then one cannot know for sure 
whether these other variables are providing an influence that is being erroneously 
attributed to spending. Likewise, the meaningfulness of these other variables is best 
determined by relating them to each other.
For social scientists, multiple regression is a valuable analytical tool. It allows 
researchers to do precisely the kinds of things discussed above. By controlling for other 
variables, one can pinpoint the significance of the variable of interest In my case, 1 can 
get at the importance of money and challenger quality by controlling for such things as 
state/district partisanship, state unemployment, and an incumbent's health. I can also 
determine whether any of these variables interact in relevant ways, such as the effect 
that money has on the vote at different levels of CPQ. The following sections contain 
the results of my regression analysis for Senate elections.
85
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
OLS RESULTS
In terms of campaign spending, ordinary least squares is not the most efficient 
type of regression to perform, but it is the workhorse o f political science and deserves at 
least a glance in this study. Other researchers (Abramowitz, 1991; Jacobson, 1978) 
have performed OLS on campaign spending data, but most ultimately turn to other 
forms o f regression in an attempt to solve the endogeneity problem. Though the 
endogenous nature of the spending variable probably skews the OLS estimates, it is 
instructive to include an OLS model in order to see if my results conform to earlier OLS 
estimations. In a sense, OLS allows us to get our feet wet before swimming into the 
depths of instrumental variables and 2SLS.
In Tables 6.1 and 6.2,1 present two OLS equations for the Senate. Table 6.1 
contains the most basic, with incumbent and challenger spending as the only 
independent variables. ̂  Both coefficients are highly significant and in the expected
Table 6.1 OLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-Senate 
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending 3.279 .329 6.03***
Challenger Spending -5.392 -.796 -14.90***
Party 2.387 .127 2.80***
R-Squared=. 46 
N=279
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01
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direction. Since this study is concerned with the relative impact that each variable has 
on the vote, I am also interested in comparing the strength of the two variables within 
the equation.
A natural inclination might be to look at the unstandardized coefficients in order 
to gauge the relative strength of variables, but this would be incorrect. The approach 
adopted by virtually all researchers is to look at the standardized (beta) coefficients. 
Anthony Walsh writes, "This value tells you how much a one standard deviation change 
in the independent variable will affect the dependent variable, also in standard 
deviation units, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the equation. This is 
an important statistic to reveal in any report because, unlike the unstandardized slope, it 
is a measure of the relative importance of the independent variables in the equation 
(1999: 282).
The results displayed in Table 6.1 are as expected. While both spending 
coefficients are significant, the beta for challenger spending (-.796) is more than double 
the beta for incumbent spending (.329). When candidate spending is isolated within an 
equation, challengers do indeed get a bigger bang for their buck. However, such an 
equation does not tell the whole story. As the R-squared indicates, the spending 
variables alone explain less than half of the variance. Therefore, a more complete 
model is required.
In Table 6 .2 ,1 present results from the full model, which lifts the R-squared to 
.54. The results from this equation are in harmony with the generally accepted view 
within the scholarly community; both challenger and incumbent spending have a 
significant effect on the vote, though the effect of challenger spending is greater.
Notice that the beta for challenger spending (-.575) greatly exceeds the beta for 
incumbent spending (.222). So even when candidate spending is placed alongside other 
essential variables, the relative strength of challenger spending comes through.
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Table 6.2 OLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending—Senate
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending 2.096 .222 3.77***
Challenger Spending -3.790 -575 -9.16***
Governor -2.453 1 o C/l ISl -1.15
Senator -3.795 I o -.83
U S. Rep -4.121 - 178 -3 37***
Major -2.252 1 o 00 -1 59*
Minor -468 -.023 -.45
Celebrity -5.449 - I l l -2.38***
Controversy -2.574 -083 -1.88**
Scandal -4.411 -.080 -1.75**
Health -7.907 -.121 -2.75***
Unemployment 090 .020 .43
Unemploy*Party -518 - 199 -3.86***
Party I.D. .134 .183 3.28***
Ideological Distance 050 .024 .53
Party -1.771 -099 -1.68**
R-Squared=54
N=260
Note: *<10 **<.05 ***<01
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The coefficients for eleven of the thirteen remaining variables are in the 
expected direction. The two variables-state unemployment level and incumbent 
ideological distance-that are in the wrong direction have coefficients that are 
insignificant. Plus, when state unemployment level is interacted with a dummy variable 
coded one if the incumbent is in the same party as the president, it becomes highly 
significant. This more refined variable shows that, in distributing justice, voters tend to 
be fair and save their retribution for those politicians belonging to the party in power 
(Hibbing and Alford, 1981; Stein, 1990).- While the coefficient tapping into ideology 
is insignificant, its party identification counterpart is not. This supports the belief 
among some scholars that party is still a central factor in deciding elections, and that it 
serves as a more accessible guide to the average voter than does ideology (Aldrich,
1995; Petrocik 1987 and 1989; Sundquist, 1983).
In order to gauge CPQ, 1 constructed five separate dummy variables, each coded 
one if a challenger had previously held a particular elective office and zero if he or she 
had not held that office. Those challengers who held higher offices (senator, governor, 
representative, and major statewide office/mayor of important city) are assumed to be 
of a higher quality compared to those who held only minor offices or had no previous 
electoral experience at all. While I do not employ an additive scale, there is 
undoubtedly a hierarchy of offices. Only two of these coefficients reach significance: 
U.S. Representative and major office.
1 am not surprised that being challenged by a former senator does not 
significantly decrease the vote percentage of the incumbent. In most cases, these are 
people who were rejected by voters in the prior election and are trying to mount a 
comeback. The office of senator is a prestigious one, but some of the luster wears off 
after suffering a recent electoral defeat Also, these rematches are difficult for 
challengers because incumbents have had six years to wield all of the advantages that
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come with holding office. This results in the challenger having to combat the oft-noted 
"sophomore surge" (Gelman and King, 1990; Holbrook and Tidmarch, 1991). If the 
former senator/current challenger could not achieve victory as an incumbent, then it is 
unlikely that he or she will do so while standing on the opposite side of the fenced
I am a bit surprised that a challenge waged by someone with a gubernatorial 
pedigree is not significant The assumption is that a governor's statewide coalition 
translates effectively in a run for that other prestigious statewide office: senator. 
Perhaps the explanation for this insignificance lies in the perceived role for each office. 
Senators are thought of as distant legislators, while governors are viewed as the 
executives who actively manage the state. The voters may not see governors in the role 
of senator, a governor's duties do not translate effectively to the Senate. This line of 
thinking is in the same vein as the argument that senators are not elected president 
because their legislative role is not consonant with those duties performed by the chief- 
executive (Bartels, 1985; Kenney and Rice, 1988).
Those challengers who held the office of U.S. Representative did have a 
significant influence on the vote. This is consistent with the finding that U.S. 
Representative is the most valuable office to hold, in terms of election to the Senate 
(Lublin, 1994). Representatives have advantages that the other top officeholders do not. 
Unlike former senators, representatives are usually still in office when they decide to 
run for a senate seat Their candidacies are not viewed as attempts to return to the 
status quo-or in the case o f governors, as lateral moves-but as logical moves up the 
political ladder. They have usually achieved a string o f House victories and can bring 
that momentum, along with their own incumbency advantages, into the election. And 
since they have spent at least part of their careers on Capitol Hill, they avoid the 
perceptual pitfalls faced by governors.^ A move from the lower chamber to the upper
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chamber is functionally consistent, just as a move from the city hall of a metropolis to 
the governor’s mansion would be. They are prepared legislators and a run for the 
Senate is the logical next step.
The variable for major statewide officials and mayors of important cities has a 
coefficient that reaches significance at th e . 10 level. To a certain degree, these 
officeholders are in the same boat as representatives when it comes to mounting a 
challenge for the senate. They are politicians seeking upward mobility in their careers, 
and they have a fairly solid constituency-base from which to run. However, these 
offices are not as prestigious as the previously mentioned three, which means that these 
candidates do not benefit as fully from established reputations. They have to work 
harder to get the attention of the press and have a somewhat harder time convincing the 
public that they have the right stuff to flourish as senators.
As one might anticipate, challengers with experience only in minor offices do 
not, solely on the basis of that qualification, pose much of a problem for incumbents. 
The effect of this variable on the vote is insignificant, though in the right direction. 
Perhaps minor officeholders should attempt to attain a certain degree of celebrity. The 
variable for celebrity status does have an independent effect on the vote.
It appears that the political world is no more immune from the allure of 
celebrity than the rest of society. Merely having a recognizable name and face-no 
matter if unaccompanied by political experience and know how-is enough to threaten 
the comfortable existence of incumbents. Candidates are elected by an expression of 
the public's will, so it stands to reason that those challengers already basking in the 
glow of the public eye are more advantaged than run-of-the-mill challengers.
The three remaining variables in my model demonstrate that certain 
circumstances can arise in a campaign that significantly threaten an incumbent's 
electoral security. These circumstances center around the activities and health of
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incumbents. Incumbents who find themselves embroiled in controversies or scandals 
will suffer at the polls. Incumbents who exhibit poor health are also vulnerable, both 
physically and electorally. This trio of variables shows that the vaunted incumbency 
advantage is not indestructible. If voters begin to question an incumbent's ability to 
carry out the duties of his or her office, regardless of whether this doubt is self-inflicted 
or caused by forces beyond the incumbent's control, then there is a real chance that the 
incumbent will be replaced.
2SLS RESULTS
Because of the non-recursive nature of the campaign spending model, it is 
appropriate to use an estimation technique that purges the model of troublesome 
endogenous variables. Two-stage least squares is the technique employed in this study. 
The model is exactly the same under 2SLS, except that a predicted value is substituted 
for actual candidate expenditures. This predicted value is derived from regressing the 
spending variable onto an instrumental variable (i.e. a reduced form equation). The 
technique is valid so long as the instrumental variable is correlated with the endogenous 
variable, but not with the error term. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the 
instruments used in my 2SLS equations are state population and challenger wealth.
In Tables 6.3 and 6.4,1 present two 2SLS equations for Senate elections. Table 
6.3 contains the most basic, with incumbent and challenger spending as the only 
independent variables. As with OLS, both variables are highly significant and in the 
expected direction. The R-squared is a bit lower than that for the OLS counterpart to 
this equation, coming in at .42.
An initial examination of the unstandardized coefficients reveals that incumbent 
spending is a stronger performer than challenger spending This is a perfect illustration 
of why it is a mistake to use unstandardized coefficients when comparing variables. A 
closer look at the equation shows that the t-value for challenger spending is larger,
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Table 6 J  2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-Senate
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending 7.442 .748 5.79***
Challenger Spending -6.944 -1.026 -11.93***
Party 3.801 .202 3.74***
R-Squared=.42
N=279
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***.01
which means that challenger spending is actually more significant. A t-value is 
calculated by dividing the unstandardized coefficient by the standard error. So even 
though challenger spending has a smaller unstandardized coefficient in this equation, it 
also has a much smaller standard error, which is the reason why it performs better than 
incumbent spending. Basically, the effect of challenger spending is more homogenous, 
while the effect o f incumbent spending is more variant.
This is borne out by a comparison of the standardized coefficients for the two 
spending variables. The beta for challenger spending (-1.026) is more robust than the 
beta for incumbent spending (.748). Again, the use of standardized (beta) coefficients 
in determining the relative importance of variables in an equation is the more reliable 
course of action for researchers. In this instance, the beta coefficients provide clear 
proof that Jacobson's (1978) original contention is as applicable in Senate races as it is 
in House races. Challengers do receive higher marginal returns on their expenditures.
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Table 6.4 2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-Senate
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share o f the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending 5.142 .546 3.59***
Challenger Spending -5.125 -778 -7.lt***
Governor -1.789 -.040 -.79
Senator -.584 I '© © l_/t -.11
U.S. Rep -3 698 - 159 -2.83***
Major -1.970 -072 -1.31*
Minor -265 -.013 -.24
Celebrity -4.662 -095 -1.91**
Controversy -2.462 -080 -1.70**
Scandal -3.552 -.064 -1.31*
Health -6.5 U -.100 -2.09**
Unemployment .305 070 1.28*
Unemploy* Party -554 -.213 -3.87***
Party I.D. 109 148 2 44***
Ideological Distance -043 -.021 -.40
Party -.591 -033 -.48
R-Squared=51
N=260
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<01
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In Table 6 .4 ,1 present the results from the full model. Both of the spending 
variables are significant at the .01 level. Again, challenger spending has a stronger 
effect on the vote. This finding is consistent with the findings of other scholars 
applying 2SLS to campaign spending (Green and Krasno, 1988). It casts some doubt on 
Gerber's assertion that incumbent spending is paramount in Senate elections. Certainly 
the difference between the two spending coefficients is smaller in this equation than in 
the equations previously discussed, but challenger spending (-.778) still clearly 
outperforms incumbent spending (.546).
It is worth mentioning again that this result is perfectly attuned to my central 
theory. If the favorable differential in spending effects for challengers is the result of 
challengers having low recognition among the electorate and thus being able to garner 
more benefits from spending on communications, then it stands to reason that 
challengers garnering higher amounts of recognition from the public would benefit less 
from spending. As I detailed in the previous chapter, challengers for the Senate have a 
higher profile than challengers for the House; thus, the difference in the effects of 
spending between incumbents and challengers is smaller in Senate campaigns than in 
House campaigns.
U.S. Representative and major statewide official/mayor of important city are the 
only CPQ coefficients to reach significance; none of the others even come close, 
though they are all in the expected direction. The explanation for this result is identical 
to the one offered in my discussion of the full OLS model. As for the other variables in 
the equation, only ideological distance has a coefficient that fails to reach significance; 
the other seven variables are all significant and in the expected direction.
Curiously, incumbent controversy (-.080) is more significant than incumbent 
scandal (-.064). This creates the counter-intuitive finding that being accused of a 
violation of law is less damaging to an incumbent’s ability to attract votes than being
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considered a bit shady or irrational. One would expect the opposite to be true. Having 
their honesty and judgment questioned is often considered par for the course for 
politicians, but as a group, they tend not to lean toward felonious behavior. For this 
reason, scandals would have more of an impact. Voters are more likely to focus on 
these behavioral aberrations and punish the wrongdoer via the ballot
One possible explanation for the finding is that some controversies may be 
viewed by the public as worse than some scandals. For instance, a public display of 
drunkenness is deemed as more reprehensible than a violation of campaign finance law. 
Marital infidelity may be less acceptable than the casual use of marijuana. Maybe 
incumbents faced with a scandal are more diligent in their campaigning and more 
liberal with the use of campaign funds, thus counter-acting any potential negative 
effects. Since they think that a scandal can seriously threaten their incumbency, they 
are prepared to deal with it in advance of the campaign. Controversies are not 
considered as threatening, so incumbents are not as vigilant. This lack of vigilance 
translates into lost votes. In any event, the scandal variable is insignificant Further 
scholarly exploration of campaigns involving candidate misconduct will hopefully shed 
more light on this interesting topic.
The interaction term between state unemployment level and the incumbent's 
status in the governing party is one of the strongest variables in the model. This is clear 
proof that economic factors do influence the outcome of elections. Many studies have 
found that presidents are held accountable for the state of the economy (Erikson, 1989; 
Hibbs Jr., 1987) and my findings suggest that senators, too, are held accountable if their 
party affiliation matches that of the president This type of collective accountability 
should provide ample motivation for presidents and senators to bridge any institutional 
gaps in an effort to attain party solidarity. In a sense, they all sink or swim together. 
This situation is an example of the continuing importance of parties.
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This importance is additionally manifested in Table 6.4 by the performance of 
the partisan identification variable. When an incumbent runs in a state that has a high 
number of citizens identifying with his or her party, then he or she will perform better at 
the polls. This holds true for Democrats and Republicans. Obviously, it is easier to win 
an election when the electorate is predisposed to vote for you. Incumbents running in 
states with a fairly even distribution of party identifiers or with a higher number of 
opposing identifiers have a tougher trek, since they do not have the luxury of preaching 
to the choir.
Finally, the variable measuring an incumbent’s ideological distance from the 
electorate is insignificant. In this equation, however, it is in the right direction. Taken 
together, these variables perform relatively well. 1 would like a higher R-squared, but 
further refinement of the model should strengthen its explanatory power.
The overall strength of the model is only one consideration in this study. The 
key question that I seek to answer is whether a challenger's level of political quality 
determines the effectiveness of his or her spending. Do high-quality challengers receive 
lower marginal benefits from their expenditures? The very strong performance of the 
two spending variables in my model should allow me to answer this question with a fair 
degree of accuracy. It is to this task that I now turn.
Partitioned Samples
When seeking to demonstrate that a particular variable creates variation in the 
performance of another variable, researchers will often utilize an interaction term. 
Specifically, they code the variable that is hypothesized to cause the effect as a dummy 
variable, and then multiply it with the variable that is supposed to be affected. In this 
study, CPQ would be transformed into a variable coded one for high-quality challengers 
and zero for those that are not. Candidate spending would then be multiplied by this 
variable. This method is employed when the researcher thinks that only one variable in
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the overall model is affected. None of the remaining variables should be directly 
affected by the dummy variable.
The use of an interaction term is not suitable for this study. Instead, I choose to 
divide the entire sample into two groups based on the political quality of challengers. 
Rather than using CPQ to create a dummy variable, I use it to guide my division of the 
sample. One group contains only high-quality challengers, and the other group contains 
only low-quality challengers (minor office and no elective office). This method of 
analysis is appropriate when the researcher thinks that all o f the variables in the model 
are affected. That is the case here.
I think that CPQ alters the dynamics of an entire campaign, of which candidate 
spending is one element, albeit an important one. Senate contests are waged over an 
entire state, and therefore require a lot of diligence in order to be successful. It is not 
enough for a candidate to run an ad on two or three television stations in order to reach 
likely voters. This might work in smaller House districts, but the geography of a Senate 
race dictates that candidates disburse their messages through various media outlets and 
across vast populations.
It is also not enough for a candidate to stand in front of a local grocery store or 
shopping mall and greet voters as they arrive. Instead, the candidate must be willing to 
devote an inordinate amount of time traveling across the state and focusing on often 
distinct groups of voters. Obviously, this combination of retail and personal politics 
requires an efficient organization and substantial campaign funds. Entrenched 
incumbents have both of these, but what about challengers?
This is where the distinction between high-quality and low-quality challengers is 
clearest High-quality challengers have experience running successful campaigns; 
sometimes even statewide campaigns. This means that they begin the Senate race with 
a relatively high amount of recognition among voters. Low-quality challengers do not
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have this kind of experience. While they may have met with past electoral success, 
winning a seat on the local school board or in the state House hardly prepares one for 
mounting a challenge for a U.S. Senate seat. Those challengers with no previous 
electoral experience face an even bleaker scenario.
What does this mean in terms of challenger expenditures? Results from past 
research point out that the primary function of campaign expenditures is to 
communicate with the electorate. An effective utilization of funds will result in a 
greater awareness of the candidate by the public. Such spending will be most beneficial 
to those candidates who are not well-known by the public.
For example, imagine that two candidates each spend $10,000 to run an ad 
during a popular prime time program. This program is watched by 100,000 people in 
the state, and these people also happen to be conscientious citizens who regularly vote. 
Before the ad airs, Candidate A is already known by 90,000 of these voters and 
Candidate B by 20,000 of them. No one gets up to go to the refrigerator or to use the 
bathroom during the commercial, so all 100,000 voters see the ad. Candidate A has just 
reached 10,000 new voters, or one voter per one dollar spent Candidate B has just 
reached 80,000 new voters, or eight voters per one dollar spent.
So, even though each candidate spent the same amount of money on the same 
thing, one candidate got a higher return on that expenditure. And the explanation for 
that higher return is that the candidate was not as well-known to the public as his or her 
opponent. Like Candidate A in the above example, incumbents tend to be well-known 
among voters. This means that the extent of the spending differential in a campaign 
will be determined by the challenger. Since high-quality challengers are also fairly 
well-known, the marginal benefits that they receive from spending will be similar to 
those received by incumbents. Since low-quality challengers are not as well-known, the
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marginal benefits that they receive from spending will be much greater than those 
received by incumbents.
My major contention is that the difference in the benefits received from 
campaign expenditures will be greater in elections involving low-quality challengers 
than in elections involving high-quality challengers. However, there is more to the 
stoiy. It is simply illogical to think that the ever-fluctuating atmosphere of a campaign 
will remain unaltered, except for spending, when a prominent challenger enters that 
atmosphere. High-quality challengers are in a position to take advantage of other 
elements in a campaign that low-quality challengers are not.
For instance, high-quality challengers should be better able to capitalize on 
incumbent controversies and scandals. High-quality challengers are usually relatively 
well-funded and have experience waging victorious campaigns. This means that they 
are prepared to take advantage of any mistakes made by their opponents. Becoming 
embroiled in a personal imbroglio is the type of mistake that incumbents try to avoid 
like the plague. Should an incumbent become involved in a controversy or scandal, 
however, then high-quality challengers are more likely to make them pay.
High-quality challengers should also be better able to capitalize on poor 
economic conditions in order to achieve victory. If a state is suffering through 
economic malaise, then much of the blame is placed at the feet o f those incumbents 
perceived to be responsible for directing economic policy. Governors are the most 
obvious targets, but senators, particularly those in the president's party, may also 
become focal points for the electorate's wrath.^ Challengers skilled in the art of 
campaigning can leverage this negative perception toward incumbents to their own 
benefit. Challengers without much electoral experience or skill are not likely to be as 
opportunistic.
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In addition, high-quality challengers may be better able to sway voters without 
strong partisan affiliations. These independents tend to rely on other cues in deciding 
how to cast a vote. Many of these cues are candidate-centered, such as political 
advertisements and personality-driven interviews. Since high-quality challengers are 
relatively prominent, then they can make good use of these cues. Furthermore, high- 
quality challengers have a better chance of blunting the impact of party identification 
among party identifiers. Party identification is a strong factor in any election, but in 
elections where both candidates are well-known to voters, it may play less of a role.
So, it is not that challenger political quality interacts only with spending in an 
interesting way, but that it affects all o f the variables in my model. The most efficient 
way o f capturing this is to separate the two types of campaigns-those with high-quality 
challengers and those with low-quality challengers-and run equations for both. This 
allows me to gauge the effect of spending in these two different electoral environments.
High-Quality Challengers In Table 6.5,1 display the results of my analysis for 
elections involving high-quality challengers. The coefficient for challenger spending is 
significant. As stated many times throughout my work, challengers rely heavily on 
campaign funds to present themselves to the public. Even if a challenger has 
superlative qualifications, a steady flow of cash serves to enhance the benefits that 
those qualifications are already providing. It is rare that a challenger can achieve 
victory absent formidable amounts of spending. It is a safe assumption that without 
money, challengers-even high-quality challengers-do not stand much of a chance. But 
if they do acquire campaign funds, they are virtually guaranteed benefits from these 
funds. The level of significance for challenger spending in every equation in this 
dissertation serves to reinforce this contention.
The most important aspect of this equation is how challenger and incumbent 
spending compare to each other. For while challenger spending is significant,
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Table 6.5 2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-Senate Campaigns
with High-Quality Challengers
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote 
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending 3.423 .407 1.30*
Challenger Spending -2.693 -.408 -1.71**
Celebrity -8.075 -.121 -1.47*
Controversy -4.539 -.213 -2.54***
Scandal -5.477 -.140 -1.67**
Health -5.529 -.082 -1.07
Unemployment .834 .285 3.24***
Unemploy*Party -.948 -.490 -4.35***
Party I.D. .172 .295 3.19***
Ideological Distance -.115 -.071 -.70
Party -3.738 -.271 -2.21**
R-Squared=.52
N=92
Note: *<10 **<05 ***<01
incumbent spending occupies an equally important place in the equation. The beta for 
the former is -.408, while the beta for the latter is .407; almost perfect parity in this 
regard. This is a markedly different relationship than the one seen in the other
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equations for the Senate. In the other equations, both variables are significant, but 
challenger spending is always the stronger performer.
The whole reason for bifurcating the data set is to get at this very relationship, 
and the relationship conforms to expectations. By isolating this subset of elections, one 
can get a clearer view of what occurs when an incumbent encounters an experienced, 
skilled, and well-financed opponent. What occurs is that both candidates get locked 
into a sort of spending stalemate. The primary factor that normally allows challengers 
to have a spending advantage is of little consequence in these elections.
Specifically, high-quality challengers are denied the huge gains that their low- 
quality counterparts receive from expenditures on communications, because they start 
out with a fairly high amount of recognition among the public. Thus, while they still 
get positive benefits from their expenditures, they also reach the point of diminishing 
returns much sooner. This brings the benefits that they receive from spending into line 
with the benefits that incumbents receive. Incumbents are used to receiving little from 
the dollars that they spend, the difference in these elections is that their high-quality 
challengers are now in the same boat.
What are the consequences of this for the final election result? One might think 
that challengers who are denied the advantage derived from differential spending 
effects have two chances: slim and none, with slim having just left town. In fact, just 
the opposite is true. The reason that they are not getting huge returns on every 
campaign dollar spent is because they have advantages that most challengers do not 
enjoy. While these advantages may not be as numerous as those that accrue to 
incumbents, they are sufficient to wage an effective campaign.
Given the choice of having previously held an important elective office and 
being known by the electorate versus being inexperienced and obscure, only those
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challengers prone to tilting at windmills would choose the latter. High-quality 
challengers may not get the benefits from spending that other challengers get, but this is 
offset by the fact that their experience and visibility place them on a fairly level playing 
field with incumbents. This is not to say that incumbents are underdogs, because even 
in the more competitive arena of Senate elections, incumbents win a majority of the 
time, but it is to say that high-quality challengers have a better chance of winning than 
low-quality challengers. Deriving higher marginal returns from campaign spending 
does not do one any good when you do not have much to spend in the first place, which 
is the position that most low-quality challengers find themselves in.
The remaining results basically conform to expectations. High-quality 
challengers take advantage of incumbent controversies and scandals, as well as taking 
advantage of incumbents who are in the governing party during poor economic times. 
They are not able to overcome the influence o f party identification on the electorate. 
Incumbents from states with populations that mirror their own partisanship are in a 
more favorable position than incumbents who must run against the tide o f partisanship. 
This partisan loyalty is especially important to an incumbent in a competitive election.
Low-Quality Challengers In Table 6 .6 ,1 display the results of my analysis for 
elections involving low-quality challengers. The coefficient for challenger spending is 
significant Though low-quality challengers often have difficulty acquiring campaign 
funds, whatever funds they can acquire are very beneficial in helping them to achieve a 
higher vote total. This points out the Catch-22 that low-quality challengers face in 
congressional elections. They are unable to raise large sums of money because of a 
dismal level of recognition among contributors, but the surest way of increasing that 
recognition is to raise—and spend-large sums of money. The problem is not the 
efficiency with which funds are expended, but rather the inability to acquire those funds 
in the first place.
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Table 6.6 2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending—Senate Campaigns
with Low-Quality Challengers
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote 
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending 5.115 .581 3.09***
Challenger Spending -5.495 -.845 -6.56***
Celebrity -5.762 -.141 -1.99**
Controversy -1.776 -.054 -.83
Scandal -2.343 -.041 -.60
Health -5.610 -.098 -1.45*
Unemployment .049 .010 .14
Unemploy*Party -.449 -.168 -2.24**
Party LD. .071 .097 1.20
Ideological Distance .032 .016 .22
Party .622 .035 .37
R-Squared=44
N=168
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01
In this equation, as opposed to the one for high-quality challengers, the 
coefficient for incumbent spending is significant at the more stringent .01 level. 
However, incumbent spending does not come close to achieving parity with challenger
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spending. The beta for challenger spending (-.845) is larger than that for incumbent 
spending (.581). Once again, the relationship between the spending variables is as 
predicted. In elections with low-quality challengers, the difference in the coefficients 
should be greater than in elections with high-quality challengers.
Low-quality challengers do not enjoy the advantages that were described in the 
previous section, which means that they have a huge amount of ground to cover in order 
generate recognition among the public. They rely heavily on campaign funds in order 
to accomplish this goal. Since each dollar spent translates into increased familiarity 
among voters, the marginal returns are quite high. Incumbents capitalize to the extent 
that they can from expenditures, but as with the other group of elections, the 
relationship between the spending variables really depends on the characteristics o f the 
challengers. The lack of recognition for low-quality challengers and the abundance of 
recognition for incumbents manifests itself through a greater disparity between the two 
spending coefficients.
Among the other variables in the equation, only challenger celebrity status, the 
incumbent's health, and the interaction term between unemployment and the 
incumbent's membership in the governing party are significant Low-quality 
challengers are unable to capitalize on incumbent controversies or scandals that arise 
during the course of a campaign. Oddly, the partisan demographics of a state are 
insignificant in these elections. Why would state party identification be significant in 
elections with high-quality challengers, but insignificant in elections with low-quality 
challengers?
As mentioned earlier, logic would lead one to believe that if anyone could 
dampen the effects of partisanship, it would be high-quality challengers. Perhaps an 
explanation lies in emphasizing the role of incumbents as opposed to challengers. In
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contests where incumbents are met with virtually no competition, they dominate the 
political landscape. Through a phenomenal advantage in spending and highly skewed 
coverage by the press, powerful incumbents are able to promulgate an electoral black­
out against challengers. In such a scenario, incumbents will attract votes from all 
segments of the electorate, including both parties. These landslide elections make party 
identification a mute point; voters of both persuasions are casting ballots for the 
incumbent in large percentages.
In more competitive elections, incumbents are unable to cast aside challengers 
with such ease. Competitive elections, usually involving high-quality challengers, are 
contests where both camps have the resources to shore up their political bases. As a 
consequence, incumbents are unable to draw as much support from voters who identify 
with the opposite party. Thus, party lines remain intact and party identification emerges 
as a more important source of the vote. Again, this is merely an initial attempt to 
explain an interesting question that has been raised by my findings.
CONCLUSION
The main focus of this dissertation is challenger spending, and a comparison of 
the equations for high-quality and low-quality challengers fully supports my theory of 
challenger spending as it relates to the vote. High-quality challengers, because of their 
level of recognition among voters vis-a-vis incumbents, should receive less benefits 
from spending than low-quality challengers. Looking at high-quality challengers 
(Table 6.5), the standardized coefficient for challenger spending is virtually equal to 
that of incumbent spending, and challenger spending reaches significance at the .05 
level. Looking at low-quality challengers (Table 6.6), the standardized coefficient for 
challenger spending is far stronger than that of incumbent spending, and challenger 
spending easily reaches significance at the .001 level.
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It is clear that for Senate elections, expenditures by low-quality challengers have 
far more vigor than expenditures by high-quality challengers. Because of their lack of 
visibility among voters, low-quality challengers should especially benefit from 
expenditures, and my results show that they do. The question now becomes whether 
this holds true for House elections as well. It is to this question that I now turn.
ENDNOTES
1) Obviously, party is included in the model as a control variable, but it is not relevant 
to my analysis.
2) Divided government can make retribution more difficult. If one party controls 
Congress and the other controls the White House, voters may be ambivalent in 
assessing blame.
3) Some incumbents fall victim to strong partisan tides. A competent senator can lose 
if the national mood is against his or her party. So, as a challenger, that person might 
have a good chance at regaining office, especially if the tide has shifted. These 
partisan tides are accounted for in my model by the party variable.
4) Many U.S. Representatives have also spent time in state legislators. This adds to 
their pedigree as qualified legislators.
5) For instance, senators have access to federal largesse that can alleviate economic 
woes. Also, they have considerable individual power to add measures to 
economic legislation that will benefit their states.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF HOUSE RESULTS
The previous chapter detailed evidence to support the main theory guiding this 
research project The evidence suggests that low-quality challengers receive greater 
benefits from campaign spending than high-quality challengers. Since a  candidate's 
quality is a reliable proxy for a candidate's level of recognition among voters, then the 
conclusion reached is that candidate visibility does, in fact, impact the benefits that 
challengers receive from spending. These findings are within the context of campaigns 
for the Senate. I now turn my attention to campaigns for the House.
It is well documented that the institutional rules and norms for both chambers 
are, in some important aspects, different from one another (Asher, 1973; Fenno, 1982; 
Rieselbach, 1979). Likewise, the electoral environment within which campaigns occur 
are different for the two chambers. House races occur more frequently; they tend to be 
centered around more parochial issues; television advertising is not as necessary for 
reaching large segments of the constituency; they attract a higher percentage of 
challengers with no previous experience in elective office; incumbents win reelection 
at higher rates. One wonders whether the impact of candidate expenditures is another 
difference between campaigns for the two chambers.
One of the paramount contentions of this dissertation is that my theory of 
campaign spending is equally applicable to both the House and the Senate. The vast 
majority of the literature in this area has looked at one chamber-usually the House-to 
the exclusion of the other. Rarely have both chambers been examined at the same time. 
This creates uncertainty as to whether results for one chamber are generalizable to the 
other. Establishing a theory that encapsulates both chambers would advance the 
literature, with the primary benefit being a more unified understanding of congressional
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elections. Thus, it is important that my results for the House mirror my results for the 
Senate in terms of challenger spending benefits.
OLS RESULTS
In Tables 7.1 and 7.2 ,1 present two OLS equations for the House. Table 7.1 
contains the most basic, with incumbent and challenger spending as the only 
independent variables. The coefficient for challenger spending is extremely significant 
(check out that t-value), while the coefficient for incumbent spending is insignificant. 
My data set is much larger than that of the early studies using OLS to estimate House 
elections, but the basic finding remains the same. This finding is what sparked the 
academic debate because of its counter-intuitive logic. It does not seem logical that 
incumbents would receive no benefits from expenditures.
Table 7.1 OLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-House
Dependent Variable. Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending .164 .013 .92
Challenger Spending -5.170 -.692 -46.94***
Party 1.132 .056 4.39***
R-Squared=.48
N=3181
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01
In Table 7.2,1 present the results for the full model. With the additional 
variables thrown into the mix, the finding of insignificance for incumbent expenditures
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Table 7.2 OLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-House
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share o f the Two-Party Vote 
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending .312 .025 1.80**
Challenger Spending -4.739 -.634 -41.98***
Governor 10.739 .027 2.19**
Senator 5.436 .009 .78
U.S. Rep -2.518 -.029 -2.36***
Major -1.126 -.025 -2 .0 0 **
Minor -1.800 -.063 _4 9 4 ***
Celebrity -1.733 - . 0 2 2 -1.79**
Controversy -4.839 -.078 -6.28***
Scandal -8.513 -.081 -6.56***
Health -3.365 -.017 -1.37*
Party I.D. .117 .145 10.92***
Ideological Distance .062 .015 1.44*
Party .177 .008 .67
R-Squared=. 51
N=3181
Note: *<10 **<.05 ***<.01
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disappears. Incumbent spending is significant at the .05 level, but it does not bring the 
same weight to the model as challenger spending, which is significant at the .001 level. 
A look at the standardized coefficients for the two variables offers dramatic proof that 
challengers receive greater benefits from spending. The beta for challenger spending 
(-.634) is ten times that of incumbent spending (.025).
It is interesting to compare these results with those from the full OLS equation 
for Senate elections. In that equation, the difference between the spending coefficients 
was not nearly as big as it is here. The challenger spending coefficient was double that 
of incumbent spending. This finding is in line with what my theory would lead one to 
expect. Because challengers in House campaigns are not as well-known as challengers 
in Senate campaigns vis-a-vis incumbents, the difference in spending effects between 
incumbents and challengers should be far greater in House elections.
Overall, the model performs fairly well, with all but the senator coefficient 
achieving significance. It is a bit odd that the beta for challengers with minor electoral 
experience (-.063) is larger than those for the other CPQ variables. It is also worth 
noting that the beta for incumbent controversy (-.078) is similar to the beta for 
incumbent scandal (-.081). Apart from challenger spending, the largest coefficient is 
for partisan identification (.145). This makes sense when one considers all of the 
electorally safe districts that exist throughout America. An incumbent who serves a 
district that is heavily populated with fellow partisans is likely to win landslide victories 
election after election. As the incumbent becomes increasingly entrenched, the 
advantages derived from incumbency and party become virtually insurmountable.
2SLS RESULTS
As mentioned in the previous chapter, OLS estimates of campaign spending 
equations may be skewed, and so it is necessary to turn to other statistical techniques. 
Table 7.3 contains the results for the basic 2SLS equation. Both of the coefficients are
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Table 7 J  2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-House
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share o f the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending 2.018 .16 3.30***
Challenger Spending -4.507 -.603 -21.48***
Party .953 .047 3.55***
R-Squared=47 
N=318 1
Note: *<10 **<.05 ***<.01
significant at the .01 level. Of the two variables, challenger spending performs best. 
Though incumbent spending does not perform as well as challenger spending, it is 
highly significant. This is in contrast to the OLS model discussed above, which found 
incumbent spending to be insignificant. Since the data set used for each equation is 
exactly the same, this reversal can only be the result of the different statistical 
techniques employed.
Because it is not equipped to handle endogenous variables, OLS produces biased 
estimates. Green and Krasno (1988:886) note,
If incumbents raise money as they become threatened by the prospect of defeat, 
the apparent effect of incumbent expenditures will be biased [negatively], and 
the role of incumbent spending will be understated. Conversely, if challengers 
attract campaign contributions as their prospects for victory improve, the 
estimates for challenger expenditures will be biased positively, and the effect of 
challenger spending will be overstated.
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Through the creation of instrumental variables, 2SLS eliminates, or at least dramatically 
reduces, this problem. As a result, the bias which caused the coefficient for incumbent 
expenditures to be underestimated to the point of insignificance in the OLS model is 
jettisoned, and the true relationship of incumbent spending to challenger spending is 
realized. Likewise, 2SLS lends itself to a more accurate assessment of the other 
variables in the model.
In Table 7 .4 ,1 present the regression results for the full model. Again, both o f 
the spending coefficients are significant, with challenger spending (-.546) having a 
higher value than incumbent spending (. 164). Upon examining all o f the equations in 
this chapter, a definite pattern can be detected in elections for the House. Challengers 
get a far bigger bang for their buck than do incumbents. In Senate elections, 
challengers also derive higher marginal returns on expenditures, but not to the extent 
that they do in House elections.
The simple fact is that the average challenger for the House is not as qualified or 
as recognizable as the average challenger for the Senate. This creates a huge disparity 
between incumbents and challengers in terms of public awareness. Many challengers 
enter House races as virtual unknowns, and this situation is only reinforced by a lack of 
media attention. Unless challengers can generate a certain degree of momentum on 
their own, local media outlets are unlikely to devote much time to covering their 
campaigns. This is in stark contrast to the inundation of information that districts 
receive from incumbents via such channels as television and radio advertising, 
telephone solicitations, and direct mailings.
Therefore, the coefficients o f the spending variables in this equation should 
come as no surprise. If campaign expenditures are mainly employed to communicate a 
candidate's message to the electorate and many voters are already aware o f the 
incumbents message, then the incumbent will not benefit as much from these
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Table 7.4 2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-House
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending 1.981 .164 3.32***
Challenger Spending -4.077 -.546 -20.28***
Governor 10.804 .027 2.14**
Senator 6.187 .011 .87
U.S. Rep -2.047 -.024 -1.86**
Major -.947 -.021 -1.63*
Minor -1.667 -.059 -4.43***
Celebrity -1.604 -.020 -1.61*
Controversy -4.320 -.070 -5.38***
Scandal -9.012 -.086 -6.73***
Health -3.816 -.019 -1.51*
Party I.D. .110 .136 9.90***
Ideological Distance .006 .009 .85
Party .053 .002 .19
R-Squared=.55
N=318l
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01
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expenditures. Conversely, the challenger is often in dire need of connecting with voters 
and will reap huge returns on any investment made in this area. So while challengers of 
all stripes benefit from spending, the context within which challengers operate in House 
elections increases these benefits.
Of the five variables measuring a challenger's previous office, only the one for 
the office of senator has a coefficient that fails to rise to a level of significance. This 
finding is not surprising. The office of senator is more prestigious than that of 
representative, so that a former senator running for the House is perceived as taking a 
step down on the political ladder. Candidates in this situation are likely to be on the 
downslope of their careers or trying to restore a tarnished image. In any event, this is a 
situation where the office of senator does not yield the usual benefits.
In this equation, the coefficient for holding a minor elective office is once again 
stronger than the other political quality coefficients. This result is not a product of 
skewed OLS estimates. Why would these challengers meet with more success than 
those with experience in more prestigious offices? The explanation for the offices of 
governor and U.S. Representative is much the same as that for senator.
Because a run for the House is seen as a step down for someone who has been 
governor of a state, these candidates may receive as much skepticism as support from 
the electorate. Those challengers in the U.S. Representative category are politicians 
who were defeated for reelection and are trying to reclaim a seat on Capitol Hill. ̂  It 
stands to reason that if  the voters in a district reject a candidate one time, they are going 
to be more apt to do it again should that candidate return. There are instances where an 
incumbent loses a very close election and emerges victorious two years later, but 
generally a defeat carries the stamp o f finality.
An explanation for the relationship between major and minor challengers is not 
as obvious. It would seem that challengers in the major category should fare better than
116
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
those in the minor category. A possible reason for this result could lie with how I code 
state legislators. For House races, I place state senators in the major category and state 
representatives in the minor category. I felt this was warranted because of the 
congruousness of state Senate districts and U.S. House districts. But in fact, state 
senators may not have any particular edge over state representatives when it comes to 
running for this higher office.
A challenger’s celebrity status plays just as well at the district level as at the 
state level. The rate of reelection to the House is extremely high, but one factor that 
can threaten reelection is damage wrought by a controversy or scandal; both of these 
coefficients are significant. The more accurate estimates produced by 2SLS confirm 
the predicted relationship between these two variables. The beta for incumbent scandal 
(-.086) is bigger than the beta for incumbent controversy (-.070). The repercussions 
horn scandals, which involve accusations of violations of law, should be more severe 
than those from controversies. The equation also points to negative repercussions for 
incumbents who suffer from poor health.
After the two spending variables, district partisanship performs strongest in the 
model. Districts tend to be more homogenous than states in terms of partisanship, so 
that a candidate with strong party ties should remain electorally safe. Districts tend to 
be more homogenous in other respects as well, which explains why members of the 
House who are especially talented at taking the pulse of their constituents can call that 
chamber home for decades on end.
High-Quality Challengers
As in the previous chapter, elections are divided into two categories: those with 
high-quality challengers and those with low-quality challengers. This allows me to 
accurately gauge the effect that challenger quality has on the effects of spending. As 
discussed earlier, House campaigns rarely attract the level o f challengers that Senate
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Table 7.5 2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending—House Campaigns
with High-Quality Challengers
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending 2.983 .251 .84
Challenger Spending -6.030 -.689 -3.73***
Celebrity .058 .001 .01
Controversy -2.979 -.097 -1.44*
Scandal -1.501 -3.374 -.44
Party I.D. .116 .112 1.86**
Ideological Distance .157 .085 1.40*
Party 2.030 .127 2.18**
R-Squared=53
N=218
Note: The variable for health is excluded due to a lack of variance.*<.10 **<.05 
***<.01
campaigns do. So even high-quality challengers in House races are unlikely to enjoy 
the kind of recognition exhibited by elite challengers for the Senate. Therefore, high- 
quality challengers should receive greater benefits from spending than incumbents, just 
not as great as their low-qualhy counterparts. In Table 7.5,1 present the results.
A look at the coefficients for the two spending variables reveals the one truly 
unexpected result from this entire dissertation. Incumbent spending is insignificant in
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this equation. While this finding does not negate my overall theory, it does represent the 
one major assumption that fails to fall into place as anticipated. I expected for there to 
be a difference in the coefficients between these two variables, and that expectation is 
confirmed. But I also expected that difference to be relatively small; instead, one o f the 
coefficients foils to play much of a role in the equation at all
If incumbent spending was going to be found insignificant, one would assume 
that it would occur in the House model for low-quality challengers, but the next section 
demonstrates that this is not the case. Even that result would have been mildly 
surprising, since it is counter-intuitive to think that any candidate would not derive some 
benefit from spending, no matter how paltry. Jacobson's (1978) finding of insignificance 
was deemed to be a product of the use o f OLS, and subsequent studies (Kenny and 
McBumett, 1994; Goidel and Gross, 1994) have corrected that problem through the use 
of other statistical techniques.
However, no previous study has sought to explicitly examine the role that a 
challenger's political quality has on spending by partitioning elections involving high- 
quality and low-quality challengers. This is the first study to treat elections with high- 
quality challengers as an entirely distinct sample. What is it about these races that causes 
incumbent spending to be ineffective? Clearly, this is an area that is ripe for further 
research.
The iron-clad finding that challengers greatly benefit from expenditures holds 
true. The electoral fortresses that House incumbents construct are, perhaps, only 
capable of being penetrated by large sums o f money. Even if challengers enter a 
campaign with previous experience winning elections, the daunting task o f defeating a 
congressional incumbent requires a certain reliance on effective spending. The good 
news for high-quality challengers is that incumbent spending in these campaigns
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appears to be impotent. Incumbents cannot rely solely on spending to overwhelm their 
opponents. However, incumbents do have a variety o f other advantages that they can 
draw on, so that spending inefficiency can be overcome and reelection achieved.
O f the five remaining variables, three of the coefficients are significant. The feet 
that the coefficient for incumbent scandal is not significant is unexpected. One would 
expect skilled challengers to be positioned to take advantage of indiscretions committed 
by incumbents, but this is not the case. Perhaps House incumbents are so entrenched 
that even personal errors can be overcome; a situation that does not exist for their less 
secure counterparts in the upper chamber.
Incumbents also appear to be impervious to the threat posed by celebrity. Being 
a celebrity does not significantly increase the vote total for challengers. As with the 
other regressions in this dissertation, the variable measuring an incumbent's ideological 
distance from his or her constituency exerts little influence on the final outcome of an 
election. Though ideology does not come into play, party identification does. The 
strength o f party affiliation as a determinant o f the vote continues to be a thread that runs 
throughout all o f the models in this dissertation. Clearly, reports o f the party system's 
demise are greatly exaggerated.^
T nw-Oiialitv Challengers
In Table 7 .6 ,1 offer findings for House elections with low-quality challengers. 
Both challenger and incumbent spending are significant at the .001 level. Challenger 
spending (-.571) provides greater benefits than incumbent spending (.155), and is by far 
the strongest standardized coefficient in the model. The feet that low-quality challengers 
have very little going for them, in terms o f electoral firepower, means that every dollar 
spent yields large gains. The downside is that they usually raise a pittance of what 
incumbents raise, which counteracts the marginal advantage that they have. All
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Table 7.6 2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-House Campaigns
with Low-Quality Challengers
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables b B T
Incumbent Spending 1.841 .155 3.36***
Challenger Spending -4.154 -.571 -22.24***
Celebrity -1.704 -.022 -1.75**
Controversy -5.019 -.080 -6.05***
Scandal -10.509 -.099 -7.62***
Health -4.287 -.023 -1.80**
Party I.D. .109 .143 10.09***
Ideological Distance .013 .016 1.62*
Party -.216 -.011 -.80
R-Squared=. 51 
N=2939
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01
other things being equal, challengers who match incumbents in spending should prevail 
in the election. But all other things are not equal, and the obstacles faced by challengers 
are often to vast to overcome.
The two spending variables perform as the assumptions expressed in this 
dissertation would lead one to expect. The lack of awareness on the part o f the 
electorate for low-quality challengers, coupled with the scarcity o f comprehensive
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media coverage, creates an electoral environment in which challengers have virtually 
nothing else to rely on other than the amount of funds that they manage to scrape 
together. Expenditures aimed at communicating with potential voters are the only 
reliable option that low-quality challengers have in their quest to capture the public's 
imagination. They cannot rest on past laurels, current journalistic curiosity, or future 
favorable events. Their best bet is to spend whatever funds they have, and hope that 
this helps them gain a foothold in the campaign. This set of circumstances inevitably 
leads to a large discrepancy in the benefits that low-quality challengers and incumbents 
receive from expenditures.
All of the other coefficients in the equation are also significant. Once again, the 
weakest performer is the coefficient for an incumbent's ideological distance from the 
electorate. This variable performs poorly in each of the equations in this study. The 
variable is constructed by calculating the ideological disposition of incumbents through 
their roll-call votes in Congress and comparing these to a measure of their constituents' 
ideology. The fact that this variable performs poorly may point out the electorate's 
disinterest in how votes are cast in Washington D.C. An incumbent's party label and 
personal attributes may simply outweigh any perceived ideological drift in the minds of 
voters. Certainly a radical shift in an incumbent's ideological tenor could spell trouble, 
but most incumbents work hard to avoid this perception.
The significance of the celebrity coefficient is yet another indicator of the 
public's fascination with celebrities. In the realm of politics, logic would dictate that 
past political experience and a proven track-record are the most important 
qualifications for office. Whether or not someone appeared on a television show or met 
with success on an athletic field of play should be irrelevant Throughout this study, the 
strong performance of the celebrity variable shows just the opposite.
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Even a challenger with virtually no experience can generate a certain degree of 
heat by virtue of accomplishments outside the realm of politics. And o f course, we all 
know this to be true. The exciting thing about politics is that it exists free from the 
strict dictates o f logic. Sometimes things happen that do not seem to make any sense, 
especially in the raucous environment of campaigns. Campaigns are about people, and 
people always have been and always will be drawn to the famous, albeit in varying 
degrees.
The coefficients for controversy and scandal are also highly significant 
Incumbents facing low-quality challengers understand that they have a virtual lock on 
victory. The staggeringly high reelection rates to the House over the past few decades 
are proof of this. With this in mind, the one thing that incumbents should avoid at all 
costs is becoming embroiled in a messy controversy or ugly scandal. These things 
certainly tarnish an incumbent's image, and can possibly cause defeat Alas, how many 
times have we watched in disbelief as an incumbent pulls out a metaphorical gun and 
shoots himself or herself in the foot? And while such events produce a collective 
shudder from the other 534 members of Congress, they are seen as a sign o f hope to all 
those struggling challengers. Victory, sweet victory, can be delivered in the strangest of 
packages.
The variable for an incumbent's health has performed relatively well throughout 
this study. Politics can often be a harsh business and this is an example of that It has 
long been known that a suspect medical history is a barrier to candidates seeking to 
capture the White House. Apparently, poor health is also an impediment to reelection 
to Congress. Whether voters are wary of sending someone to Washington D.C. who 
may be unable to perform the requisite duties or whether these incumbents cede ground 
to their opponents because of an inability to campaign vigorously, incumbents with 
health concerns travel a tougher road than they otherwise would.
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Finally, a few more words about party identification. The coefficients for this 
variable have performed strongly in equations for both chambers. As politicians 
become increasingly comfortable using the communication tools offered by the 
information age, it is easy to assume that the trend toward personalized campaigns will 
accelerate. However, this assumption underestimates the important function that 
parties continue to have in our political system. An individual candidate's operation, 
even in a small House district, pales next to the political infrastructure that is 
maintained by the two major parties. No one disputes that charismatic politicians are 
often able to build loyal coalitions, but the results in these pages demonstrate that the 
banner under which they run remains influential.
CONCLUSION
With one exception, the results in this chapter basically conform to my overall 
theory. In House races, virtually every challenger is going to enter the race operating 
under a deficit in terms of recognition from the public. For high-quality challengers, 
that deficit should be smaller than for low-quality challengers. For this reason, the 
difference in the coefficients between incumbent and challenger spending should be 
smaller in contests with high-quality challengers than with low-quality challengers.
The equation for elections with high-quality challengers (Table 7.5) produces 
the only deviation from my overall expectations. In this equation, incumbent spending 
is insignificant. Rather than having fairly similar coefficients, challenger spending is 
considerably stronger. In fact, the difference between the betas from this equation and 
the equation for low-quality challengers (Table 7.6) is approximately the same. This 
indicates that both types o f challengers benefit equally well from expenditures.
This finding serves as an interesting sidenote. As we know from Jacobson's 
(1978) article, such counter-intuitive results often spark as much attention as the main
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conclusion. It is an issue that bears further analysis, but as I explain in the next chapter, 
it does not particularly call into question my theory. It is to this final chapter that I now 
turn.
ENDNOTES
1) There are instances where two incumbent U.S. Representatives square-off in an 
election due to redistricting. However, these elections are excluded from my 
analysis.
2) My regards to Mark Twain.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:
A LOOK BACK AND A LOOK FORWARD
In this chapter, I summarize the key findings from this dissertation, as well as 
discuss some areas for future research. As with any lengthy study, there is a 
voluminous amount of information contained in the preceding chapters. All of that 
information is here because I deem it relevant to the topic under consideration. But to 
paraphrase George Orwell, some pieces of information are more relevant than others. 
There are numerous instances where my research produced interesting and even 
surprising results. These instances are discussed in the text in the hope that they might 
spark additional avenues of inquiry. However, they do not directly relate to the central 
issue around which this entire enterprise revolves.
Ultimately, this dissertation is concerned with the campaign expenditures of 
congressional candidates, and how the benefits derived from those expenditures are 
affected by the electorate's recognition of the candidates. This is a topic that, though 
relatively new on the political science scene, has garnered quite a bit of attention. It 
attracts scholars because of its complex methodological issues and its possible impact 
on campaign finance reform. In undertaking this project, I hope to add to the existing 
literature by exploring areas that have been ignored and providing new evidence to 
support a traditional theory.
One of the main contributions of this work is the sheer amount of data that has 
been collected and analyzed. Previous studies have focused on elections for either the 
House or the Senate, and those focusing on the House have covered a small number of 
years. For the first time, this study provides a comprehensive examination of both 
chambers over a twenty year period. This comparative approach to the topic bolsters 
the generalizability of my findings, as well as provides a viable framework that can 
offer a degree of consistency to future research.
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THE THEORY
In his original 1978 article examining House elections, Gary Jacobson discovers 
that challengers receive greater benefits than incumbents from campaign expenditures. 
He reasons that this result centers around the communication aspects of congressional 
campaigns. Most of the spending that occurs in a campaign is intended, in one way or 
another, to acquaint the public with the candidate. For the most part, challengers are 
not as well-known as incumbents by the public. Therefore, any dollar that a challenger 
spends on communicating with the public is going to yield more than a dollar spent by 
an incumbent, simply because the challenger has more to gain in terms of public 
visibility.
Subsequent studies have yielded varying results, but all of these results confirm 
Jacobson's key conclusion: challengers get a bigger bang for the buck. The one 
exception is an article by Alan Gerber (1998) that examines the role of spending in 
Senate elections. He finds that incumbents and challengers equally benefit from 
spending, and if  anything, incumbents actually receive higher marginal returns on 
spending. Based on this finding, he questions the viability of Jacobson's theory.
The main objective of this dissertation is to demonstrate how these varying 
results are consistent with Jacobson's theory. The problem is that these two 
accomplished scholars are not approaching the subject from a broad enough viewpoint. 
Jacobson fails to make any nuanced distinction between different types of challengers 
(high-quality and low-quality), while Gerber fails to make any distinction between 
different types of elections (House elections and Senate elections). This study 
encompasses all of these critical elements in an attempt to bridge the gap that currently 
exists in the literature on campaign spending.
The voter recognition theory that serves to guide this dissertation is a logical 
extension of Jacobson's theory. By elaborating on some critical elements from his
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theory, I provide a way o f looking at campaign spending that is applicable to all 
congressional elections at all times. Basically, the theory focuses on the different 
electoral environments within which House and Senate candidates operate.
The Senate is the more prestigious of the two chambers. Consequently, 
elections for the Senate tend to be more competitive than elections for the House. A 
primary determinant of electoral competitiveness is the quality of the challenger. 
Incumbents have the experience and resources to run effective campaigns, but 
challengers vary in this regard. High-quality challengers are those that have previous 
experience in an important elective office, while low-quality challengers lack this 
experience. Because of this experience, high-quality challengers enjoy a higher level of 
recognition ffom the public than low-quality challengers. Thus, Senate elections differ 
from House elections because they attract high-quality challengers who are well-known 
by the public.
If the benefits that challengers receive from expenditures are inversely related to 
the level of recognition that voters have of these challengers, then low-quality 
challengers should receive greater benefits from spending than high-quality challengers. 
Since incumbents from both chambers maintain high levels of recognition among the 
electorate, the difference in spending benefits between incumbents and challengers is 
determined by the quality of challengers. Low-quality challengers should receive much 
greater benefits than incumbents, while high-quality challengers should receive benefits 
that are roughly equal to incumbents. Thus, the difference in spending benefits between 
incumbents and challengers is smaller in Senate elections than in House elections.
THE EVIDENCE
In order for the voter recognition theory to be valid, three key assumptions must 
be true. First, the difference between the coefficients for incumbent spending and 
challenger spending should be larger in elections with low-quality challengers than in
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elections with high-quality challengers. In Tables 6.5 and 6 .6 ,1 present results for 
Senate elections. In elections with low-quality challengers, the standardized (beta) 
coefficient for challenger spending is -.845 and for incumbent spending is .581. Setting 
aside the negative sign, which merely proves that the coefficient is in the proper 
direction, the difference between these coefficients is .264. In elections with high- 
quality challengers, the beta for challenger spending is -.408 and for incumbent 
spending is .407; a difference of .001. As predicted, the difference in spending benefits 
is larger in elections with low-quality challengers.
In Tables 7.5 and 7.6,1 present results for House elections. In elections with 
low-quality challengers, the beta for challenger spending is -.571 and for incumbent 
spending is .155; a difference of .416. In elections with high-quality challengers, the 
beta for challenger spending is -.689 and for incumbent spending is .251; a difference 
of .438. It is also worth noting that incumbent spending is not significant in the 
equation for high-quality challengers. In House elections, the predicted differences do 
not come to fruition. However, this is not a major blow to the veracity o f the theory due 
to the second key assumption.
The second assumption is that Senate elections will attract more high-quality 
challengers than House elections. As shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, of the 279 
challengers in Senate elections, 98 of them were designated as high-quality. O f the 
3550 challengers in House elections, 220 o f them were designated as high-quality It 
now becomes clear why the single exception to my correctly predicted results—House 
elections with high-quality challengers-is not as crucial as one might think. Only a 
mere 6% of total House elections fall into this category. In contrast, a respectable 35% 
of total Senate elections involve high-quality challengers. With the set o f deviating 
elections representing such a minuscule percentage o f the overall data set, it does not 
disrupt the overall legitimacy of the theory.
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We now know that Senate elections have more high-quality challengers than 
House elections, and that high-quality challengers receive smaller marginal returns on 
expenditures than low-quality challengers. This brings us to the third and final 
assumption. The difference in spending coefficients for incumbents and challengers in 
all Senate elections should be smaller than the difference in spending coefficients for 
incumbents and challengers in all House elections.
In Tables 6.4 and 7.4,1 present the relevant results. In Senate elections, the beta 
for challenger spending is -.778 and for incumbent spending is .546; a difference of 
.232. In House elections, the beta for challenger spending is -.546 and for incumbent 
spending is . 164; a difference of .382. As predicted, the difference in spending benefits 
is larger in House elections. And focusing entirely on challengers, we see that the 
standardized coefficient for challenger spending in House elections is .232 points higher 
than that for challenger spending in Senate elections. For all intents and purposes, all 
three key assumptions are supported by the evidence.
As the above summary of the evidence demonstrates, challengers do receive 
greater benefits from spending than incumbents i f  those challengers are not as 
recognizable to the electorate as incumbents. That important "if' is what my voter 
recognition theory highlights. Jacobson concludes that all challengers get higher 
returns on spending, while Gerber concludes that no challengers get higher returns on 
spending, but the truth lies somewhere in between. The determination of challenger 
spending benefits is conditional, rather than absolute.
Challengers receive these benefits on the condition that they are relatively 
obscure. Low-quality challengers are relatively obscure and tend to populate House 
elections, so challengers receive greater benefits in those elections. High-quality 
challengers are relatively well-known and tend to gravitate toward Senate elections, so 
challengers receive lesser benefits in those elections. This is how one can arrive at
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different results that serve to support the same theory. The theory predicts different 
results depending on the environment within which congressional elections take place.
FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several areas that are prime candidates for future research. One area 
centers around the finding of insignificance for the incumbent spending coefficient in 
that set of House elections involving high-quality challengers. This is the one truly 
unexpected result in the whole dissertation. Why does incumbent spending play such a 
minor role in these elections? The initial thing that I would like to test is whether my 
classification o f high-quality and low-quality challengers needs to be refined for House 
races. Specifically, should state representatives and state senators be placed in the same 
category?
For Senate races, I place all state legislators into the "minor office" category. 
These offices do not give candidates the type of statewide exposure that is necessary to 
wage competitive Senate campaigns. The results in this study appear to support my 
decision. For House races, 1 divide state representatives into the "minor office" 
category and state senators into the "major office" category. The latter decision seemed 
warranted due to the fact that many state Senate districts are as large, and in a few cases 
even larger, than U.S. House districts. * However, the small geographic size and 
compact media market of many House districts may allow even state representatives to 
gain a foothold in these races. An industrious state representative campaigning 
diligently would have the opportunity to make himself or herself known to voters.
By placing all state legislators into the "major office" category for House 
elections, I would increase the number of cases in this particular data set, and perhaps 
generate results that are more in line with expectations. Even if the results remain the 
same, it is still beneficial to pursue this line of inquiry because of the need to arrive at a 
universal classification for challengers. As 1 mention in the literature review, scholars
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employ various means for determining challenger political quality. The use of a single 
classification system would facilitate the comparison of results and enable this research 
agenda to move forward in a more orderly fashion. A better understanding of where 
state legislators fit into the mix would help in this endeavor.
Another possible line of future research concerns the methods used for 
measuring voter recognition of challengers. Like other researchers, I use the challenger 
political quality variable as a proxy for a challenger’s level of visibility. Challengers 
who have served in prestigious offices are going to be more well-known by the public 
than challengers who do not have such experience. This is sound logic and the variable 
works fine as a proxy. But it is a proxy.
If given a  choice, every researcher prefers to measure a phenomenon directly, 
rather than rely on an indirect measurement Of course, this is not always possible. 
Researchers operate under temporal and financial constraints that force them to adopt 
more pragmatic methods. The optimum situation is to conduct research without any 
constraints. In fact, if you stroll through university hallways, you are prone to hear 
professors speaking with childlike wonder about the possibilities that arise out of 
unlimited funding. What would unlimited funding mean for the measurement of voter 
recognition?
The best measurements that exist for the public's awareness of candidates are 
derived from political surveys. All across the country, people are asked various 
questions aimed at determining the extent of their political knowledge. One such 
question measures the percentage o f the public who are able to recall or recognize a 
challenger's name. This is the most direct way to measure that variable.
The problem is that every two years there are approximately 468 congressional 
elections, which means that there are approximately 468 different polls that one would
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have to collect in each election cycle. This would require the resources to acquire 
access to the various newspapers and television news broadcasts where these poll 
results are reported. Even if this is possible, there may be some districts or some years 
where this survey question was not asked. There may be instances where the timing of 
the surveys are suspect; occurring too late in the campaign season to accurately gauge 
voter recognition of challengers at the beginning of the campaign. Such informational 
gaps would frustrate attempts to conduct both cross-sectional and longitudinal studies.
In order to prevent such gaps, one would need to conduct separate surveys in 
each state and in each House district. By conducting your own survey, you would 
ensure that you are getting the information that you want at the time in the campaign 
when you want it. You would also ensure the type of continuity that makes the Gallup 
surveys of presidential approval so valuable. A single national survey would not 
provide the necessary number of respondents needed in each district for a reliable 
measure of that district's awareness of its House challenger, so the separate surveys 
would be appropriate.
Obviously, the expense required to mount this kind of operation is prohibitive. 
However, a research grant could provide someone with the opportunity to collect 
information from various existing polls. Though not perfect, this approach would yield 
enough data to perform new analyses, and serve as a first step toward a universal 
measure for this variable. The information gleaned from these polls also could be used 
in research focusing on other topics. In any event, it is an area worth pursuing.
Finally, the campaign spending research agenda would benefit by moving 
beyond elections between incumbents and challengers. The basic assumptions behind 
the voter recognition theory are transferable to open seat elections. Different variables
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would need to be substituted for the incumbent variables in the spending equation, but 
this is fairly easily done. One would just need to determine what factors are critical to 
the success of one candidate over another in open seat races.
As for challenger political quality, it would affect spending in much the same 
way as it does for incumbents and challengers. The candidate who has a higher degree 
of recognition from the electorate should receive smaller benefits from campaign 
expenditures. Whereas incumbents are almost always considered to be the better 
known of the two candidates, in open seat elections this does not apply. In some ways, 
the absence of powerful incumbency advantages should allow spending to play an even 
more important role. However, other factors like party identification could fill the void. 
Studying open seat elections would provide answers to these questions, and provide 
researchers with a more complete picture of campaign spending.
CONCLUSION
The issue of campaign spending is as timely as it is important. Many citizens 
feel disconnected from the political process and distrustful of political leaders. One of 
the ways to remedy this problem is to make the political process more responsive to the 
needs of ordinary Americans. And one o f the ways to make the system more responsive 
is to eliminate the disparity that exists in terms of the influence that wealthy Americans 
wield in comparison to ordinary Americans.
The fact that candidates benefit from spending means that they will try to 
acquire as much money as they can for their campaigns. This is a rational response.
The fact that wealthy citizens gain access to candidates through donations means that 
they will be willing to give money to those campaigns. This is a rational response. The 
fact that both of these actions are rational means that they will continue unless a third 
party steps in and puts a halt to i t
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The purpose o f this dissertation is not to recommend policy prescriptions for 
campaign finance reform. I simply want to point out that some type of reform to the 
present system is needed, unless you happen to support the wealthy being able to drown 
out the voices of others through large donations. I do not To paraphrase one of the 
Supreme Court justices during a recent case concerning the constitutionality of limiting 
campaign contributions, the First Amendment guarantees you the right to free speech, 
but not the right to have that speech amplified by a megaphone.
This issue has been debated for decades and will probably be debated for 
decades to come. The literature on campaign spending can serve to provide that debate 
with objective, relevant facts. It is my hope that this dissertation adds to the literature 
and informs the debate. If so, then I have fulfilled my duty as a scholar and an 
American.
ENDNOTES
1) For example, California has some state legislative districts that are bigger than U.S.
House districts.
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 













The percentage of the two-party vote received by the 
incumbent.
The amount o f total campaign expenditures by the 
incumbent in real 1982-84 dollars.
The amount o f total campaign expenditures by the 
challenger in real 1982-84 dollars.
A dichotomous variable coded I if the challenger was a 
governor.
A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger was a 
senator.
A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger was a 
representative.
A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger was a 
statewide official or mayor o f an important city.
A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger was a 
state legislator or local official.
A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger 
achieved prominence through activities other than holding 
elective office.
A dichotomous variable coded 1 if incidents called the 
incumbent's honesty, judgment, or competence into 
question.
A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the incumbent was 
alleged to have been involved in illegal activities.
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Table A.1 cont
Name Description
Health A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the incumbent's 
physical condition was an apparent political problem.
Unemployment The unemployment rate for the state.
Unemployment*Party The unemployment rate interacted with a variable that is 
coded 1 if the incumbent belonged to the governing party.
Party I.D. An estimate of a state's/district's partisan make-up based 
on pooled survey data compiled by Erikson, Wright, and 
Mclver (1993) and an estimation procedure developed by 
Ardoin and Garand (2000). The figure is the 
percentage point difference between the number of 
respondents identifying with the incumbent's party and 
those identifying with the opposite party.
Ideological Distance A measure of the distance between the voting record of 
incumbents and the ideological make-up of their 
state/district. The voting record is culled from ADA and 
ACU ratings, while state/district ideology is measured 
using the same procedure as that for party identification.
Census The population of the state/district as determined by the 
United States census.
Wealth A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger was 
considered wealthy.
Party A dichotomous variable coded 1 for the Democratic party
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APPENDIX B: PARTISAN AND IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION
Table B.l Partisan Identification in the United States
State Rep. Ind. Dem. Mean N
Alabama 23.4% 322% 44.4% 21.1 2.419
Alaska — — — -11.0 —
Arizona 34.7 29.9 35.4 0.6 1.767
Arkansas 202 32.8 46.8 26.5 1.727
California 33.3 272 39.4 6 2 14.773
Colorado 32.6 388 28.6 -4.0 1.863
Conn. 24.5 432 322 7.8 2269
Delaware 28.7 40.6 30.7 2.0 443
Florida 32.7 27.9 39.3 6.6 7.466
Georgia 21.0 31.0 48.0 27.0 3.814
Hawaii — — — 7.0 —
Idaho 37 3 390 23.8 -13.5 724
Illinois 28.7 36.5 34.8 6.1 7.0%
Indiana 32.9 36.0 31.2 -1.7 3.964
Iowa 32.4 38.1 29.6 -2.8 2230
Kansas 38.3 32.7 29.0 -9.3 2,037
Kentucky 25.5 24.8 49.8 24.3 2.458
Louisiana 20.0 24.7 S5.3 352 2,405
Maine 27.0 43.5 29.5 2.4 777
Maryland 247 29.4 46.4 222 2.9%
Mass. 15.8 50.0 342 18.3 4.158
Michigan 29.8 38.3 31.9 2.1 6.806
Minnesota 27.3 35.8 36.8 9.5 3.181
Mississippi 270 292 438 16.7 1.416
Missouri 26.8 38.6 34.6 7.8 3283
Montana 27.4 40.4 322 4.7 594
Nebraska 402 28.9 30.9 -92 1252
Nevada 31.8 312 37.0 5.1 487
N.H. 31.8 462 21.8 • 10.0 760
N J. 27.5 39.9 32.6 5.1 5252
N.M. 26.3 31.7 42.0 15.7 843
N.Y. 29.7 32.6 37.7 8.0 11299
N.C. 27.6 25.8 46.6 19.0 3.885
N.D. 36.2 36.6 27.3 -8.9 495
Ohio 31.0 33.6 35.4 4.4 7.778
Oklahoma 29.9 192 50.8 20.9 2.115
Oregon 312 302 38.6 7.4 2,063
Penn. 34.8 26.8 38.4 3.7 8.710
R.I. 15.5 56.4 2 82 12.7 614
S.C. 27.5 332 39.2 11.7 2204
S.D. 38.4 21.3 40.3 2.0 717
Tenn. 26.5 342 392 12.9 3.149
Texas 26.1 34.5 39.4 13.4 9.6%
Utah 41.9 33.5 24.5 -17.4 966
Vermont 28.6 48.0 23.4 -5.1 448
Virginia 29.4 37.9 32.7 3.3 4245
Washington 24.0 44.1 31.9 7.8 3.179
W.V 28.6 22.7 48.7 20.1 1259
Wisconsin 27.1 38.7 342 7.1 3.413
Wyoming 34.5 35.1 302 -42 333
Note: These percentages are derived from CBS/NYT national surveys conducted from
1976 to 1988.
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Table B.2 Ideological Identification in the United States
State Con. Mod. Lib. Mean* N
Alabama 40.5% 42.0% 17.5% 23.1 2,142
Alaska — — — 25.0 —
Arizona 37 4 43.4 19 2 18.2 1,578
Arkansas 368 44.6 18.6 18.3 1,528
California 31.6 43.1 25.4 6.2 13,369
Colorado 31.3 46.1 2X6 8.6 1,724
Conn. 29.4 45.6 25.0 4.4 2,095
Delaware 32.0 48.2 198 12.2 409
Honda 37.1 42.9 20.0 17.1 6,735
Georgia 36.6 446 18.8 17.7 3,443
Hawaii — — — 6.0 —
Idaho 42.5 42.9 14.6 279 666
Illinois 32.5 45 I 22.4 10.1 6,456
Indiana 36.0 44.7 19.3 16.7 3,510
Iowa 33.0 47 5 19.5 13.5 1,980
Kansas 36.5 42.9 20.6 159 1.810
Kentucky 33.7 45.8 20.5 13.2 2.103
Louisiana 40.0 43.0 17.0 23.0 2,119
Maine 36.1 42.6 21.3 14.7 685
Maryland 304 44.8 24.8 5.7 2,723
Mass. 28.2 44.5 27.3 0.8 3,704
Michigan 31.6 45.6 22.8 8.8 6,135
Minnesota 33.2 46.5 20.4 12.8 2.942
Mississippi 41 2 43.0 158 25.4 1X23
Missouri 34.4 46.7 18.9 15.5 3,167
Montana 34.3 42.5 23.2 I I I 551
Nebraska 37.5 43.7 188 18.7 1.128
Nevada 29.6 41.0 294 0.2 446
NIL 34.2 44.5 21 3 12.8 685
N.J. 30.1 43.2 26.7 3.4 4.833
NM. 36.2 43.6 20.2 16.0 746
N.Y 304 42.4 273 3.1 10,619
NC 37.8 45.1 17.1 20.7 3.326
N.D 40 5 456 13.9 26.6 447
Ohio 32.4 452 22.3 10.1 7,013
Oklahoma 42.0 43.4 14.7 27.3 1.866
Oregon 32.8 42.3 24.9 7.9 1.890
Penn. 33.0 445 22.4 10.6 7,783
R.I. 29.0 44.1 26.9 2.1 562
S.C. 39.8 41.8 18.4 214 2.128
S.D. 38.4 47.2 14.4 24.1 627
Tenn. 366 43 3 20.1 16.6 2,764
Texas 406 42.0 17.4 23.2 8,745
Utah 44.1 39.7 16 1 28.0 868
Vermont 348 41.7 23 5 11.4 405
Virginia 370 43.9 19.1 17.9 3,948
Washington 29.2 47.5 23.3 5.9 2.915
W.V. 32.2 44.8 230 92 1.348
Wisconsin 32.6 45.4 22.1 10.5 3,113
Wyoming 39.7 38.4 21.9 17.8 292
* Since none of the states have a positive number, interpretation is made easier by 
simply dropping the negative sign. Thus, states with a higher number are 
ideologically more conservative.
Note: These percentages are derived from CBS/NYT surveys from 1976 to 1988.
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APPENDIX C: INCUMBENT CONTROVERSY OR SCANDAL
Table C .l House Campaigns Involving Incumbent Controversy or Scandal, 1974-94
Year State DistrktCategorization Name/Party
1974 Arkansas 2 controversy Wilbur Mills (D)
1974 Idaho 1 controversy Steven Symms (R)
1974 Indiana 2 controversy Earl Landgrebe (R)
1974 Indiana 11 controversy William Hudnut (R)
1974 Kentucky 4 controversy M. G. Synder (R)
1974 Massachusetts 4 controversy Robert Drinan (D)
1974 Minnesota 3 scandal Bill Frenzel (R)
1974 New Jersey 9 controversy Henry Helstoski (D)
1974 New Jersey 13 controversy Joseph Maraziti (R)
1974 New York 3 scandal Angelo Roncallo (R)
1974 Ohio 9 controversy Thomas Ashley (D)
1974 Oklahoma 1 controversy James Jones (D)
1974 Pennsylvania 9 controversy E. G. Shuster (R)
1976 California 4 scandal Robert Leggett (D)
1976 California 11 controversy Leo Ryan (D)
1976 Florida 1 controversy Robert Sikes (D)
1976 Idaho 2 scandal George Hansen (R)
1976 Kansas 2 controversy Martha Keys (D)
1976 New Jersey 9 scandal Henry Helstoski (D)
1976 Oklahoma 1 scandal James Jones (D)
1976 Pennsylvania 11 controversy Daniel Flood (D)
1976 South Carolina 6 controversy John Jenrette (D)
1976 Texas 14 controversy John Young (D)
1976 Utah 2 scandal Allan Howe (D)
1978 California 14 scandal John McFall (D)
1978 California 25 scandal Edward Roybal (D)
1978 California 31 scandal Charles Wiison (D)
1978 Florida 12 scandal J. Herbert Burke (R)
1978 Idaho 2 controversy George Hansen (R)
1978 Indiana 3 controversy John Brademas (D)
1978 Michigan 13 scandal Charles Diggs Jr.(D)
1978 New Jersey 15 controversy Edward Patten (D)
1978 New York 29 controversy Edward Pattison (D)
1978 Ohio 19 controversy Charles Carney (D)
1978 Pennsylvania 4 scandal Joshua Eilberg (D)
1978 Pennsylvania 11 scandal Daniel Flood (D)
1978 Rhode Island 1 controversy Fernand Germain (D)
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Table C .l cont
Year State District Categorization Name/Party
1978 Texas 5 controversy Jim Mattox (D)
1978 Washington 7 controversy John Cunningham (R)
1978 Wisconsin 1 controversy Les Aspin (D)
1980 Iowa 6 scandal Berkley Bedell (D)
1980 Maryland 1 scandal Robert Bauman (R)
1980 Massachusetts 6 scandal Nicholas Mavroules (D)
1980 Michigan 10 scandal Don Albosta (D)
1980 Mississippi 4 scandal Jon Hinson (R)
1980 Missouri 10 controversy Bill Burlison (D)
1980 New Jersey 4 scandal Frank Thompson (D)
1980 New York 17 scandal John Murphy (D)
1980 Pennsylvania 3 scandal Raymond Lederer (D)
1980 Pennsylvania 12 scandal John Murtha (D)
1980 South Carolina 6 scandal John Jenrette Jr. (D)
1982 California 15 controversy Tony Coelho (D)
1982 Delaware 1 controversy Thomas Evans Jr.(R)
1982 Idaho 1 controversy Larry Craig (R)
1982 Idaho 2 controversy George Hansen (R)
1982 North Carolina 7 controversy Charlie Rose (D)
1984 Idaho 2 scandal George Hansen (R)
1984 Illinois 19 controversy Daniel Crane (R)
1984 Massachusetts 10 controversy Gerry Studds (D)
1984 Ohio 1 controversy Thomas Luken (D)
1986 California 41 controversy Bill Lowery (R)
1986 New Mexico 3 controversy Bill Richardson (D)
1986 New York 27 controversy George Wortley (R)
1986 North Carolina 7 controversy Charlie Rose (D)
1986 Pennsylvania 15 controversy Don Ritter (R)
1986 Rhode Island 1 scandal Fernand Germain (D)
1986 Tennessee 5 scandal Bill Boner (D)
1986 Texas 14 controversy Mac Sweeney (R)
1988 California 44 controversy Jim Bates (D)
1988 Florida 4 controversy Bill Chappell Jr. (D)
1988 Georgia 4 scandal Pat Swindall (R)
1988 Maryland 1 controversy Roy Dyson (D)
1988 Missouri 8 controversy Bill Emerson (R)
1988 Oklahoma I controversy James Inhofe (R)
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Table C.1 cont.
Year State District Categorization Name/Party
1990 Alabama 2 controversy Bill Dickinson (R)
1990 California 17 controversy Charles Pashayan (R)
1990 California 44 controversy Jim Bates (D)
1990 Georgia 10 controversy Doug Barnard Jr.(D)
1990 Illinois 11 controversy Frank Annunzio (D)
1990 Maryland 1 controversy Roy Dyson (D)
1990 Minnesota 7 controversy Arlan Strangeland (R)
1990 Rhode Island 1 controversy Ronald Machtley (R)
1992 Colorado 2 controversy David Skaggs (D)
1992 Connecticut 5 controversy Gary Franks (R)
1992 Illinois 20 controversy Richard Durbin (D)
1992 Indiana 7 controversy John Myers (R)
1992 Indiana 8 controversy Frank McCloskey (D)
1992 Iowa 3 controversy Jim Ross Lightfoot (R)
1992 Kansas 4 controversy Dan Glickman (D)
1992 Massachusetts 3 controversy Joseph Early (D)
1992 Massachusetts 6 scandal Nicholas Mavroules (D)
1992 Michigan 9 controversy Dale Kildee (D)
1992 Michigan 10 controversy David Bonior (D)
1992 Minnesota 6 controversy Gerry Sikorski (D)
1992 Missouri 5 controversy Alan Wheat (D)
1992 New Hampshire 2 controversy Dick Swett (D)
1992 New Jersey 9 controversy Robert Torricelli (D)
1992 New York I controversy George Hochbrueckner (D)
1992 New York 2 controversy Thomas Downey (D)
1992 New York 5 controversy Gary Ackerman (D)
1992 New York 7 controversy Thomas Manton (D)
1992 North Carolina 3 controversy Martin Lancaster (D)
1992 Ohio 6 controversy Bob McEwen (R)
1992 Ohio 10 controversy Mary Rose Oakar (D)
1992 Pennsylvania 3 controversy Robert Borski (D)
1992 Pennsylvania 8 controversy Peter Kostmayer (D)
1992 Pennsylvania 19 controversy Bill Goodling (R)
1992 Pennsylvania 20 controversy Austin Murphy (D)
1992 Rhode Island 1 controversy Ronald Machtley (R)
1992 Texas 2 controversy Charles Wilson (D)
1992 Texas 12 controversy Pete Geren (D)
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Table C.1 cont
Year State District Categorization Name/Party
1992 Texas 16 controversy Ronald Coleman (D)
1992 Texas 23 controversy Albert Bustamante (D)
1992 Texas 25 controversy Michael Andrews (D)
1992 Wisconsin 6 controversy Thomas Petri (R)
1994 California 43 scandal Ken Calvert (R)
1994 Nevada 1 controversy James Bilbray (D)
1994 Texas 14 controversy Greg Laughlin (D)
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Table C.2 Senate Campaigns Involving Incumbent Controversy or Scandal, 1974-94
Year State Categorization Name/Party
1974 Alaska controversy Mike Gravel (D)
1974 Colorado controversy Peter Dominick (R)
1974 Washington controversy Warren Magnuson (D)
1976 Indiana controversy Vance Hartke (D)
1976 Maryland controversy Glenn Beall Jr. (R)
1976 Nevada controversy Howard Cannon (D)
1976 New Mexico scandal Joseph Montoya (D)
1978 Massachusetts scandal Edward Brooke (R)
1978 Michigan controversy Robert Griffin (R)
1978 Texas controversy John Tower (R)
1978 West Virginia controversy Jennings Randolph (D)
1980 Georgia controversy Herman Talmadge (D)
1980 Kentucky scandal Wendell Ford (D)
1980 Missouri controversy Thomas Eagleton (D)
1984 Iowa scandal Roger Jepsen (R)
1984 Oregon controversy Mark Hatfield (R)
1986 Idaho controversy Steven Symms (R)
1986 New York controversy Alfonse D'Amato (R)
1986 North Dakota controversy Mark Andrews (R)
1986 Ohio scandal John Glenn (D)
1986 South Dakota controversy James Abdnor (R)
1986 Wisconsin scandal Bob Kasten (R)
1988 Minnesota controversy Dave Durenberger (R)
1990 Delaware controversy Joseph Biden (D)
1990 Illinois controversy Paul Simon (D)
1992 Arizona controversy John McCain (R)
1992 New York controversy Alfonse D' Amato (R)
1992 Ohio controversy John Glenn (D)
1994 Massachusetts controversy Edward Kennedy (D)
1994 Montana controversy Conrad Bums (R)
1994 Texas scandal Kay Bailey Hutchison (R)
1994 Virginia controversy Chuck Robb (D)
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APPENDIX D: CELEBRITY CHALLENGERS 
Table D.l Celebrity Challengers in House Campaigns, 1974-94
Year State & District Reason for Celebrity Name/Party
1974 Indiana 4 member o f prominent family Walter Hehnke (R)
1974 Nevada 1 member o f prominent family James Santini (D)
1974 New York 29 member o f prominent family Edward Pattison (D)
1974 North Carolina 6 war hero & college athlete R.S. Ritchie (R)
1974 North Carolina 8 television performer W.G. Hefner (D)
1976 Colorado 2 television personality Ed Scott (R)
1976 Missouri 5 addressed Rep. Convention Joanne Collins (R)
1976 South Carolina 5 professional athlete Robert Richardson (R)
1976 Vermont 1 nationally known attorney John Burgess (D)
1978 Alabama 1 college athlete L.W. Noonan (D)
1978 California 27 Gregory Peck's son Carey Peck (D)
1978 Colorado 2 television personality Ed Scott (R)
1978 Missouri 2 television journalist Robert Chase (R)
1978 Virginia 1 son of decorated soldier Lew Puller (D)
1980 California 27 Gregory Peck's son Carey Peck (D)
1980 California 43 leader of state KKK Tom Metzger (D)
1980 Connecticut 4 noted scientist John Phillips (D)
1980 Indiana 3 member o f prominent family John Hiler (R)
1980 New York 23 noted businessman Andrew Albanese (R)
1980 New York 39 noted civic leader James Abdella (R)
1980 Ohio 2 television journalist Tom Atkins (R)
1980 Ohio 12 television personality Robert Shamansky (D)
1982 California 32 brother of U.S. Rep Brian Lungren (R)
1982 Florida 19 television journalist Glenn Rinker (R)
1982 Massachusetts 10 noted businessman John Conway (R)
1982 North Carolina 3 decorated soldier Eugene McDaniel (R)
1984 California 27 professional athlete Robert Scribner (R)
1984 Delaware 1 wife o f governor Elise du Pont (R)
1984 Missouri 2 radio personality John Buechner (R)
1984 Nebraska 2 member o f prominent family Tom Cavanaugh (D)
1984 Ohio 9 television journalist Frank Venner (R)
1986 Colorado 3 Olympic gold medalist Ben N. Campbell (D)
1986 Georgia 4 actor Ben Jones (D)
1986 Maryland 2 R.F.K.'s daughter Kathleen K. Townsend (D)
1986 Missouri 8 led demonstration Wayne Cryts (D)
1986 West Virginia 3 television journalist Tim Sharp (R)
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Table D.l cont.
Year State & District Reason for Celebrity Name/Party
1988 Pennsylvania 15 member of prominent family Ed Reibman (D)
1988 Georgia 4 actor Ben Jones (D)
1988 Tennessee 3 television personality Harold Coker (R)
1990 Alaska 1 part of Exxon Valdez event John Devens(D)
1990 California 37 actor Ralph Waite (D)
1990 Missouri 8 member of prominent family Russ Carnahan (D)
1990 West Virginia 2 college athlete Oliver Luck (R)
1992 California 42 flew plane around world Dick Rutan (R)
1992 Minnesota 6 television journalist Rod Grams (R)
1992 New Jersey 4 member of prominent family Brian Hughes (D)
1994 Arizona 6 sportscaster J. D. Hayworth (R)
1994 Florida 5 drag-racing icon Don Garlits (R)
1994 Nevada 2 best-selling author Janet Greeson (D)
1994 North Carolina 3 son o f former U.S. Rep Walter Jones Jr. (R)
1994 North Carolina 11 television journalist Maggie P. Lauterer (D)
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Table D.2 Celebrity Challengers in Senate Campaigns, 1974-94
Year State Reason for Celebrity Name/Parly
1974 South Dakota former Vietnam P.O.W. Leo Thorsness (R)
1976 California prominent academic S. I. Hayakawa (R)
1976 New Mexico astronaut Harrison Schmitt (R)
1976 New York former ambassador to U.N. D.P. Moynihan (D)
1984 Michigan astronaut Jack Lousma (R)
1986 Wisconsin executive director of NFLPA Ed Garvey (D)
1988 Minnesota son o f Hubert Humphrey Hubert Humphrey III (D)
1988 Nebraska "dashing" war hero Robert Kerrey (D)
1988 New Jersey football star Pete Dawkins (R)
1994 Virginia involvment in Iran-Contra Oliver North (R)
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APPENDIX E: REDUCED FORM EQUATIONS 
Table E .l Reduced Form Regression for Incumbent Spending in Senate Elections
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Spending
Independent Variables b B T
Governor .284 .063 1.20
Senator -.414 -.037 -.73
U.S.Rep .322 .130 2.33***
Major .293 .101 1.84**
Minor -.096 -.044 -.79
Celebrity .424 .083 1.60*
Controversy .228 .069 1.38*
Scandal -.474 -.078 -1.52*
Unemployment -.052 -.116 -2.18**
Unemploy* Party .015 .058 .97
Party I.D. .127 .077 1.19
Ideological Distance -.036 -.028 -1.28*
Census -.090 -.009 -9.25***
Wealth .102 .121 .84
Party -.275 -.145 -2.47***
R-Squared=.49
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01 N==279
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Table E.2 Reduced Form Regression for Challenger Spending in Senate Elections
Dependent Variable: Challenger Spending
Independent Variables b B T
Governor 1.688 .257 4.72***
Senator 1.243 .075 1.46*
U.S. Rep 1.241 .341 5.94***
Major 1.407 .333 5.86***
Minor .269 .084 1.46*
Celebrity 1.308 .175 3.26***
Controversy .543 .112 2.16**
Scandal
OOfN -.031 -.59
Unemployment -.044 -.067 -1.23
Unemploy*Party .005 .015 .24
Party I.D. .056 .089 1.60*
Ideological Distance .010 .012 1.11
Census -.064 -.229 -4.33***
Wealth .706 .200 3.84***
Party .023 .008 .14
R-Squared=42
N=279
Note: *<.10 **<05 ***<01
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Table E J  Reduced Form Regression for Incumbent Spending in House Elections
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Spending
Independent Variables b B T
Governor .371 .010 .69
Senator .892 .018 1.17
U.S. Rep .731 .098 6.34***
Major .517 .135 8.63***
Minor .374 .154 9.83***
Celebrity .421 .062 4.00***
Controversy .428 .079 5.10***
Scandal .174 .019 1.27
Health .043 .002 .16
Party I.D. .006 .109 6.59***
Ideological Distance .050 .047 1.08
Population -4.660 -.260 -16.72***
Wealth .241 .087 5.58***
Party -.054 -.032 -1.96**
R-Squared=48
N=3567
Note: *<.10 **<05 ***<01
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Table E.4 Reduced Form Regression for Challenger Spending in House Elections
Dependent Variable: Challenger Spending
Independent Variables b B T
Governor .334 .006 .39
Senator 1.259 .016 1.05
U.S. Rep 1.582 .139 8.67***
Major 1.249 .213 13.12***
Minor .933 .247 15.22***
Celebrity 1.171 .113 7.05***
Controversy .829 .101 6.25***
Scandal .860 .061 3.84***
Health .727 .027 1.71**
Party I.D. .015 .139 8.23***
Ideological Distance .086 .018 1.30*
Population -2.342 -.008 -.51
Wealth .660 .152 9.43***
Party .087 .032 1.91**
R-Squared=45
N=3186
Note: *<10 **<05 ***<01
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APPENDIX F: SAMPLE STATISTICS
Table F.l Sample Statistics for Variables in the Model—House
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Incumbent Vote % 65.18 10.25 26.0 96.4
Incumbent $ 279,890 220,402 0 2,384,676
Challengers 123,576 169,361 0 2,422,318
Incumbent $ PV .55 .41 .00 5.10
Challenger $ PV .25 .33 .00 4.62
Party I.D. 10.31 13.18 -16.70 35.40
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Table F.2 Sample Statistics for Variables in the Model-Senate
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Incumbent Vote % 59.13 9.36 37.50 83.20
Incumbent $ 2,453,085 2,256,911 0 16,282,540
Challenger $ 1,316,491 2,025,352 0 20,222,466
Incumbent $ PV .94 .90 .00 5.97
Challenger $ PV .47 .65 .00 6.11
Party I.D. 6.51 10.48 -17.4 27.0
Unemployment 6.57 2.10 2.20 15.50












Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Nicholas Chad Long was bom in Gadsden, Alabama on April 16,1971. Raised in the 
South, he developed a passion for politics as a young child. He cast his first ballot for 
Jimmy Carter in a 1980 mock presidential election at his elementary school. He later 
achieved glory by winning an election for governor in the eighth grade. After realizing 
that his dream of becoming a professional tennis player was not meant to be, he 
enrolled at Northeast Louisiana University. He earned a bachelor’s degree from that 
institution in 1993. He remained in his home state for graduate school. He received a 
master's degree in 1998 and a doctorate in 2001 from Louisiana State University.
162
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT
Candidate: N icholas Chad Long
Major Fiald: P o l i t i c a l  Science
Title of Dissertation: Show Me th e  Money: An A n a ly s is  o f th e  Im pact o f







O ctober 31, 2001
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
